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BROADCASTING, THE RELUCTANT DRAGON:
WILL THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS
END THE SUPPRESSING OF CONTROVERSIAL IDEAS?
Donald M. Malone*
You see all the other fellows were so active and earnest and
all that sort of thing-always rampaging, and skirmishing, and
scouring the desert sands, and pacing the margin of the sea,
and chasing knights all over the place, and devouring dam-
sels, and going on generally-whereas I liked to get my meals
regular and then to prop my back against a bit of rock and
snooze a bit, and wake up and think of things going on and
how they kept going on just the same, you know!
- K. Grahame, The Reluctant Dragon (1953)
I. INTRODUCTION
Like a reluctant dragon, the broadcast media' have for the
most part been content to get their earnings regularly and to
"think of things going on... just the same." Television, the me-
dium with the greatest potential for expressing a wide variety of
ideas and social needs, has shown a marked reluctance to exercise
that potential. Robert Montgomery has eloquently described the
disparity between potential and performance in the television
industry:
As we were all informed and believed when television was
new, it has the greatest potential for good of any commu-
nications instrument ever invented. Most of us still feel that
this is true. At the same time, I think there are now millions
of people who, like me, believe that television lost its way and
fell among evil companions who have not only prevented it
from realizing its potential but have turned it in another
direction. Ironically, the technological advance of television
has been spectacular. More than ever today it offers a
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. B.EE.., 1959, Cornell Univer-
sity; M.S., 1960, California Institute of Technology; J.D., 1963, University of California
Hastings College of the Law. Formerly Staff Attorney for Telecommunications, U.S.
Department of Commerce.
I In this article, the term "broadcast media" means commercial AM and FM radio and
commercial VHF and UHF television. The term "broadcasters" means commercial
broadcast licensees and commercial broadcast network management.
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brilliant promise. But sadly, there is no relationship between
technology and the quality of what is being transmitted.2
The scope of this article will be limited to one aspect of elec-
tronic media 3 programming-the extent to which the public is and
should be exposed to an accurate cross section of public opinion
and a broad range of controversial ideas. 4 Many people, including
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 5 have acknowl-
edged that a desirable goal for the broadcast media, particularly
television, is to provide a marketplace for controversial ideas.6
Part I1 of this article will identify the principal reasons why that
goal has not been achieved. Part III will examine the fairness
doctrine, the antecedents of which have been traced back to
1929. 7 While generally requiring that a broadcast licensee's pro-
gramming cover issues of public importance in a manner fairly
presenting conflicting points of view, 8 the broad discretion given
2 R. MONTGOMERY, OPEN LETTER FROM A TELEVISION VIEWER 14 (1968).
3 The term "electronic media" includes the broadcast media and community antenna (or
cable) television.
4 "Controversial ideas" are ideas, attitudes and viewpoints on matters of public concern
that differ from those of the majority of citizens. Of course, there are many ideas,
controversial by this definition, which may not seem controversial to many readers of this
article; however, this definition probably corresponds to the definition of "controversial"
that would be used by a network official or a sponsor in actual practice.
5 See FCC, Notice of Inquiry: The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness
Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30 F.C.C.2d 26,
27 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Doctrine Inquiry], where the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) said that the "goal is clear: to foster 'uninhibited, robust,
wide-open' debate on public issues.... That is the profound, unquestioned national com-
mitment embodied in the First Amendment."
6 As Justice Holmes said over fifty years ago:
[Wihen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good derived is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion). This marketplace
concept of the first amendment was elaborated by Justice Holmes in Gitlow v. People of
New York. 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (dissenting opinion), and by Justice Brandeis in
Whitney v. California. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (concurring opinion).
7 Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 FRC Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds,
37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), petition for cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930); and
Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, supra note 5, at 27. But (f. Blake. Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC: Fairness and the Emperor's New Clothes, 23 FED. COM. B.J. 75, 79 (1969).
stating that the fairness doctrine was not announced until 1949. The fairness doctrine is
not set forth in any specific statutory provision, but is the product of FCC rulings applying
the public interest standard of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307.
309,316(1970).
8 The FCC has recently explained the doctrine's basic rationale and requirements as
follows:
The fairness doctrine is grounded in the recognition that the airwaves are
inherently not available to all who would use them. It requires that those
given the privilege of access hold their licenses and use their facilities as
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to licensees in applying the doctrine has significantly lessened its
impact.9 Moreover, a raging debate continues over whether the
effect of the fairness doctrine has been more to suppress than to
enhance the expression of controversial ideas. 10 Part IV will
describe a new legal doctrine-the first amendment right of ac-
cess" -which has recently been applied to the broadcast media,
12
and whose effect may be to thrust controversial programming
upon all electronic media.' 3 Finally, part V will discuss additional
ways to encourage the broadcasting of controversial ideas.
1I. THE CAUSES OF THE DRAGON'S RELUCTANCE
The dragon's reluctance stems from a number of powerful
constraints, both public and private, that discourage the broad-
casting of controversial ideas. Of course, there are external pres-
sures and constraints upon all media, but conformist pressures are
significantly stronger on broadcasting than upon the print media.
trustees for the public at large, with a duty to present discussion of public
issues and to do so fairly by affording reasonable opportunity for the presen-
tation of conflicting views by appropriate spokesmen. The individual licensee
has the discretion, and indeed the responsibility, to determine what issues
should be covered, how much time should be allocated, which spokesmen
should appear, and in what format.
Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, supra note 5, at 27- 28.
9 The fairness doctrine does require broadcast news programs to maintain at least the
appearance of objectivity, and may be in part responsible for the fact that television news
ranks first in credibility in public opinion. H. MENDELSOHN & I. CRESPI, POLLS, TELE-
VISION, AND THE NEW POLITIcs 265 (1970). But see E. EFRON, THE NEWS TWISTERS
(1971), arguing by word count from newscasts that network newscasting is far from
objective.
10 Compare Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting:
Pillars in the Forum ofDemocracy, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 447 (1968), with Robinson, The
FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television
Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67 (1967).
11 See generally Barron, Acces.s to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Barron, Access]; Barron, An Emerging
First Amendment Right of Access to the Media, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Barron, Emerging Access].
12 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3410 (Feb. 28, 1972) [BEM]; see also Johnson &
Western, A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television
Time, 57 VA. L. REv. 574 (1971).
While the FCC has sought and obtained certiorari, note 12 supra, the Office of Tele-
communications Policy, Executive Office of the President, [see Reorg. Plan no. I of 1970,
Exec. Order 11556, 35 Fed. Reg. 14193 (1970)], appears to have accepted the circuit
court's opinion as it stands. See Remarks of Clay T. Whitehead, Director, Office of
Telecommunications Policy, at the International Radio and Television Society News-
maker Luncheon, in New York City, October 6, 1971.
13 The cases before the BEM court involved only the broadcast media. The rationale for
extending the court's holding to cable television as well is set forth in part IV E of this
article.
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A. The Reflexive Reaction to Burns
from the Dragon's Fire
The broadcast media reach massive audiences; 14 radio in the
past, and television today, have demonstrated a tremendous
capacity to influence these audiences. 15 Moreover, whatever may
14 Tebbe[, Network Television's Uncertain Future, 53 SATURDAY REV., Nov. 14, 1970,
at 69.
15 As to radio, see H. MENDELSOHN & I. CRESPI,' supra note 9, at 256; as to television,
see id. at 264 and A. KROCK, THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED 66 (1971). See also N.
JOHNSON, HOW TO TALK BACK TO YOUR TELEVISION SET 26-27 (1970), noting that
television's salesmen cannot have it both ways. They cannot point with pride
to the power of their medium to affect the attitudes and behavior associated
with product selection and consumption, and then take the position that
everything else on television has no impact whatsoever upon attitudes and
behavior.
For examples of the power of television advertising, see id. at 25- 26.
But see Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness
andAccess, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 768-7 1 (1972), concluding from writings in the field of
communications theory that
legal doctrines should be developed and assessed free from any grandiose
conceptions of the influence of television on political life. Broadcasting has at
best an incremental and at worst a marginal effect on political consciousness.
Too high a price in administrative and judicial inefficiencies, or in broadcast
revenues, should not be paid for doctrines designed to increase the number of
voices heard on the air.
Id. at 77 1. While a certain degree of debunking may be required in response to some
popular assessments of the political impact of the electronic media, Professor Jaffe over-
states the case. In the first place, he relies principally upon older articles representing the
high water mark of scholarly scepticism on this issue, as can be seen from reviewing
Schramm's latest compilation of materials on communications, W. SCHRAMM & D. ROB-
ERTS, THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION (rev. ed. 1971). See, e.g.,
Lang & Lang, THE MASS MEDIA AND VOTING, id. at 678 (studies of the effect of the
media on voting behavior during political campaigns consider too narrow a period of time;
the long run effect of the media between campaigns should be considered); Roberts, The
Nature of Communication Effects, id. at 347 (noting, at 377, the importance of dis-
tinguishing between the effects of the mass media in the modification of established beliefs,
and in the formulation of new opinions and beliefs; in the latter situation, the mass media
have a more clearly perceptible influence); Krugman, The Impact of Television Advertis-
ing: Learning without Involvement, id. at 485 (suggesting that noncommercial persuasive
use of television should be divided into attempts at influence not requiring viewer personal
involvement, and attempts at influence characterized by a high degree of viewer personal
involvement; over the long run, the former-like advertising-can be more influential
because the public receives it less guardedly); Hovland, Reconciling Conflicting Results
Derived from Experimental and Survey Studies ofA ttitude Change, id. at 495 (conclusions
on communications effects vary with the methodology employed; methodological improve-
ments required). See also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, TELEVISION AND
GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE (1972). (Despite misleading news-
paper headlines at the report's release, and the presence of five network representatives on
the twelve member directing committee, Comment, 175 SCIENCE 608 (1972), several
studies showed significant correlation between the viewing of violence on television and
subsequent aggressive behavior).
Second, Professor Jaffe misperceives the appropriate response for the law. Rather than
construe the first amendment in the light of the most sceptical scholarly views on the
impact of television on behavior and attitudes, "a subject on which there is sharp con-
troversy," Jaffe at 768, the law should strive to maintain the effectiveness of opportunity to
express diverse viewpoints that existed prior to the concentration of communications
power "wrought by the changing technology of the mass media," Barron, Access, supra
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be the actual boundaries of broadcast media influence, that
influence appears to many to be almost overwhelming. 16 This
appearance of power has not gone unnoticed by advertisers, gov-
ernment officials, and concerned citizens. It has often led to
significant congressional attention, not only in the form of hear-
ings, 17 but also in the enactment of several pieces of legislation.
The banning of cigarette advertising from the broadcast media18 is
only a recent example of Congress's estimation of television's
power to influence the public.
Since television, the most powerful of the broadcast media, is
relatively youthful, broadcasters are still learning how to use its
power responsibly. 19 In the meantime, mistakes and misuses of
television's powers increase its vulnerability to criticism. For
example, while the intensity of the criticism of the CBS docu-
mentary The Selling of the Pentagon was disproportionate to the
magnitude of the documentary's errors,20 the mere existence of
error was sufficient to cause a congressional committee to conduct
an investigation 2' that no doubt would never have been consid-
ered if the print media had been involved. 22 Presumably because
of their fear that the material presented by television reaches a
note 1I, at 1644, at least until the social sciences can provide more definite answers than
they can today. Professor Jaffe's formulation puts too little emphasis upon the historical
importance of the communications media to our political process, and too much emphasis
upon administrative and judicial convenience and the protection of broadcaster revenues.
See note 282 infra and accompanying text.
16 Vice President Spiro Agnew spoke to the issue as follows:
One Federal Communications Commissioner considers the powers of the
networks equal to that of local, state and Federal Governments all combined.
Certainly it represents a concentration of power over American public opin-
ion unknown in history.
Now, my friends, we'd never trust such power, as I've described, over
public opinion in the hands of an elected Government. It's time we ques-
tioned it in the hands of a small unelected elite.
Excerpts from Television News Coverage, 36 VITAL SPEECHES 98, 99, 100 (1969). See
also A. KROCK, supra note 15, at 23, 173-74; BROADCASTING, Dec. 27, 1971, at 21
(fairness doctrine complaints have increased from 409 in 1966 to over 60,000 in 1970).
17See, e.g., Hearings on Fairness Doctrine Before the Special Subcomm. on In-
vestigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., ser. 90-33 (1968).
18 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
19 Fang, It is Your Business, Mr. Cronkite, 54 SATURDAY REV., Jan. 9, 197 1, at 46, 54.
See also, D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW CASES AND COMMENT
706-7 10 (1969); Irvine, The Selling of the Selling of the Pentagon, 23 NAT'L REV. 855
(197 1); The Art of "Cut and Paste," 97 TIME, April 12, 1971,at56.2 0 See text accompanying notes 86- 88 infra.
21 See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
22 Actually, the same revelations in print media have not led to comparable controversy.
See Sherrill, The Happy Ending (Maybe) of "The Selling of the Pentagon," THE NEW
YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, May 16, 1971, at 25, 26. Vice President Spiro Agnew dis-
tinguished newspapers from television journalism to justify differing degrees of first amend-
ment freedom. Supra note 16, at 98.
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very large audience and that the audience always believes the
presentation, those affected by broadcast criticism and others
sympathetic to their cause feel more seriously threatened by criti-
cism from the broadcast media than by comparable criticism from
the print media.
Thus, when the dragon gathers its power and actually does
breath a little fire, the pain among those suffering burns is severe
and their reaction is strong.23 Paradoxically, the popular view of
the power of the broadcast media, rather than causing respect or
greater freedom of action, induces a strong reaction among those
criticized to fend off the perceived threat. The appearance of
power is a wellspring of constraint.
B. The Effect of the Federal Collar
Around the Dragon's Throat
One popular view is that since the broadcast media are govern-
mentally regulated, they are not entitled to the freedom of speech,
particularly critical speech, accorded the print media.2 4 However,
the constraints upon programming actually imposed under federal
law are not intended to suppress the broadcasting of criticism or
controversial ideas,2 5 whatever effect federal regulation may have
in practice. The Supreme Court's opinion in Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC,2 6 hardly pro-broadcasting industry in its
approach and reasoning, reaffirms the idea that "refusal to permit
the broadcaster to carry a particular program or to publish his
own views... would raise ... serious First Amendment is-
sues." 2 7 Nonetheless, existence of the popular view no doubt
enhances the strong response by viewers and others to critical or
controversial programming.
2 Broadcasters are beginning to learn that a heavy volume of adverse mail does not
necessarily indicate widespread dissatisfaction. After a "major news program" led to such
mail, a public opinion survey indicated that 86 percent of those who watched the program
rated it good to excellent. Goodman, U.S. Broadcasting Freedom, 36 VITAL SPEECHES
658, 659 (1970).
24 For a thoughtful analysis of this problem and of the freedom appropriate to licensed
media, see Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW &
EcON. 15 (1967). See also B. Monroe, The Captive Medium, 37 VITAL SPEECHES 267
(1970).
2 So long as the licensee is willing to give fair presentation to opposing views and to
comply with the fairness doctrine, he is free to broadcast any idea:
The most significant meaning of freedom of the radio is the right of the
American people to listen to this great medium of communications free from
any governmental dictation as to what they can or cannot hear and free alike
from similar restraints by private licensees.
FCC, Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as Editorializing].
26 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
27 1d. at 396.
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Another effect of federal regulation is the increased pressure on
broadcasters arising from informal threats by those situated in
government or those having access to government officials that
the regulatory process will be used as a means of reprisal.2 A
network executive could hardly be blamed for fearing that a
Federal Communications Commission, sympathetic to a President
who had recently been attacked by the network, might retaliate by
awarding the license of one of the network's supporting stations to
a citizen's group at renewal time. 29 Interestingly, the recent deci-
sion of Citizens Communications Center v. FCC,3 0 which over-
turned the FCC's attempt to give existing licensees some prefer-
ence for renewal over competing applicants, may weaken network
ability to resist informal threats of government reprisal.
In summary, the presence of the federal collar supports the
public myth that broadcasters are not supposed to transmit critical
or controversial ideas and lends some air of credibility to informal
threats of retaliation through the regulatory process. Some argue
that the only solution to these problems is to remove the collar,
freeing broadcasting from federal review of licensee program-
ming.31 As will be shown below, so drastic a "solution" is not
required.
C. The Dragon's Anatomy and Appetite
The men at the top, the network management and the in-
dividual broadcast licensees, are held responsible for the material
broadcast on their stations.32 Despite federal regulation of pro-
28 The observations of an aggressive journalist tend to make him sceptical toward the
objectivity of regulatory officials, particularly if informal congressional pressures are ap-
plied. See D. PEARSON & J. ANDERSON, THE CASE AGAINST CONGRESS 161 (1968).
29 See generally Sherrill, supra note 22, at 27 and 78; Statement of Walter Cronkite
before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 30, 1971 (unpublished hearings) [hereinafter cited as Cronkite]. See
also B. Monroe, supra note 24, at 268.
30 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The case is noted in 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1012 (1972).
31 Cronkite, supra note 29.
32 In denying renewal of an existing license, the FCC criticized one licensee's failure to
maintain control over his programming as follows:
Complete supervision of and control over programs, including careful exam-
ination of their content, directly affects the rendition of a public service. The
right to determine, select, supervise, and control programs is inherently
incident to the privilege of holding a station license. In fact, the right be-
comes a responsibility of a licensee, as he must be held to strict account-
ability for the service rendered.
United States Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C. 208 (1935). In addition, see Banzhaf v. FCC,
405 F.2d 1082, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). The FCC has
reaffirmed this position by stating that "broadcasting licensees must assume responsibility
for all material which is broadcast through their facilities," in FCC, Network Programming
Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
[VOL. 5:2
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gram content, with only a few specific exceptions33 the licensees
and network management retain a great deal of discretion over the
material they broadcast.3 4 This discretion includes the choice of
issues to be covered, the choice of spokesmen for any particular
issue, and the power to censor any remarks of any speaker,3 5 even
on the very topic the speaker was invited to discuss.3 6
This approach to programming, with its emphasis on total pow-
er and total responsibility at the very top, has helped foster a
different attitude toward the broadcast media than exists toward
the print media. Absent alleged defamation, the idea of expecting
a newspaper publisher to justify printing a column by Walter
Lippman seems preposterous; but such justification is routinely
expected by the FCC from the managers of broadcast media.3 7
Likewise, the print media experience a greater tendency on the
part of the public to blame the author, rather than the publisher,
for a columnist's offensive remarks. With freedom from direct
governmental regulation, the print media have less to fear from
Policy Statement on Programming]. Broadcast licensees are expressly prohibited, how-
ever, from censoring material broadcast by a candidate for public office pursuant to 47
U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970).
The public at large appears to expect networks to exert strong control over the program-
ming they supply. See, e.g., Sherrill, supra note 22, at 25, 26.
33 These exceptions include: the Banzhaf, personal attack, and political editorial aspects
of the fairness doctrine [see text accompanying notes 120- 130 infra]; the equal opportu-
nities requirement [47 U.S.C. § 3 15(a) (1970)]; and various explicit prohibitions of par-
ticular kinds of programming or expression, including prohibitions of: cigarette advertising
[15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970)], lottery information or advertising [18 U.S.C. § 304 (1970)],
fraudulent communications [18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970)], obscene or indecent or profane
language [18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970)], and "rigged" quiz shows [47 U.S.C. § 509 (1970)].
34 The fairness doctrine allows great leeway in meeting its requirement that a reasonable
percentage of broadcast time be devoted to information on, and consideration and dis-
cussion of, public issues of interest to the community being served. The FCC has stated:
It should be recognized that there can be no one all-embracing formula which
licensees can hope to apply to insure the fair and balanced presentation of all
public issues. Different issues will inevitably require different techniques of
presentation and production. The licensee will in each instance be called
upon to exercise his best judgment and good sense in determining what
subjects should be considered, the particular format of the programs to be
devoted to each subject, the different shades of opinion to be presented, and
the spokesmen for each point of view. In determining whether to honor
specific requests for time, the station will inevitably be confronted with such
questions as whether the subject is worth considering, whether the viewpoint
of the requesting party has already received a sufficient amount of broadcast
time, or whether there may not be other available groups or individuals who
might be more appropriate spokesmen for the particular point of view than
the person making the request.
Editorializing, supra note 25, at 1251-54. Accord, Democratic National Committee, 25
F.C.C. 216 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace
v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
3 For the exception for certain broadcasts by political candidates, see note 32 supra.36 See, e.g., letter to Hon. Richard L. Ottinger from Chairman Dean Burch, 31 F.C.C.
2d 852 (1970).
37 See Kalven, supra note 24, at 22- 23.
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informal threats by government officials. And, ordinarily, adver-
tisers do not seek to hold a newspaper publisher accountable for
everything in his paper, particularly the views of syndicated col-
umnists. On the other hand, in the broadcast media the tendency
is reversed with top management blamed-for all offensive pro-
gramming. Thus, while it is fair to say that the public expects
newspapers to assert their independence and to resist advertiser
and informal governmental pressure, it is almost impossible to
discern a similar expectation with respect to the broadcast
media.3 8
If those desiring to suppress controversial or critical program-
ming were to apply their pressures directly against the producer
or journalist who developed or expressed them, their efforts
would probably prove fruitless. Therefore, the pressure is applied
to top management. A consciousness of the need to sustain reve-
nues39 and to renew a federal license 40 makes top management
much more vulnerable to external advertiser and informal govern-
mental pressures than individuals at lower echelons of a broadcast
organization. 41 When top management submits to such pressures,
it transmits them to working journalists and entertainers, with
sanctions that are stronger than those which the original source of
pressure could himself have imposed. 42 While we might expect
the fairness doctrine to provide station and network management
with some insulation from external pressures, the broadcaster's
wide discretion in implementing fairness doctrine requirements
38 Differences in the natures of the two types of media may also be a factor. The public
may link a controversial broadcast program with its sponsor, see, e.g., F. FRIENDLY, DUE
TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR CONTROL ... 17, 20, 62, 75-76 (1967), but it is less
likely that the public associates a newspaper columnist's views with those advertising in
the same newspaper.
39 Id. at xi-xii, 112, 182-84.
40 Monroe, supra note 24, at 268.
41 The distinction between top management and those below has been described as
follows:
Another distinction must be made, one between the network entrepreneurs of
television, and those who work for it in the lower echelons. The medium is
full of extremely able and talented men, fully capable of realizing everything
television is capable of doing. They do what they are permitted to do, and
many of them are miserable doing it, praying for the day when, if ever, it will
be possible to accomplish better things.
Nor would it be fair to assert that television does nothing worth com-
mendation. Sometimes, by virtue of the sheer expertise of the people who
work for it, television shows real flashes of the exciting medium it can be; in
the live transmission of public events, it cannot be excelled. By and large,
however, what is done well on television is done in spite of network control,
not because of it.
R. MONTGOMERY, SUpra note 2, at 14- 15.42 See notes 52-89 infra passim, particularly notes 70 and 81 and accompanying text
infra.
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and general public ignorance of the doctrine significantly reduce
the doctrine's insulating value.
One final exacerbating aspect of the dragon's anatomy is the
concentrated structure of the broadcast industry. 43 The obvious
effect of this concentration is to provide fewer managers upon
whom offended advertisers and government officials need apply
their pressures. Presumably, the smaller the number of managers,
the stronger and more concentrated those pressures can be. The
concentration of economic power in the management of the three
major commercial networks has enabled them to produce directly,
or indirectly through so-called joint ventures with "nominally
independent producers,"' 44 almost all "prime time" television pro-
gramming. In 1957 truly independent producers provided approx-
imately one-third of the evening network schedules; by 1968 the
independent share had declined to below 4 percent. 45 Thus the
economic concentration within the broadcast media has led to
concentration of control over individual program production. As a
practical matter, if more programs were independently produced,
criticism and pressures for conformity might be diffused enough to
provide some protection for the controversial nature of a particu-
lar program. When substantially all programming is under the
direct control of the network and its management, this potential
insulating factor disappears. Recently the FCC has taken some
steps to deal with the problem of economic concentration. These
will be discussed in part V of this article.
D. Constraints Inherent in the Public's
Response to the Dragon
One common broadcaster response to the criticism that the
media fail to carry a sufficient diet of controversial ideas is to note
that many private individuals and public officials have been
allowed to appear on interview and panel discussion shows. This
type of program, generally carried on Sunday afternoon (the time
known within the industry as the "intellectual ghetto"),46 does not
reach an audience large enough to cause the strong reflexive
reaction described in part II A. The fairness doctrine in this
43 See, e.g., N. JOHNSON. supra note 15. at 45; FCC. Competition and Responsibility in
Network Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d 382 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Prime
Time Access Rules].
44 Prime Time Access Rules, supra note 43, at 389.
45 Id. at 390.4 6 See F. FRIENDLY, supra note 38, at 104; G. STEINER, THE PEOPLE LOOK AT
TELEVISION 164 (1963).
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particular context provides some insulation to broadcast manage-
ment by rather clearly requiring the presentation of a variety of
opinions on interview and panel shows, thereby reducing manage-
ment's personal responsibility for the appearance of controversial
individuals. The format of these programs offers the further pro-
tection that views expressed are much more likely to be associ-
ated with the prominent guest who espouses them, rather than
with the station or network management.
Since interview and panel discussion shows offer the broad-
caster a relatively painless way to satisfy his fairness doctrine
obligations, it is natural for him to utilize and call the critics'
attention to such shows. However, this response fails to recognize
that there are much more effective ways of transmitting in-
formation than by interview and panel discussion shows, and that
when one of the more effective approaches is used to convey
controversial ideas, suppression or very strong attempts at sup-
pression have been common.
As common sense might tell us, people prefer to have in-
formation and ideas conveyed to them in a way that is entertain-
ing- either amusing or dramatic. The truth of this observation, for
television in particular, has been confirmed not only by the suc-
cess of Sesame Street,47 but by a detailed study of public opinion
and viewing habits made a decade ago by Dr. Gary A. Steiner. 48
47 See Trout, Sesame Street, 158 AM. SCHOOL BOARD J., April, 1971, at 19.48G. STEINER, supra note 46. While criticised for its failure to show more than one
would already know from common sense and common knowledge and its tendency to
encourage television to cater to people's idle fancy, 68 NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW,
April 14, 1963, at 38, Dr. Steiner's work was termed "statistically sound" and "a welcome
step in the direction of an objective, scholarly assessment of [the television] medium" in a
contemporary protessional review. O'Hara, Book Review, 351 ANNALS 199 (1964).
Among other things, Dr. Steiner asked his respondents to review a list of kinds of
programs, and state whether television provided enough, not enough, or too much of each
kind. Three kinds of programs listed were education, information, and food for thought.
Approximately 60 percent of the respondents thought that television did not provide
enough education; approximately 50 percent, not enough information; and approximately
40 percent, not enough food for thought. G. STEINER, supra note 46, at 134-39. Sub-
sequently, Dr. Steiner studied viewing choices actually made by a portion of his earlier
respondents, dividing the programming available for choice into three categories: light
entertainment, heavy entertainment, and heavy information. During those time periods in
which at least one program within each category was available for choice, heavy in-
formation was selected by 5 percent of all viewers and 9 percent of all viewers having a
college education or beyond. Id. at 201. However, heavy entertainment was selected by 31
percent of all viewers, by 36 percent of viewers who said television did not provide enough
food for thought, and by 53 percent of those having a college education or beyond. Id.
Another example of public awareness of learning from television entertain-
ment-viewers learning of civil rights from television police dramas-is recounted in
Gunther, "You Have the Right to Remain Silent .. ", 19 TV GUIDE, Dec. 18, 1971, at 6.
At least one production company has been sensitive to the public's interest in in-
formation and entertainment combined. In describing The Electric Company, a sequel to
Sesame Street for second, third and fourth graders, Edith Efron notes that:
[VOL. 5:2
Right of Access
Irrespective of whether this observation comports with our ro-
mantic view of Homo sapiens, it appears that viewers would
rather receive their education, information, and food for thought
in an entertaining format,49 rather than in the typically unenter-
taining discussion or interview show.50
Thus, the fact that the dragon gives forth some smoke and
fumes on Sunday afternoons does not reduce his apparent reluc-
tance to raise more controversial issues on "popular" programs.
Indeed, as the following examples indicate, the dragon ordinarily
suppresses attempts to convey controversial ideas through enter-
taining or dramatic programming. 51
See It Now. The birth, life, and ultimate demise of the first
television news documentary program to cover controversial is-
sues in a sometimes-by broadcast standards-controversial man-
ner have been described in a book by one of the program's
co-producers, Fred W. Friendly. 52
Edward R. Murrow and Friendly began producing the program
in November 1951 under the sponsorship of the Aluminum Com-
pany of America, then strongly motivated to improve its public
image. 53 After two years of making the transition from radio to
television journalism, Murrow and Friendly decided during the
height of the McCarthy investigations to cover a subject that
would necessarily embroil the program in controversy. 54 An Air
Force lieutenant, Milo J. Radulovich, was about to lose his com-
mission on the ground that his father and sister were left-wing
sympathizers. Murrow and Friendly invited the Pentagon to sup-
ply material for a program, but the Pentagon refused and sug-
If The Electric Company is a serious academic venture, there's no way to
realize it from what appears on the screen. The letters and words and
sentences are so brilliantly interwoven with entertainment that there is no
classroom atmosphere to the proceedings at all. In fact, exactly like Sesame
Street, the integration of entertainment and pedagogic goals is done with such
supreme skill that an adult can watch the show with interest and often with
extreme artistic delight.
And now-"The Electric Company," 19 TV GUIDE, Oct. 16, 197 1, at 8, 10.
49,,Entertaining format" should include drama, or a dramatic documentary or news
presentation. Indeed, the dramatic effect of available film or tape is a significant factor in
the selection of news items by network television journalists. The Art of "Cut and Paste,"
supra note 19, at 56.
50 The courts have understood the role of entertainment in the communication of ideas.
In considering the issue of first amendment protection, they have consistently refused to
distinguish between entertainment and expression of ideas. Kalven, supra note 24, at
28-30.
51 These examples will also provide support for the conclusions expressed in part III of
this article concerning the effectiveness of the fairness doctrine, and for the recommenda-
tions contained in parts IV D and V.52 Supra note 38. As to the program's primacy in controversial matters, see id. at 3, 16.
53 Id. at xiii, xviii- xix.
54 Id. at 3.
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gested instead that the program not appear at all.55 With an
absence of material on the Pentagon viewpoint and a closing
statement by Murrow that left little doubt as to his position, the
program failed to fit within the traditional broadcast concept that
" 'the audience should be left with no impression as to which side
the analyst himself actually favors.' "56
The program led to considerable public praise for Murrow and
Friendly, while the CBS network reaped a harvest of bitter con-
demnation and criticisms from both ends of the political spectrum.
CBS was caught in a cross-fire: liberals castigated CBS for not
supporting Murrow and Friendly more fully; supporters of
McCarthy condemned CBS for not stopping the program alto-
gether. Although some animosity also arose toward the sponsor,
Alcoa, including a few threats of order cancellations, letters from
the public showed strong support for the program.57 The power of
television programming to stimulate public pressure became
apparent five weeks later when the Secretary of the Air Force
announced before an invited television film crew that Lieutenant
Radulovich would be retained by the Air Force. The announce-
ment was shown that night on See It Now. 58
See It Now devoted a half-hour to the work of Senator
McCarthy on March 9, 1954, with occasional critical information
and commentary interspersed by Murrow.5 9 A second program
was primarily devoted to a filmed McCarthy hearing. 60 Sub-
55 Id. at 8- 10.56 Id. at 10.
5 7 Id. at 17.
5 1 id. at 19- 20.
59 For example, Murrow introduced a filmed excerpt of 'Senator McCarthy questioning
Reed Harris, for many years a civil servant in the State Department, about a book Harris
had written in 1932. Harris was also questioned about his acceptance of legal services
from the American Civil Liberties Union and asked whether he knew that the ACLU had
"been listed as a front for and doing the work of the Communist party." Following the
excerpt, Murrow commented:
Senator McCarthy succeeded only in proving that Reed Harris had once
written a bad book, which the American people had proved twenty-two years
ago by not buying it, which is what they eventually do with all bad ideas. As
for Reed Harris, his resignation was accepted a month later with a letter of
commendation. McCarthy claimed it was a victory.
The Reed Harris hearing demonstrates one of the senator's techniques.
Twice he said the American Civil Liberties Union was listed as a subversive
front. The Attorney General's list does not and has never listed the ACLU
as subversive, nor does the FBI or any other federal government agency.
And the American Civil Liberties Union holds in its files letters of com-
mendation from President Eisenhower, President Truman and General Mac-
Arthur.
Id. at 38. While carefully restrained, the program's viewpoint was nonetheless obvious.
60 McCarthy's filmed hearing had fizzled. Because the camera could tell the story
virtually unaided, there was less commentary from Murrow, and the program was better
received by CBS management. Id. at 45, 47.
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sequently, in response to an offer from Murrow, Senator
McCarthy submitted a filmed reply which was aired on the April
6 program. The reply was of poor quality, 61 but despite this and
the film's technical inadequacies 62 it did change viewer reaction to
the program's treatment of the Senator. The ratio of mail received
by CBS dropped from ten pieces to one in favor of Murrow to
two to one.
63
Soon after the Radulovich affair, a program on the Bricker
amendment to limit the treaty making powers of the President
featured a live debate between Senators Bricker and Kefauver. In
addition, three law professors debated the amendment. Feeling
that the additional debate slanted the overall show against him,
Senator Bricker issued two hostile reports on network practices.
CBS management believed this incident to be one of the factors
behind a subsequent congressional investigation "designed to pun-
ish the networks." 64 Regardless of the accuracy of that observa-
tion, this incident demonstrates the willingness of network man-
61 id. at 54-55. One writer commented upon the program as follows:
I did not respond well to the Senator. He took half an hour to make a few
accusations against Murrow, to give a rambling history of Communism and
the Russian Revolution, and [to make one surprise accusation, soon refuted
by President Eisenhower]. The techniques were stable; the handling of the
medium incredibly dull.
Seldes, Murrow, McCarthy and the Empty Formula, 37 SATURDAY REV., April 24, 1954,
at 26- 27.
62 The significant difference between the technical quality of the Murrow-Friendly
production and Senator McCarthy's response was the subject of a contemporary criticism
of the practice of offering no more than "equal" time to amateurs. Seldes in his criticism
wrote:
Unfortunately, it doesn't make sense, except mathematically, and Senator
McCarthy's answer to Murrow was a brilliant demonstration of the fallacy
involved. In the days of radio, when the formula was created, equal time
meant time to make a speech in answer to a speech. To be sure, one speaker
might have a better voice or a better ghost-writer than another, but there was
a rough equality. In television it is possible to imagine a propagandist hiring a
great dramatist to write a play in favor of (or against) public ownership of all
electrical power, producing this play with great players, and then offering his
opponents equal time for reply-time which for lack of talent or money they
might be able to fill only with a series of dull speeches. In the case of Murrow
and McCarthy, we had on the original broadcast the product of some three
years of experience in the handling of film clips, an art in which Murrow and
his co-worker Fred Friendly have no peers. Since (Mr. Murrow has told me)
they looked at 15,000 feet of film beyond the amount they showed, I would
guess they had spent many weeks and some $15,000 on their program
(counting salaries and incidentals). In reply Senator McCarthy came up with
a feebly handled newsreel talk illustrated by two or three unanimated
maps-about as weak a television program as you could devise. I am not
impressed by the reiterated statement in the press that no one knows who
will pay the $6,000 this reply cost; I am impressed by the possibility that
someone might be attacked who couldn't even borrow enough to make a film.
Seldes, supra note 61, at 26. CBS eventually paid the cost of preparing McCarthy's film,
however. F. FRIENDLY, supra note 38, at 53.
63 F. FRIENDLY, supra note 38, at 43, 58.
64 Id. at 26- 27.
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agement to attribute their problems to the dissemination of con-
troversial programming.
During 1954 and 1955, See It Now continued to air con-
troversial programs. 65 Finally, a program describing how a small
Texas weekly newspaper exposed a land scandal involving state
officials brought strong pressure on Alcoa, just as Alcoa was
enlarging its facilities in Texas. This pressure, combined with the
history of customers angered by prior See It Now programs, led
Alcoa to terminate its sponsorship of the program. 66 See It Now
continued on an irregular schedule of hour long programs, not all
of them sponsored, for three more years. However, the con-
troversies brought on by the subjects of the programs and Mur-
row's injection of his own opinions eventually brought the series
to a halt. 67
After the quiz show scandal, CBS Reports was created.68
While the program's treatment of controversial subjects did re-
ceive continued support from CBS management, the practice in-
stituted by CBS of allowing affiliates to review each show in
advance did affect the tenor of the program. As Friendly explains:
I must admit that this system tempered our broadcasts. The
stations didn't try to influence our choice of subjects any
more than the management did, but I found myself subcon-
sciously applying a new kind of conformity to our documen-
taries. Looking back now, I suppose that I was subtly
influenced to do controversial subjects in a noncontroversial
manner. We did handle tough subjects and we often did them
well, but there were no strong endings such as in the
McCarthy [or] Radulovich... programs.... Our techniques
improved through the years, but in balancing arguments rath-
er than objectively weighing them, we were sacrificing one
ingredient of good journalism. 69
Thus the indirect pressure of affiliate review resulted in a dimin-
ution of controversial expression at the national level. Addition-
ally, some affiliates have completely suppressed controversial pro-
gramming at the local level, with advertiser pressure playing a key
role.70
6 These included programs on race relations and one that brought considerable pressure
on both Alcoa and CBS, an interview with J. Robert Oppenheimer. Id. at 68.66 Id. at 76.
67 Id. at 76-92.
68 Id. at 99.
6Id. at 135.
70 E.g., a journalist for a Jacksonville, Florida, television station turned out explicit and
controversial documentaries on local pollution. While approving mail poured in from
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The Smothers Brothers. The Smothers Brothers show on CBS
was more than an entertainment program; it contained ample
quantities of social commentary. 71 Furthermore, the commentary
was there for its own sake and not just as a vehicle for comedy,
which distinguished the program from Laugh-In and humorists
like Bob Hope.72 On the other hand, the humor was sometimes
sophomoric, crass or so thickly laced with commentary as to be
no longer perceptible. 73
Despite its problems, the program demonstrated the ability of
satirical entertainment to communicate controversial ideas
effectively. 74 Those who remember Officer Judy can hardly point
to any discussion or interview show, or even any documentary,
that could communicate as effectively social criticism of police
officers. 75 The program was also successful in holding the interest
of the young. 76 Perhaps the material needed to attract such an
audience could hardly avoid being offensive, at times, to those on
the other side of the generation gap.
Whatever other problems the Smothers Brothers may have
had,77 at least one factor in CBS's decision to cancel their pro-
gram was the network's desire to suppress forceful social com-
mentary on popular programs. 78 While the Smothers Brothers'
approach to entertainment during their subsequent appearance on
ABC may have been doomed to failure, 79 it appears that ABC's
tight censorship kept them from maintaining the style that pre-
viously had been successful on CBS.8 0 The history and demise of
the Smothers Brothers' program demonstrates the broadcaster's
viewers, sponsor disapproval worked its corrosive effect, and the journalist began to worry
when a station official sarcastically offered him a list of WJXT's customers "so [he] could
hit them systematically instead of one by one." Eventually, he was fired, "for doing his job
too well." The Devil in Duval County, 96 TIME, Aug. 17, 1970, at 42.
71 Dempsey, Social Comment and TV Censorship, 52 SATURDAY REV., July 12, 1969,
at 53; Kloman, The Transmogrification of the Smothers Brothers, 72 ESQUIRE, Oct., 1969,
at 148, 153; Simonds, Smothering Dissent: A Pungent Social Comment, 21 NAT'L REV.
345 (1969).
72 Dempsey, supra note 7 1, at 53.
73 Id.; Simonds, supra note 7 1, at 345.
74 See note 50 supra.
75 If the role was ever overdone, so on some occasions are political cartoons, yet few
would suggest that publishers should suppress such cartoons.
76 Kloman, supra note 7 1, at 153.
77 The sophomoric and tasteless character of some Smothers Brothers humor and the
program's occasional banality muddy this analysis somewhat. See Simonds, supra note 71,
at 346, criticising both the Smothers Brothers approach and television's inability to deal
with "politics or sex or anything else remotely touchy."
78 Dempsey, supra note 71. Affiliates also previewed each show before it was aired, no
doubt exercising some chilling effect upon the Smothers Brothers. Kloman, supra note 71,
at 148.
79 Brudnoy, Mom Always Loved Them Best, 22 NAT'L REV. 1009 (1970).
80 Shayon, Painful Passing, 53 SATURDAY REV., Oct. 3, 1970, at 48.
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strong reluctance to present any meaningful and effective com-
bination of social commentary and entertainment.81
The Selling of the Pentagon. The furor that arose in 1971 over
this CBS documentary should reassure us that controversial ideas
still appear, at least occasionally, on network television. Further-
more, the strong stand that CBS management took in supporting
this documentary is also reassuring; but the fact that CBS was
required to defend the documentary is illustrative of the great
difference in public attitude toward broadcast and print journal-
ism. 82 The program has been characterized as hardly revolution-
ary, one that broke no new turf "except in television." 83 Indeed,
the show's information had been reported earlier in the print
media. Nevertheless, the reaction to the program was explosive.
As one observer explained:
But inasmuch as not many people read, and a great many
people watch television, some of Washington's most powerful
pro-Pentagon politicians felt that their interests had for the
first time been attacked in a truly significant and dangerous
way. And it made them very angry.8 4
A number of public figures, including Vice President Spiro Ag-
new, Congressman F. Edward Hbert, and Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird, denounced CBS for broadcasting the documentary,
while Congressman Harley Staggers launched an investigation
that was aborted only when the House of Representatives, in
effect, sustained CBS's refusal to honor a subpoena to produce all
film taken but not broadcast. 85
The reason for criticising a controversial documentary is to
81 Lest it be thought that suppressive practices are confined to one network, consider the
following description of the demise of David Brinkley's half-hour program on N BC:
[Where "in depth" reporting gets too deep,] the story, and often the program,
mysteriously disappears. Such was the case with David Brinkley when, on
his own half-hour show, he exposed the shocking corruption of the Federal
road-building program, with its broad highways leading into nowhere, in one
instance, and accompanying evidences of money siphoned off into bottomless
pockets to the tune of millions upon millions of dollars. His interview with
the federal administrator of the highway program may have been one of the
most embarrassing episodes involving a public figure ever seen on the tube.
Apparently it was too embarrasing. The program was canceled soon after-
ward, with the usual bland excuse, and nothing more was ever heard again on
the air about the corruption. It would be a naive observer indeed who would
not conclude that the networks had retreated willingly before pressure from
high places.
R. MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 110- 11.
82 Sherrill, supra note 22, at 78. See also TV v. the Pentagon, 97 TIME, April 5, 1971, at
46.
83 Sherrill, supra note 22, at 26.
8 4 id.
8See H.R.REs. 534, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., 117 CONG. REC. H6642, H6669-70 (daily
ed. July 13, 1971); Irvine, supra note 19, at 855.
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destroy its credibility with the public, or at least to distract the
public from thinking about its basic message. In this case, CBS
gave its potential critics a golden opportunity to accomplish the
latter, if not both, objectives, by indulging in editorial practices
that were likely to mislead the public in important ways, 86 merely
for the sake of smoothing the overall appearance of the film.8 7
"Seeing is believing" states the adage, and television journalists
should realize that unless the average viewer is informed to the
contrary he is going to believe, or think that he is expected to
believe, that events occurred just as they appear on the screen.88
To perform such severe editing without informing the viewer is to
invite successful attacks upon the credibility of the documentary
itself, allowing the main message to become obfuscated by the
dispute over editorial methodology. The dragon must rid itself of
the notion that news presentation should meet the standards of
smoothness and continuity applicable to entertainment.
CBS News. A strong attack was conducted by members of the
print media friendly to the administration against a portion of a
November 3, 1970, CBS News telecast showing two South Viet-
namese soldiers stabbing a prisoner to death in the presence of
American military advisers.8 9 In order to attack the credibility of
the telecast, print media stories itemized various alleged dis-
crepancies between the televised and printed accounts of the
incident. As the print media campaign grew, apparently feeding
upon leaks from the White House staff, CBS News finally decided
to reply, consuming seven minutes of air time in responding to the
discrepancies alleged by the print media. While seven minutes
may not seem long, it is approximately one-third of the news time
available in a half-hour broadcast, certainly a significant amount
of time in its context. If this is the cost that a network must bear
to present a controversial news item, the eventual result may be
self-censorship.
86CBS recorded a long answer responding to a question basic to the theme of the
documentary, used parts of it as responses to two other more specific questions, and
deleted the balance altogether. It also selected small excerpts from a public speech by a
Colonel of the Marines, and arranged them in a different order, failing to indicate that two
of the excerpts were quotations from others and so identified by the speaker. Irvine, supra
note 19. But see The Art of"Cut and Paste," supra note 19, at 56: "CBS maintains, with
some support from a tape of the speech, that the colonel's own words and Souvanna
Phouma's were so confusingly interwoven as to be almost indistinguishable."
87 The Art of"Cut and Paste," supra note 19, at 56, 57.
88id. at 56. The networks have perhaps forgotten how "hearing was believing" the
evening before Halloween, 1938, when Orson Welles recreated H.G. Wells' The War of
the Worlds. For a full description of the program and the panic it caused, see H. KOCH,
THE PANIC BROADCAST (1970).
so Knoll, Shaping Up CBS: A Case Stud), in Intimidation, 34 THE PROGRESSIVE, July,
1970, at 18; Sherrill, supra note 22, at 93.
WINTER 1972]
Journal of Law Reform
III. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: A PROD OF LIMITED
EFFECTIVENESS
The inherent nature of the broadcast technologies makes some
degree of federal regulation essential in order to provide effective
utilization of the airwaves without harmful interference.90 Early
attempts to use the radio broadcast medium without significant
governmental regulation resulted in such extensive and chaotic
interference that strong pressures grew for congressional enact-
ment of regulatory legislation. This public pressure resulted in
passage of the Radio Act of 1927.91 In addition to regulating the
broadcast technology, the Act required consideration of the "pub-
lic convenience or necessity" in the award of broadcast licenses. 9 2
In 1934 the Act was rewritten, the regulatory body was renamed
the Federal Communications Commission, and its authority ex-
tended.9 3
While regulation of the technology of the broadcast industries is
generally conceded to be both necessary and constitutional,9 4 a
battle rages over whether the FCC should be merely a tech-
nological traffic policeman, or whether it is also appropriate for
the FCC to use its licensing and other authorities to regulate
program content.9 5 While the issue is still being debated, the
FCC's general authority to regulate program content is now set-
tled. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States" held such
regulation to be consistent with the first amendment on the ra-
tionale that the unavoidable existence of technological limitations
on the opportunity to broadcast is sufficient to justify further
limiting this opportunity to those who can demonstrate that their
operation will meet9 7 or, in the case of competing applicants, will
most advance,98 the public interest, convenience or necessity.
In evaluating the reasonableness of the FCC's regulation of
broadcasters, it must be recognized that the immutable laws of
technology, coupled with the allocation of vast portions of the
9 0 See W. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES, CASES AND MATERIALS 1019-23 (1967).
91 Id. at 1023.
92 Radio Act of 1927 § 9, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166 (1927).
93 W. JONES, supra note 90, at 74-76, 1028. The "public convenience or necessity"
became the "public interest, convenience or necessity." Communications Act of 1934
§§ 303, 307, 309, 316; 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307, 309, 316 (1970).
94 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 10, at 86; Frank, Broadcasting and the First Amend-
ment, 38 VITAL SPEECHES 125, 127 (1971).
95 See generally the first six authorities cited in note 101 infra.
96319 U.S. 190 (1943).
9 Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962);
and Lee Roy McCourry, 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 895 (1964).
9a Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945); Citizens Communications
Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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electromagnetic spectrum to communications uses other than con-
ventional broadcasting, have led to a situation in which the num-
ber of opportunities to broadcast is significantly less than the
number of individuals financially able and willing to purchase or
build the required facilities.99 Unlike the situation in the print
media, the number of persons able to enter the broadcast media is
not related to consumer demand. Where the rationing of a tech-
nologically-as opposed to an economically-limited opportunity
is required, it is not surprising that a regulatory commission has
been substituted for the laws of the economic marketplace. How-
ever, since the opportunity in question is the opportunity to com-
municate ideas to the public, the first amendment subjects FCC
powers to restrictions not applicable to -other regulatory commis-
sions. Nevertheless, as the courts have held, these first amend-
ment values do not prohibit the limited intervention into content
now practiced by the FCC.100
One important aspect of federal regulation of the broadcast
media is the fairness doctrine, 1 1 which requires a broadcast li-
99 W. JONES, supra note 90, at 1019-22, 1030-33. See also Levin, The Radio Spectrum
Resource, II J. LAW & ECON. 433 (1968); and TELECOMMUNICATIONS SCIENCE PANEL
OF THE COMMERCE TECHNICAL ADVISORY BOARD, ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM UTILI-
ZATION-THE SILENT CRISIS (1966) [hereinafter cited as SILENT CRISIS]. Some
authorities, e.g., Robinson, supra note 10, at 88, point to an excess of channels in the Ultra
High Frequency (UH F) portion of the spectrum and assert that their availability demon-
strates that only economic factors limit the number of television stations. However,
technologically, UHF channels are so inferior as to have great difficulty competing with
existing VHF stations (those assigned to channels 2 through 13). As the Supreme Court
correctly noted in its Red Lion opinion, 395 U.S. 367, 398 (1969), UHF television
channels are not going begging. The fact that more UHF stations cannot practically
compete with VH F stations is hardly, by itself, a strong argument for loosening regulation
of all broadcasting.
100 The Supreme Court has not definitively established the limits of the FCC's power to
intervene in the programming process, perhaps in part because the FCC has been so
cautious in exercising of this authority. Kalven, supra note 24, at 18, 37. The FCC was
bold in elaborating the fairness doctrine in the instances of personal attacks and political
editorials (see text accompanying notes 109- 127 infra), but the Supreme Court, in review-
ing these elaborations in the Red Lion opinion, again set no express limits upon the FCC,
although it did suggest limits in dictum, 395 U.S. at 396.
101 See note 7 supra. A partial selection of literature on the fairness doctrine includes:
Barrow, supra note 10; Blake, supra note 7; Jaffe, The Fairness Doctrine, Equal Time,
Reply to Personal Attacks, and the Local Service Obligation: Implications of Tech-
nological Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 550 (1968); Kalven, supra note 24; Marks,
Broadcasting & Censorship: First Amendment Theory After Red Lion, 38 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 974 (1970); Robinson, supra note 10; Note, A Fair Break for Controversial Speak-
ers: Limitations of the Fairness. Doctrine and the Need for Individual Access, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 532 (1971); Note, Fairness Doctrine: Television as a Marketplace of
Ideas, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1222 (1970).
Other major aspects of federal regulation are the statutory equal opportunities require-
ment, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970), and the FCC's program balance requirement. The FCC
has explained the distinction between the fairness doctrine and the equal opportunities
requirement as follows:
The "equal opportunities" requirement relates solely to use of broadcast
facilities by candidates for public office. With certain exceptions involving
specified news-type programs, the law provides that if a licensee permits a
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censee 10 2 to cover controversial issues of public importance103 in
a fair manner, giving reasonable opportunity for the presentation
of contrasting viewpoints. 10 4 While the licensee has broad dis-
cretion to determine whether a particular matter constitutes a
controversial issue of public importance, he is expected to ex-
ercise this discretion in a reasonable manner, and his determina-
tions are subject to FCC review. 10 5 When the licensee intends to
cover, or has already covered, one side of such an issue, he has an
affirmative obligation to seek out appropriate spokesmen for any
contrasting views; while he has considerable discretion in making
person who is a legally qualified candidate for public office to use a broadcast
station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for
that office in the use of the station....
The fairness doctrine deals with the broader question of affording reasonable
opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on controversial
issues of public importance. Generally speaking, it does not apply with the
precision of the "equal opportunities" requirement. Rather, the licensee, in
applying the fairness doctrine, is called upon to make reasonable judgments
in good faith on the facts of each situation-as to whether a controversial
issue of public importance is involved, as to what viewpoints have been or
should be presented, as to the format and spokesmen to present the view-
points, and all the other facets of such programming .... In passing on any
complaint in this area, the Commission's role is not to substitute its judgment
for that of the licensee as to any of the above programming decisions, but
rather to determine whether the licensee can be said to have acted reasonably
and in good faith. There is thus room for considerably more discretion on the
part of the licensee under the fairness doctrine than under the "equal op-
portunities" requirement.
FCC, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 40 F.C.C.2d 598 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Primer].
For discussions of federal regulation of programming, see Note, Regulation of Program
Content by the FCC, 77 HARV. L. REv. 701, 704 (1964); and Policy Statement on
Programming, supra note 32.
102 While FCC rules extend the fairness doctrine to CATV-originated programming, 47
C.F.R. § 74.1115 (197 1), the scarcity rationale does not apply to a CATV system since
its operator must lease available channels, or channel-time, to anyone willing to pay, and
increase channel capacity in response to increased demands. See part IV E of this article
infra. The FCC's public access channel requirement, discussed in part IV E infra, further
reduces any need for control of the cable operator's programming to protect the public's
right to receive all viewpoints on controversial ideas of public importance.
On the other hand, the FCC argues that the absence of scarcity is immaterial, FCC,
Amendment of the Commission's Rules Relative to Community Antenna Television
Systems, 34 Fed. Reg. 17651, 17658-59 (1969), because the fairness doctrine is in the
public interest. But in the absence of scarcity, the first amendment itself is the controlling
expression of the public interest. The FCC's argument that CATV's carriage of broadcast
signals subjects CATV-originated programming to regulation is too broad. This argument
supports FCC regulation of what CATV does with broadcast signals, Carroll Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958), but does not properly extend beyond the
necessities of regulating and protecting broadcast technology.
If it is constitutional for the FCC to apply the fairness doctrine to a medium in which
technological scarcity does not prevail, what would prevent Congress from applying the
fairness doctrine to any newspaper subscribing to an interstate wire service?
103 This requirement applies even when state law is contrary. State v. Univ. of Maine,
266 A.2d 863 (Me. 1970).
104 Notes 8 and 101 supra.
105 Fairness Primer, supra note 101, at 601-02.
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such a choice, his action is again subject to FCC review. 10 6 The
licensee is not required to give equal time to contrasting view-
points, nor need they be expressed on the same program, so long
as the licensee's overall performance in presenting the contrasting
viewpoints is reasonable and fair. 10 7
A more extensive analysis of the fairness doctrine requires the
consideration of two regulatory themes that thread their way
through the economic regulation of traditional "natural monop-
oly" industries.108 One can be characterized as regulation in an
"absolute" sense; a typical example would be a public utility
commission determining the "just and reasonable" rate to be
charged by a particular regulatee. The other theme can be charac-
terized as regulation in a "relative" sense; an example would be a
commission's comparison of the regulatee's practices as between
different customers to determine whether they constitute unjust
discrimination against a particular customer or provide that cus-
tomer with an unreasonable preference or advantage. 10 9 The fair-
ness doctrine is a curious amalgam of these two regulatory
themes, adapted, of course, for application to the flow of in-
formation through the broadcast media.110 The "absolute com-
ponent" of the general fairness doctrine is its requirement that
licensees present a reasonable amount of programming treating
controversial issues of public importance, 1 l while its "relative
component" is the requirement that, in treating controversial is-
sues of public importance, the licensee must ensure a balanced
presentation of opposing viewpoints.11 2
106 Id. at 607-608. See also FCC, Notice of Rulemaking: Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees Under the Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C.2d 27 (1970).
107 Fairness Primer, supra note 101, 607-08.
108 E.g., public utilities. In transportation, competition is limited by legislative policy,
rather than technological conditions. C. PHILLIPS, JR., THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
21 (Rev. ed. 1969). See also W. JONES, supra note 90, at 1-25.
109 For an illustration of statutory recognition of the distinction between "absolute" and
"relative" regulation, compare subsections (a) and (b) of the Natural Gas Act § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 717c (1970).
110 Presumably the themes cannot be applied to broadcasters without such adaptation,
because broadcasters are not to be subjected to common carrier regulation. 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(h) (1970).
It is not uncommon to divide the fairness doctrine into these particular components.
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 10, at 134.
'11 Editorializing, supra note 25, at 1249. But see Blake, supra note 7, at 78. Blake's
relegation of the absolute component to a footnote illustrates its practical importance to
the communications bar and supports the conclusion in the text accompanying note 114
infra.
112 Editorializing, supra note 25, at 1251. One should not infer from the parallels
between themes of economic regulation and the fairness doctrine that economic regulatory
concepts may simply be lifted bodily from that field and applied to the regulation of
broadcast programming. On the other hand, the presence of some parallels should not
seem surprising when one considers that federal regulation of broadcasting is a form of
government regulation over the utilization of a limited opportunity, the opportunity to
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The absolute component of the general fairness doctrine has
been relatively ineffective in promoting the broadcasting of con-
troversial ideas. Undoubtedly, if given the opportunity, a number
of licensees would prefer to broadcast no ideas of controversial
import whatsoever.11 3 To the extent that the operation of the
fairness doctrine causes such licensees to carry some ideas of a
controversial nature, the doctrine has had some success. How-
ever, the level of controversiality in broadcasting has not been
comparable to that in the print media, 114 for the fairness doctrine
seldom spurs a broadcaster to carry a program with ideas so
controversial as to provoke significant advertiser or informal gov-
ernmental pressure; broadcasters are usually quite ready to sup-
press a program when they believe that the economic interests of
the network or station so require.
The relative, or non-discriminatory component of the fairness
doctrine has had more obvious effects, although opinions differ as
to whether all of them have been beneficial. 115 Probably the most
clearly beneficial effect of the relative component has been on the
choice of participants for panel discussions.116 While there are
occasional exceptions, particularly at the local level, for the most
part the relative component of the fairness doctrine has brought
about a balanced selection of persons with differing viewpoints.
Unfortunately, the extent of the societal benefit is mitigated by
the limited effectiveness of most panel discussion shows as a
means of conveying controversial ideas.1 7 Additionally, the rela-
tive aspect of the fairness doctrine might have a detrimental
impact upon television journalism by encouraging "on the one
hand," "on the other hand" reporting and editing."l 8 However,
the internal pressures to avoid controversial programming prob-
convey information over the broadcast media, just as traditional economic regulation of
natural monopoly industries is a governmental system for regulating the utilization of
limited economic resources, the products or services of a public utility or transportation
industry.
113 See Sherrill, supra note 22, at 90-92.
114 Certainly The Selling of the Pentagon is an exception that proves the rule. Sherrill,
supra note 22, at 26. ABC's openly being referred to as "the silent majority's network,"
Knoll, supra note 89, at 22, is hardly a testimonial to the effectiveness of the fairness
doctrine's absolute component.
115 Compare Robinson, supra note 10, at 136-44, with Barrow, supra note 10, at
485-95. See also Frank, supra note 94, at 127.
1
1 6 Jaffe, supra note 101, at 554,
117 Note 48 supra demonstrates the low interest expressed by the public in "heavy
information" programs.
118 See Edward R. Murrow, quoted in F. FRIENDLY, supra note 38, at 10: "[S]ome
issues aren't equally balanced. We can't sit there every Tuesday night and give the
impression that for every argument on one side there is an equal one on the other side."
For a journalist's view that such an approach to broadcast news journalism is required by
the fairness doctrine, see E. EFRON, supra note 9, at 19.
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ably contribute more strongly to such journalism than does the
fairness doctrine. 119
The application of the relative component of the fairness doc-
trine to three recurring types of situations has been elaborated and
particularized through the establishment of three specific prin-
ciples within the relative component. These principles may be
referred to as the personal attack principle, the political editorial
principle, and the Banzhaf principle.
Formulated by the FCC, first by decision and subsequently in
the form or regulations, 20 the personal attack and political edito-
rial principles of the fairness doctrine were expressly approved in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.l2 ' These principles require a
licensee who has broadcast either a personal attack on an identi-
fied person or group 22 or a political editorial endorsing or oppos-
ing any legally qualified candidate for public office to notify the
person, group or affected candidates and offer a reasonable oppor-
tunity to respond. Generally, attacks by one political candidate
upon another and bona fide news programs are excepted from
these principles.' 23 While these principles can provide a specific
individual or group a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the
FCC does not regard them as forms of the first amendment right
of access. 124
It is difficult to determine whether the personal attack and
political editorial principles of the fairness doctrine increase the
presentation of controversial ideas over the broadcast media. Ob-
viously, on those occasions when either principle is invoked,
controversial ideas are likely to be broadcast. However, because
each such occasion probably costs the network or licensee a
significant amount of money, network and individual broadcast
managers are apt to attempt to minimize the number of such
occasions.' 25 Even if the personal attack principle does have a
119 Comment, From the FCC's Fairness Doctrine to Red Lion's Fiduciary Principle, 5
HARV. Civ. LIB., Civ. RIGHTS L. REV. 89, 96-97 (1970). See also Barrow, supra note 10,
at 486- 87; F. FRIENDLY, supra note 38, at e.g., 10, 122.
120 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.679 (1971).
121 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The decision was welcomed in a student comment, supra note
119, but received critically elsewhere, not only for approving the subject principles, but
also for deciding more than the narrow issue actually before it. Blake, supra note 7; Marks,
supra note 101.
122 Except, e.g., foreign groups or foreign public figures, 47 C.F.R. § 73.679(b)(1).
23 See e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.679(b)(2) and (3) (1971), and the Commission's note
following the section.
124 The FCC has stated that the principles rest
not upon an individual's right to be heard, but, rather, upon the proposition
that the public's right to be informed will be best served if the person
attacked or the candidate opposed presents the contrasting viewpoint.
Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, supra note 5, at 28.
125 See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 372, 392-93 (1969). A similar
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stultifying effect in a few specific situations, however, it generally
implements the public policy underlying the law of defamation 2 6
and should not be abandoned. Similarly, the political editorial
principle is, in effect, a reasonable extension of the statutory equal
opportunities philosophy to political editorials. 127 Yet, except dur-
ing the short life of political campaigns, the political editorial
principle is not likely to increase the broadcasting of controversial
ideas.
The Banzhaf principle is embodied in cases finding that the
broadcasting of certain product commercials amounts to the pre-
sentation of one side of a controversial issue of public impor-
tance.128 When such a finding is made, broadcasters are required
to provide a reasonable amount of programming presenting the
contrary view. To the extent that other programming does not
fulfill such a requirement, broadcasters must accept public interest
messages presenting the contrary view. The doctrine began with
cigarette advertisements and has recently been extended to adver-
tisements for high octane gasoline and high powered cars. l2 9
The Banzhaf principle has brought about an increase in the
broadcasting of controversial ideas. Since it requires the presenta-
tion of the view opposite to the view embodied in a commercial
message, and since most commercial messages reflect majoritarian
viewpoints, practically every application of the Banzhaf principle
will result in the broadcast of a controversial idea. Moreover, the
Banzhaf principle is unlikely to encourage any suppression of
controversial ideas, because the broadcasters still have a strong
argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Red Lion partially because it was
speculative, and partly because the FCC "is not powerless to insist that [licensees] give
adequate and fair attention to public issues." 395 U.S. at 392-93. A favorable student
comment on Red Lion nevertheless found this treatment "unconvincing." Comment, supra
note 119, at 96. Whatever the merits of the Court's former ground of rejection, the latter
ground appears valid only to the extent that the present level of effectiveness of the
absolute component of the fairness doctrine is satisfactory or capable of improvement
without threatening first amendment rights of broadcasters. See text accompanying notes
292-94 infra.
126 It this respect, Red Lion may mark a step back from the direction in which the
Supreme Court has been moving in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), and its progeny. Since there is an obvious need to develop alternate methods of
implementing the policy of defamation law which are more compatible with the first
amendment, the over-all effect of the personal attack principle may be highly constructive,
even though it seems unlikely that the principle will have a significantly favorable impact
upon the narrower problem considered in this article. See also text accompanying notes
345- 56 infra.
127 See note 101 supra and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 395 U.S. 367, 382-83,
385 (1969).
128 Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969);
Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 197 1).
129 Id. For a more extensive treatment of the doctrine, see Jaffe, supra note 15, at
775-79.
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economic incentive to carry the "triggering" commercial with a
relatively low risk of having to broadcast unsponsored opposing
messages. The principal weakness of the Banzhaf principle is that
its benefits are limited to the broadcast of only those ideas that
oppose the views of a "triggering" commercial, presently a rather
limited category.130
IV. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS: A NEW PROD FOR THE
RELUCTANT DRAGON
"It's all up, dragon!" he shouted as soon as he was within
sight of the beast. "He's coming! He's here now! You'll have
to pull yourself together and do something at last!"
-The Boy to the Reluctant Dragon, in
K. Grahame, The Reluctant Dragon
(1953)
A. The Genesis of the Right of Access
The first amendment right of access has evolved over a number
of years;' 3 ' its origin lies in decisions which were no doubt in-
tended by their authors to do little more than prohibit government
from imposing a prior restraint upon expression. 132 For example,
in Lovell v. City of Griffin,'33 the Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional a city ordinance that prohibited the distribution of any
kind of publication without prior permission from the city man-
ager, on the ground that the ordinance "would restore the system
of license and censorship in its baldest form."' 34
In Hague v. CIO 3 5 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
an ordinance requiring a permit before a public assembly or pa-
rade could be held on a public street, in a public park or near a
130 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 n. 34 (D.C.
Cir. 197 1).
131 The earliest case to recognize an affirmative right of access to a medium of mass
communication, Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P.
1919), appears to have been an anachronism. This 1919 decision, finding the only commu-
nity newspaper so clothed with the public interest that it had to allow all members of the
public to purchase advertising space, subject to any reasonable rules and classifications the
newspaper might impose, was so far ahead of its time that the law has not yet caught up.
132 For a recent case denying a right of access see Chicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune
Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), where the court held that the first amendment did not
require a newspaper to serve as a public forum so as to force newspaper publishers to
publish a labor union's editorial advertisement. The Seventh Circuit said that the union's
right to free speech did not give it the right to make use of the publishers' printing presses
and distribution systems without their consent.
133 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
134 Id. at 451-52.
135 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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public building. Mr. Justice Roberts' opinionl36 contained an ac-
cess-oriented description of the rights secured by the first amend-
ment:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places,
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immu-
nities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a
citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regu-
lated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order;
but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
denied.137
The right to engage in protected expression at recognized pub-
lic gathering places without local intervention was extended to
private property, under certain limited circumstances, in the
well-known case of Marsh v. Alabama.138 This case held that the
proprietors of a private town could not invoke the power of the
state to deny an individual the right to distribute religious liter-
ature on the sidewalk of the town's "business block."
Less well-known is the companion case, Tucker v. Texas.139
Here, defendant had been presenting religious views and dis-
tributing religious literature at a federally owned housing project
built for workers engaged in national defense activities. Although
the village was not a restricted area for security purposes, its
federally employed manager ordered the defendant to cease his
activities and had him arrested by state authorities when he re-
fused. The Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction. Of
the eight justices considering the case, four accepted for the
purpose of appeal the holding of the Texas courts that the man-
ager had been given authority by a federal agency to issue such an
136 There was no majority opinion in the case. An opinion by Mr. Justice Stone deemed
first amendment principles to be secured against state infringement by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, rather than the privileges and immunities clause upon
which Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion rested. Id. at 519, 512- 13, respectively.
137 Id. at 5 15- 16. The first sentence of the quotation was quoted with approval by the
Court in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (195 1). The balance of the quotation is an
early example of the right of access concept's being accompanied by assurances of the
opportunity to engage in reasonable regulation thereof.
138 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
139 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
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order, and then went on to find that this authorization violated the
freedoms of press and religion safeguarded by the first amend-
ment. The Justices added that while such restrictions might be
required for security reasons in certain circumstances, the govern-
ment had shown "no such necessity and no such intention on the
part of Congress or the Public Housing Authority."1 40 Despite
the lack of a majority opinion, 141 the case appears to support the
proposition that the federal government may not arbitrarily deny
access to federally owned property to persons wishing to engage
in protected first amendment expression. 142
While the United States Supreme Court was deciding Marsh
and Tucker, the Supreme Court of California in Danskin v. San
Diego Unified School District 43 was taking another step in the
evolution of the right of access. The California legislature had
required that school districts grant the free use of school audito-
riums for meetings by citizen groups to "discuss, from time to
time, as they may desire, any subjects and questions which in
their judgment appertain to the educational, political, economic,
artistic, and moral interests of the citizens."' 44 In short, the
legislature expressly established a public forum. Danskin placed
before the California court a subsequent amendment to the statute
by which the legislature sought to deny the use of such school
facilities to "subversive elements."
Justice Traynor, speaking for the court, found that the subver-
sive element exclusion was so broad as to exclude expression that
did not in any way constitute a clear and present danger:
The state is under no duty to make school buildings avail-
able for public meetings .... If it elects to do so, however, it
140 Id. at 520.
141 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a separate concurring opinion, refused to assume that
Congress had authorized the manager to prohibit defendant's activities. However, he did
state that:
In the case of communities established under the sponsorship of the United
States by virtue of its spending power, it would, I should think, be even less
desirable than in the case of company towns to make the constitutional
freedoms of religion and speech turn on gossamer distinctions about the
extent to which land has been "dedicated" to public uses.
Id. at 521. For explanation of the concept of land "dedicated" to public uses, see text
accompanying notes 224-33 supra.
142 See also Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), holding a postal
statute requiring an addressee of an item of "Communist political propaganda" to take
affirmative action within twenty days after notice to obtain delivery of the item, an
unconstitutional "limitation upon the unfettered exercise of the addressee's First Amend-
ment rights." Id. at 305. In addition, United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), held
unconstitutional a federal statute barring all employment in any defense facility of mem-
bers of certain organizations, because it interfered too broadly with the freedom of
association protected by the first amendment.
143 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).44 Id. at 540, 171 P.2d at 888.
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cannot arbitrarily prevent any members of the public from
holding such meetings .... Nor can it make the privilege of
holding them dependent on conditions that would deprive any
members of the public of their constitutional rights. A state is
without power to impose an unconstitutional requirement as a
condition for granting a privilege even though the privilege is
the use of state property....
Since the state cannot compel "subversive elements"
directly to renounce their convictions and affiliations, it can-
not make such a renunciation a condition of receiving the
privilege of free assembly in a school building.145
While the statement that the state has no affirmative duty to
provide a public forum is now being questioned, 146 Danskin pro-
vides a firm foundation for the right of access not only to publicly
owned forums, but also to publicly owned media. 147
Although Professor Chafee wrote about the need for affirmative
action to facilitate the presentation and discussion of unpopular
ideas over thirty years ago,1 48 Professor Barron presented the first
exposition of a right of access for individuals to today's oligopo-
listic mass media in 1967.'49 In his article, Barron argued for
abandonment of the "romantic view of the first amendment"
(essentially a laissez faire approach to the operation of the "mar-
ketplace of ideas"), in which the first amendment's role is limited
to the prohibition of laws and governmental actions that restrain
expression. Unfortunately, this "romantic view" of the first
amendment's operation has the predictable effect of permitting
those private persons who control mass communications media to
suppress and over-simplify ideas they consider undesirable. If the
marketplace is to function effectively, providing us with " 'the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources,' "150 the first amendment must be under-
stood to include an affirmative right of individual expression over
the mass media.1 5 1
145 Id.at 545-46, 171 P.2d at 891.
146 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 646 (1970).
147 For a good review of the development of first amendment public forum law, see
Horning, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 93 1.
148 Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 559 (1941). His later work,
GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947), treats the issue of affirmative govern-
mental action in much greater deatil, from postal subsidies to the antitrust laws. He
discusses, and rejects, the idea of applying the fairness doctrine, or at least the relative
component thereof, to the press. Id. (1965 ed.) at 624- 50. However, he does not appear to
have considered the more specific proposal of access for individuals for the expression of
their own ideas.
149 Barron, Access, supra note 11.
150 Id. at 1654, quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
151 Barron, Access, supra note 11, at 1641-56. The balance of the article analyzes and
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Since the appearance of Barron's article, those courts consid-
ering allegations of an individual right of access to publicly owned
media have almost uniformly recognized its existence. The cases
of Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority,152 Wirta v.
Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District,53 and Hillside Commu-
nity Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma154 all acknowledge an in-
dividual's first amendment right of access to publicly owned tran-
sit system advertising. Of these three cases, the California Su-
preme Court opinion in Wirta provides the most useful analysis of
the right of access. In Wirta plaintiff officers of Women for Peace
had offered to pay standard rates to place anti-Vietnam war post-
ers inside transit district buses, but their offer was refused. The
court relied heavily upon the determination by the defendant
transit district that placing advertising in its motor coaches would
not interfere with its primary function of providing transportation:
[D]efendants, having opened a forum for the expression of
ideas by providing facilities for advertisements on its buses,
cannot for reasons of administrative convenience decline to
accept advertisements expressing opinions and beliefs within
the ambit of First Amendment protection. 55
The court noted that the defendants' form of censorship gave total
freedom to mercantile messages, which are not protected by the
first amendment, but prohibited a form of expression which is
protected by the first amendment. Furthermore, the court stated
that many of the commercial messages implicitly took positions
on public issues, while the contrary positions were banned. 56
criticizes pertinent cases and considers several approaches to implementation of the right
of access.
152 274 F.Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
153 68 Cal.2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
154 76 Wash.2d 63, 455 P.2d 350 (1969).
155 68 Cal.2d at 55, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433. Danskin is naturally cited as
being directly on point. 68 Cal.2d at 55, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
156 The court gave several examples:
A minimum of imagination is required to illustrate the paradoxical scope of
the district's policy. A cigarette company is permitted to advertise the desir-
ability of smoking its brand, but a cancer society is not entitled to caution by
advertisement that cigarette smoking is injurious to health. A theater may
advertise a motion picture that portrays sex and violence, but the Legion for
Decency has no right to post a message calling for clean films. A lumber
company may advertise its wood products, but a conservation group cannot
implore citizens to write to the President or Governor about protecting our
natural resources. An oil refinery may advertise its products, but a citizens'
organization cannot demand enforcement of existing air pollution statutes.
An insurance company may announce its available policies, but a senior
citizens' club cannot plead for legislation to improve our social security
program. The district would accept an advertisement from a television station
that is commercially inspired, but would refuse a paid nonsolicitation mes-
sage from a strictly educational television station. Advertisements for travel,
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Thus, Wirta is in effect a precursor of the Banzhaf principle. 157
The defendant transit district also argued that riders might
believe that it endorsed the views of political advertisers. The
court rejected this contention, stating that defendants could con-
tinue their practice of requiring a disclaimer on political advertise-
ments posted in the buses. 158 While the court commended the
transit district for its equal opportunity program for political ad-
vertising during election campaigns, it said that the affirmative
efforts which had been made to inform opposing candidates of
their opportunity to advertise on the buses were not required in all
circumstances, so long as those wishing to state their protected
beliefs and opinions were permitted to do so on an equal basis:
[D]efendants may regulate the time and place and manner of
advertising to the extent necessary to accommodate those
who wish to purchase advertising space, and such regulations
are valid if they are applied without discrimination and with-
out restriction as to lawful and protected content.15 9
The cases of Zucker v. Panitz,160 Lee v. Board of Regents of
State Colleges,161 and Avins v. Rutgers, State University of New
Jersey,162 involve publicly owned print media. Zucker and Lee
apply the Wirta rationale to public high school and state univer-
sity student newspapers, respectively.16 3 The Zucker court ech-
oed Professor Barron's concern 164 with the harm that follows
from suppression of dissident ideas:
This lawsuit arises at a time when many in the education
community oppose the tactics of the young in securing a
foods, clothing, toiletries, automobiles, legal drugs-all these are acceptable,
but the American Legion would not have the right to place a paid advertise-
ment reading, "Support Our Boys in Viet Nam. Send Holiday Packages."
68 Cal.2d at 57-58,434 P.2d at 986-87, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434-35.
157 The Banzhaf principle is described in text accompanying notes 128- 29 supra.
158 68 Cal.2d at 61, 434 P.2d at 989, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
159 Id. at 62, 434 P.2d at 990, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
160 299 F.Supp. 102 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
161 306 F.Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971).
162 385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
163 Since the cases arose in publicly owned educational institutions, the courts also
relied upon Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), where the
Supreme Court stated that a public school student
may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in
Vietnam, if he does so without "materially and substantially interfer[ing] with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" and
without colliding with the rights of others .... But conduct by the student, in
class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or
type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial dis-
order or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
Id. at 513.
164 Barron, Access, supra note I1, at 1647.
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political voice. It would be both incongruous and dangerous
for this court to hold that students who wish to express their
views on matters intimately related to them, through tradi-
tionally accepted nondisruptive modes of communication,
may be precluded from doing so by that same adult commu-
nity. 16 5
In Lee, the defendant state university argued that the "Letters to
the Editor" column of the student newspaper was a sufficient
alternative to a paid advertisement. The district court rejected
that argument, because "a paid advertisement can be cast in such
a form as to command much greater attention than a letter to the
editor." The court held that to deprive the plaintiffs of the oppor-
tunity to command that attention infringed their freedom of ex-
pression.
In A vins the plaintiff alleged that his freedom of expression had
been violated by the editors of a state university law review
because they had refused to publish his article reviewing the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. From this
legislative history he had concluded that the Supreme Court had
erred in Brown v. Board of Education.6 6 The articles editor of
the review rejected the article on the ground that approaching the
problem from the point of view of legislative history alone was
insufficient. The trial judge had expressly found that that was a
valid reason for rejecting the article. 167 Furthermore, the plaintiff
conceded that he would be able to publish the article in some
other law review. Affirming the trial court, the Third Circuit held
that the plaintiff's first amendment rights had not been violated.
Barron does not view Avins as a refutation or unreasonable
restriction of the first amendment right of access. Rather, he
thinks it supports the proposition that the courts are capable of
fashioning reasonable rules governing the operation of the right of
access that will avoid undue infringement on the editorial dis-
cretion of the managers of any particular medium.'6 8 However, it
is difficult to derive specific guidelines for those rules from
Avins,16 9 perhaps because the opinion was written in advance of
16 299 F.Supp. at 105.
166 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
167 385 F.2d at 153.
168 Barron, Emerging Access, supra note I1, at 496-97.
169 Reliance upon the plaintiff's admitted opportunity to publish his article elsewhere
appears to ignore a theme, running through a number of first amendment cases since
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), to the effect that the availability of some other
place for a person to express his views is no justification for restricting his first amendment
right to express them at the place under consideration. It can be argued that, as to national
law issues, law reviews appear to have substantially the same circulation; thus, the plaintiff
still had an opportunity to express his opinion to the same audience, albeit through the
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most of the other access to state media opinions noted above and
apparently did not explicitly consider the principles that Barron
and earlier cases had developed. 170
B. Extension of the Right of Access to the
Broadcast Media
Against this backgound, two cases arose before the FCC in
1970, Democratic National Committee (DNC)171 and Business
Executives Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM)1 72 which extended
the basic principles of the right of access to the broadcast media.
In DNC the Democratic National Committee requested that the
FCC issue a declaratory ruling that a broadcaster "may not, as a
general policy, refuse to sell time to responsible entities, such as
DNC, for the solicitation of funds and for comment on public
issues."1 73 The FCC held that the Democratic National Com-
medium of a law review other than the Rutgers Law Review. However, such an analysis of
Avins might allow a network to reject a proferred editorial advertisement that had recently
been carried by another network, a result that makes the analysis appear questionable
unless narrowly limited.
Barron regards need for access as a critical factor in analysis of Avins, stating: "Since
the law review audience is a national one, unlike, for example, that of a monopoly
newspaper in a single city, the showing of a need for access in such a context ought to be
far more demanding." Barron, Emerging Access, supra note II, at 497. No doubt, network
executives would welcome the opportunity to rely upon such a rationale significantly to
reduce access.
Another analysis would seize upon the difference between paid editorial advertising and
the material that is selected by the editors of a particular medium to be published at no
charge, or with payment to the author. The A vins court stated that the plaintiff could not
"commandeer the press and columns of the Rutgers Law Review for the publication of his
article, at the expense of the subscribers to the Review and the New Jersey taxpayers, to
the exclusion of other articles deemed by the editors to be more suitable for publication."
385 F.2d at 153.
The court's finding that there was a "reasonable basis" for rejection of the article by the
law review editors may amount to approval of their selecting from among competing
applicants those submissions most worthy of publication through this necessarily limited
medium. Such an analysis would be consistent with the position taken in part IV D 2 of
this article on broadcasters' power to apportion a limited opportunity to purchase editorial
advertising time among a large number of applicants.
Some journalists are disturbed by the idea of judges reviewing editorial decisions. See,
e.g., Bagdikian, Right of Access: A Modest Proposal, 8 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 10
(Spring 1969).
170 The Kissinger case, supra note 152, was decided less than a month prior to argument
before the Avins court. The Barron article, Emerging Access, supra note II, appeared in
June of 1967, three months before argument, but was not cited inAvins. Nor did the court
cite Farmer v. Moses, 232 F.Supp. 154 (S.D. N.Y. 1964), in which managers of the New
York World's Fair had prohibited plaintiffs from handbilling and picketing two state
pavilions. Because of the congestion and arrangement of the fairgrounds, and the fact that
the expression did not relate to the fair or its management, the court did not order the
management to allow picketing, although the court did order the management to recognize
plaintiffs' right to distribute their leaflets.
171 25 F.C.C. 2d 216 (1970), rev'd, Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v.
FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
172 25 F.C.C. 2d at 242.
173 Id. at 216.
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mittee's request, so far as it posited a right to purchase air time for
comment on public issues, was inconsistent with the discretion
accorded to a licensee in meeting the requirements of the fairness
doctrine and with section 3(h) of the Communications Act of
1934174 which provides that broadcasting shall not be considered
common carriage.
The FCC briefly considered the argument that the first amend-
ment required the requested ruling, 175 saying that cases con-
cerning public parks or transit systems were inapposite because
they did not involve a medium already subject to a con-
stitutionally valid fairness doctrine protecting the public's right to
be informed. The FCC argued further that no practical way exis-
ted for implementation of a right of access to the broadcast
media. 176 The FCC did, however, approve the decisions of the
major networks to sell time to the Democratic National Com-
mittee to solicit funds for the party.
In BEM, AM station WTOP of Washington, D.C., had denied
the complainant the opportunity to purchase time to air spot
announcements urging immediate withdrawal of American forces
from Vietnam and other overseas military installations. The com-
plainant argued before the FCC that WTOP's refusal to sell time
violated the fairness doctrine. The FCC found that WTOP ap-
peared to have given adequate time to contrasting views on this
controversial issue, since its coverage of the Vietnam war under
the fairness doctrine had included the ideas which the com-
plainant wished to express. Finally, the FCC rejected on the basis
of the DNC opinion complainant's allegation of a violation of a
first amendment right of access. 177
Both DNC and BEM were appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court of
appeals combined them for argument and on August 3, 1971,
17447 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970).
17 5 The FCC said initially that it was beyond the power of an administrative agency to
declare its governing statute to be unconstitutional, but that even if the FCC could declare
the statute unconstitutional, it would not do so in this case. 25 F.C.C. 2d at 227, citing
Central Nebraska Pub. P. & I. Dist. v. FPC, 160 F.2d 782, 783 (8th Cir. 1947).
176 The Commission stated:
In short, we think the present system of regarding licensees as trustees
[citation omitted] with a duty to present contrasting viewpoints through
representative spokesmen, is constitutionally sound and of greater public
benefit than the concept of an individual right of access, which we have
shown has great drawbacks in the broadcast field.
25 F.C.C.2d at 228.
177 Commissioner Nicholas Johnson dissented to both of these opinions. His dissent to
DNC, 25 F.C.C.2d at 230, included a discussion of Wirta and a description of his views
on broadcaster implementation of the right of access. His dissent to BEM, 25 F.C.C.2d at
249, included an extensive analysis of state action arguments and the right of access cases
discussed in part IVA of this article.
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issued a combined opinion, Business Executives' Move for Viet-
nam Peace v. FCC.178 Judge J. Skelly Wright succinctly de-
scribed the principle involved:
The principle at stake here is one of fundamental impor-
tance: it concerns the people's right to engage in and to hear
vigorous public debate on the broadcast media. More speci-
fically, it concerns the application of that right to the substan-
tial portion of the broadcast day which is sold for advertising.
For too long advertising has been considered a virtual free
fire zone, largely ungoverned by regulatory guidelines. As a
result, a cloying blandness and commercialism-sometimes
said to be characteristic of radio and television as a
whole-have found an especially effective outlet. We are con-
vinced that the time has come for the Commission to cease
abdicating responsibility over the uses of advertising time.
Indeed, we are convinced that broadcast advertising has great
potential for enlivening and enriching debate on public issues,
rather than drugging it with an overdose of non-ideas and
non-issues as is now the case.
Under attack here is an allegedly common practice in the
broadcast industry-airing only those paid presentations
which advertise products or which deal with "non-
controversial" matters, and confining the discussion of con-
troversial public issues to formats such as the news or docu-
mentaries which are tightly controlled and edited by the
broadcaster.' 79
The FCC unsuccessfully argued before the court that a licensee
may maintain a flat ban on editorial advertisements, first, because
the licensee discretion built into the fairness doctrine permits him
to discharge his responsibility to cover controversial issues
through means other than the acceptance of editorial advertise-
ments and, second, because the fairness doctrine requirement of
full and fair coverage of issues of public importance-even though
carried out exclusively by means other than the broadcasting of
editorial advertisements -"provides as much protection of public
debate as the first amendment demands."' 180
The D.C. Circuit's opinion raises the fundamental issue of the
first amendment interests of members of the public in the oper-
ation of radio and television. The D.C. Circuit noted only a few
prior efforts to assert such a right, all having failed because of the
courts' narrower view of the first amendment and a narrower view
178 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The case is noted in 85 HARv. L. Rrv. 689 (1972).
179 450 F.2d at 645-46.
18 ld. at 648.
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of "state action"-a view limiting the ambit of the first amend-
ment to the actions of Congress or agencies of the federal govern-
ment and excluding action of private corporations such as broad-
cast licensees. The court determined that recent developments in
the concept of state action and the Supreme Court's decisions in
Red Lion' 81 had cleared the path of "such doctrinal imped-
imenta."1 2 Even if broadcast licensees are "private" businesses,
under the first amendment ownership does not always mean abso-
lute dominion, as Marsh8 3 illustrated. The court relied on the
extraordinary relationship of "interdependence" and "joint parti-
cipation" reminiscent of the situation in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority'8 4 which, it asserted, now existed between
broadcasters and the federal government. Furthermore, while pri-
or cases had been direct suits against broadcast licensees, BEM
involved review of a decision by the FCC expressly approving a
flat ban on editorial advertising. 18 5 In short, the court was review-
ing not simply a private decision, but a decision by a federal
agency "which must inevitably provide guidance for future broad-
caster action." 186
Having decided that broadcast licensees adminster their facil-
ities subject to first amendment constraints, the court analyzed the
public's first amendment interests in the operation of radio and
television and the application of those interests to the issue of
editorial advertising. It began by emphasizing that these cases
dealt only with the public's first amendment interests in the broad-
caster's allocation of advertising time-time already relinquished
by broadcasters to others-and not normal programming time.'8 7
After noting the broadcasters' limited interests in the allocation of
advertising time, the court went on to emphasize not only the
public interest in receiving a broad range of ideas and experiences
(an interest already protected by the fairness doctrine), but also
the public interest in the manner in which views are presented, as
opposed to their content,' and the interest of individuals and
181 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
182 450 F.2d at 650.
183 See text accompanying note 138 supra.
184 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). This case held that a restaurant operating in space leased
within a publicly owned parking garage building was sufficiently engaged in state action to
subject it to fourteenth amendment prohibitions against refusing to serve Blacks.
115 Similar regulatory acquiescence was important in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451 (1952), in which a governmentally regulated, privately owned city transit
system was found to be engaged in state action.
186 450 F.2d at 653.
187 450 F.2d at 654. See also note 299 and accompanying text infra.
188 In Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F.Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969),
aff'd., 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 161- 166
supra, defendant newspaper's willingness to print plaintiffs' views in its letters to the
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groups in effective self-expression.189 Allowing others to speak in
their own way-instead of relying solely on bureaucrats and li-
censees to decide what issues are important and how they should
be covered-is the essence of the first amendment concept of a
free market of ideas. Broadcaster retention of total initiative and
editorial control, no matter how wisely executed, may be inimical
to the first amendment idea that truth must be discovered out of a
multitude of tongues, rather than authoritative selection or super-
vised discussion. 190 Even though a licensee had broadcast
anti-war views, an anti-war editorial advertisement would not
necessarily duplicate the licensee's regular coverage of that issue;
the court predicted differences in style and intensity of feeling and
expression that would enliven and enrich the public's overall
information.' 9 1 And while agreeing that spot editorial advertise-
ments might distort or oversimplify complex issues, the court
noted that the first amendment protects many forms of misleading
and oversimplified political expression in order to assure robust,
wide-open debate. If factual error or defamatory content is con-
stitutionally protected, 9 2 so is brevity of expression.
The court did not have to decide whether the broadcast me-
dium is a public forum in the sense in which public streets, parks,
meeting halls, or even bus terminals are. 93 The petitioners had
editors column did not undermine plaintiffs' right to purchase advertising space for such
expression. The court recognized plaintiffs' interest in the manner of expression of their
views, stating:
[A] paid advertisement can be cast in such a form as to command much
greater attention than a letter to the editor. Large type, photographs, repeated
publication and full pages of space are some of the modes of expression
available in an editorial advertisement that might not be available in a letter
to the editor.
306 F.Supp. at 101.
189 While the Red Lion court did say that "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write
or publish," 395 U.S. at 388, because broadcast time is necessarily limited, the court in
BEM observed that this limitation did not entirely do away with the interest of the
individual or group in effective self-expression. Instead, that interest must be limited to a
"reasonably regulated, 'abridgeable' right to speak." 450 F.2d at 655. As the court viewed
the history of the first amendment and its interpretation outside broadcasting, it could
hardly be argued that "the First Amendment protects ideas but not an individual's interest
in expressing them and doing so in his own way." Id.
190450 F.2d at 656, citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), and
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The court also noted that
even the constitutional interest relied upon by the FCC-the viewer's interest in access to
a full spectrum of viewpoints-will be better attained if others are also allowed to supple-
ment the licensee's assessment of importance, controversiality and full coverage. 450 F.2d
at 657.
191450 F.2d at 657.
192 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
193 See text accompanying notes 13 1- 170 supra. Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392
F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968) and In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1967), held respectively that bus terminals and railroad stations were public forums.
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confined their attacks to commercial broadcasters, allowing the
court to deal solely with a forum that already had been opened to
members of the public by the licensees themselves, albeit dis-
criminatorily. 194 When so viewed, the court readily found that
these cases fell within an area of law already well developed, the
law of access to state media described above. 195 By opening their
forum to paid commercial speech, while excluding paid editorial
advertisements, the broadcasters had indulged in a prima facie
constitutional violation which could be justified only by showing
"a substantial factor distinguishing the disruptive effect of edito-
rial advertising from that of commercial advertising.' 196 To point
solely to the content of the excluded speech as the "substantial
factor" would present an even clearer constitutional violation.
Discrimination against all controversial speech is censorship fa-
voring the status quo.' 97
The FCC and intervenors had alleged that a holding for peti-
tioners would give editorial advertisers a right to air time that
commercial advertisers would not have' 98 and would allow peti-
tioners to "grab the mike" from broadcasters' hands. They further
alleged that a holding for petitioners would result in: (1) returning
to the chaos of radio's early days; (2) allowing a few rich in-
dividuals or groups to buy so much time and so nearly to monopo-
lize the medium, as to upset the station's balanced treatment of
the issue; and (3) threatening broadcasters' economic
self-sufficiency by requiring them to offer free advertising time, if
necessary, to maintain the balance required by the fairness doc-
trine. The court also rejected these arguments, noting that the
FCC and intervenors misunderstood the narrowness of the issue:
194 The court described broadcasters' discriminatory policies:
[Tihe political nature of editorial advertising places it near the core of the
First Amendment. However, the very characteristic which affords it strict
constitutional protection is also the characteristic causing the broadcasters'
challenged policy to single it out and exlude it from the airwaves. That, we
believe, is the crucial aspect of these cases.
450 F.2d at 659.
195 See text accompanying notes 13 1-170 supra. The court stated:
Six courts have confronted discriminations among types of speech like the
one challenged here. Every one of them-four federal courts and two state
supreme courts-has held that once a forum, subject to First Amendment
constraints, has been opened up for commercial and "noncontroversial"
advertising, a ban on "controversial" editorial advertising is unconstitutional
unless clearly justified by a "clear and present danger."
450 F.2d 659, citing the Lee, Zucker, Kissinger, Hillside Church, and Wirta cases.
196 450 F.2d at 660.
1
9 7 Id. at 661, citing the examples from Wirta, quoted in note 156 supra.
198 A preference for editorial advertisers over commercial advertisers would appear
consistent with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), which held that "purely
commercial advertising" is not protected by the first amendment against government
prohibition. Id. at 54
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All petitioners ask is that broadcasters be required to accept
some advertising. They do not advocate an absolute right to
air their advertisements .... What petitioners do argue is that
editorial advertisements should at least be considered and
that some should be aired.
Such a modest reform would not substantially undermine
broadcasters' editorial control over their frequencies. For
broadcasters would retain full latitude to control the content
of their programming. Their editorial control over nonadver-
tising time would not be disturbed whatever. All that would
be affected is their allocation of advertising time-an area in
which editorial control over content has never been of major
importance. The interest in deciding which advertisements to
accept is not as great as in deciding what public issues to
cover and how to cover them on news presentations, for
example.... [Nor is a] broadcaster traditionally.., as in-
volved in the preparation and editing of advertisements as a
law review staff is in the preparation and editing of articles. 199
In addition, the court pointed out that traditional first amend-
ment theory provides that access to forums may be made subject
to reasonable regulations. Broadcasters would, therefore, be able
to control time, place and manner of speech, not to stifle speech
but to prevent competing groups from drowning out one another.
Broadcasters could also place a limit on the total time sold for
editorial advertising and regulate placement in the broadcast day,
so long as they did not engage in a "major" discrimination in such
placement. The court stated that the FCC, on remand, was to
develop reasonable regulations specifying the control which
broadcasters might exercise over editorial advertising. Since
broadcasters had successfully handled scheduling problems asso-
ciated with commercial advertising, the court felt that they should
be able to handle editorial advertisements in the same evenhanded
manner.
200
Similarly the possibility that wealthy individuals or groups
might be able to dominate editorial advertising time was held not
to justify a total ban on editorial advertising. The right of the
wealthy to operate their own magazines, newspapers or broadcast
stations is still protected by the first amendment despite the ad-
vantages of wealth. To prevent the potential problem of a "one-
sided flood of editorial advertisements," the court stated that the
199450 F.2d at 662-63. The last clause is a reference to Avins v. Rutgers, State
University of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968),
discussed in text accompanying notes 166- 170.
200 Particularly since those broadcasters already allowing editorial advertising had not
been shown to have experienced chaos. 450 F.2d at 664.
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FCC and licensees could set "outside limits on the amount of
advertising time that will be sold to one group or to representa-
tives of one particular narrow viewpoint. 20 1
As to the effect of fairness doctrine obligations, the court said
that if editorial advertisements are accepted on one side of an
issue, the FCC might require broadcasters to accept at least some
advertisements on the other side of the issue, free of charge if
necessary. But the court was quick to state that the FCC had the
power to make necessary adjustments upon a proper showing of a
threat of actual financial harm to a particular broadcaster.202
In short, the court concluded that none of the problems
raised were sufficient to justify an absolute ban on editorial adver-
tising. The court looked to the past and demonstrated that the
FCC had not always considered the task of reasonably regulating
access to the broadcast media so difficult. Quoting from an FCC
decision twenty-five years earlier, which held that a broadcaster
had violated free speech rights by refusing to sell program time for
the airing of controversial views, 203 the court said that the FCC
and broadcast licensees were no less competent to deal with this
problem in 1971 than they had been in 1945:
In the end, it may unsettle some of us to see an anti-war
message or a political party message in the accustomed place
of a soap or beer commercial. But we must not equate what is
habitual with what is right-or what is constitutional. A
society already so saturated with commercialism can well
afford another outlet for speech on public issues. All that we
may lose is some of our apathy. That is a small price to
pay. 204
In dissenting, Judge McGowan stated that the task of drawing up
the required regulations would not be as easy as the majority
suggested. He also noted that in the past the fairness doctrine had
been considered an adequate means of informing the public, and
questioned whether the substitution of a system in which money
alone determines what is to be broadcast would be a wise
course. 20 5 The dissent would have left this matter to the discretion
of the FCC; it could, on its own initiative, adopt such regulations
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515, 517- 18 (1945).
204 450 F.2d at 665-66.
205 Id. at 666. This characterization of the effect of the right of access appears to rely
more upon Commissioner Johnson's view that sale of editorial advertising time should be
on a first-come, first-served basis, 25 F.C.C.2d at 234-35, than it does upon the view of
the majority that Commission regulations could be written to "prevent domination by a
few groups or a few viewpoints," 450 F.2d at 664.
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but should not be required to review this question "in a con-
stitutional straitjacket which dictates the result in advance." 20 6
C. Applying First Amendment Constraints to
Private Licensees
In the state media cases described in part IV A of this article,
the first and fourteenth amendments were held to constrain state
agencies and instrumentalities of government from arbitrarily
denying an individual access to the media. The denial of access
was "state action" unreasonably restricting an individual's free-
dom of expression. The courts have regarded municipally-owned
bus systems and public high school or state college newspapers as
public forums to which the first and fourteenth amendments ap-
ply.
On the other hand, where only private action restrains an
individual's ability to express his views to the public at large, the
absence of state action is said to prevent the courts from even
considering whether the private restraint in question impairs ex-
pression in violation of constitutional norms, unless valid imple-
menting legislation protects those norms.20 7 When the private
restraint is imposed by the press, this restricted view is reinforced
by the traditional view of the first amendment as solely a restraint
upon governmental bodies (including courts). 208 The traditional
analysis is not applicable, however, to government action enforc-
ing an individual's right of access, because such action is not
implementing an area of law that conflicts with the first amend-
ment as a whole. Instead, such action requires the balancing of
zonflicting first amendment interests, neither of which can be
"preferred." 20 9 In fact, the courts are already performing the kind
of balancing process in the state media cases that extension of the
206 Id. at 667.
207 Chicago Joint Board v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
208 For example, Justice Black said: "The basic premise of the First Amendment is that
all present instruments of communication, as well as others that inventive genius may bring
into being, shall be free from governmental censorship or prohibition." Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (dissenting opinion) (allowing municipal regulation of sound
trucks). See also Barron, Access, supra note I1, at 1641-43. First amendment prohibitions
of court actions impairing expression, whether or not at the request of other individuals,
are set forth in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (contempt); Pennakamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (contempt): New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 245
(1964) (defamation); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (right of privacy); Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (defamation).
209 Areas of the law that conflict with the first amendment as a whole include national
security, Roebel, supra note 270; criminal syndicalism, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969); obscenity, Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) and Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); and defamation and invasion of privacy, note 208 supra.
See also Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Branden-
burg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970).
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right of access to privately owned media would require, that is, a
balancing of the first amendment interests of a publisher or a
broadcast licensee against the first amendment interests of the
individual seeking access.
Nevertheless, there is a strong precedential basis for the dis-
tinction between private and state action; 210 therefore, this section
will consider state action and the electronic media. The analyses
will extend beyond the classification of electronic media action as
state action to examine the extent to which such a classification
permits federal limitation of expression over the electronic media.
1. Rationales for Applying First Amendment Constraints to
Private Individuals-The concept of "state action" encompasses
a multitude of rationales. 21' Although these categories are not
mutually exclusive, and a single fact situation may involve more
than one rationale, 21 2 the following analysis will separate these
rationales into three categories: agent action, government action,
and public action.
"Agent action" means that the actions of some private in-
dividuals are, in effect, the actions of an identifiable unit of gov-
ernment or are so bound up with such a unit as to necessitate their
being treated as an extension of that unit.213 Examples are a
privately owned restaurant in a government owned parking ga-
rage 21 4 and a pre-primary election of a county political organ-
ization.215 An important incident of agent action is that it subjects
a private individual to forms or degrees of state or local govern-
ment regulation beyond those applicable to private citizens in
Government action requiring the balancing of competing first amendment interests is
seen in Lee v. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F.Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wisc. 1969),
affd, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir., 1971). Lee's holding that the editor of a state college
newspaper may be required to publish an editorial advertisement cannot be explained by
saying that the editor has no first amendment rights to assert in defense against such an
action. State college newspapers may not be subjected to prior restraints. Antonelli v.
Hammond, 308 F.Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970); Korn v. Elkins, 317 FSupp. 138 (D. Md.
1970); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F.Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971).
210 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For a recent demonstration of the continued
vitality of the distinction, compare Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), with Evans v.
Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). But, ef. Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971)
(Congress, pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, may "enforce the rights
guaranteed by the Amendment against private conspiracies.").
211 See e.g., Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 253-64
(1970), rev'd, Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 197 1).
212 See, e.g., the discussion of Marsh %'. Alabama in text accompanying notes 227-235
infra, showing that that case might fall under an agent action or public action rationale.
212 The relationship between private individual and unit of government is thus a broader
one than that implied by the word "agent." The word "instrumentality" is probably more
accurate.
214 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
215 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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general. 216 If a broadcast licensee's actions constitute state action
under the agent action concept, the licensee may be subject to
extensive governmental regulation beyond that necessitated by
present technological limitations upon entry into broadcasting. 21 7
In Chicago Joint Board v. Chicago Tribune Co.,2 1 the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed a rejection of the argument that there was
sufficient "state involvement" in the operation of the defendant
newspapers to make their conduct subject to the restrictions ap-
plicable where there is state action:
Rather than regarded as an extension of the state exercising
delegated powers of a governmental nature, the press has
long and consistently been recognized as an independent
check on governmental power....
In sum, the function of the press from the days the Con-
stitution was written to the present time has never been
conceived as anything but a private enterprise, free and in-
dependent of government control and supervision. Rather
than state power and participation pervading the operation of
the press, the news media and the government have had a
history of disassociation. 219
If agent action rationales were the only state action rationales
available, the concern expressed above would justify shrinking
from direct application of constitutional restraints opon broadcast
licensees. Fortunately, they are not the only state action ration-
ales available; there are additional rationales that apply con-
stitutional restraints to actions of private individuals without
otherwise bringing them under the almost proprietary or manage-
rial control of some unit of government associated with agent
action.
Some private actions are subject to constitutional constraint
because they can be carried out only with the aid of the power 220
216 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), for example, we
can assume that the city by virtue of owning the property on which the restaurant was
located had a more pervasive ability to exercise control over the restaurant than it would
have had if the restaurant had been across the street from the parking garage on privately
owned land. Undoubtedly, it could have, and indeed should have, placed a condition in its
lease with the restaurant requiring the lessee to offer restaurant services without dis-
crimination on the basis of race, regardless of whether it had the power under state law to
enact civil rights ordinances governing privately owned businesses in general.
The advertising agency in Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F.Supp.
438 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), which managed advertising in the Transit Authority subway system
was engaged in state action with respect to such advertising. See Barron, Emerging
Access, supra note II, at 489. Presumably, the terms of the contract between the Author-
ity and the advertising agency gave the Authority ultimate managerial control over adver-
tising in the subway system, making the agency's state ac tion a form of agent action.
217 See text accompanying notes 94- 100 supra, and part IV C 2 of this article.
218 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
219 435 F.2d at 474, quoting from 307 F.Supp. 422, 427 (N.D. III. 1969).
220 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948). After defendant homeowner had contracted
to sell his home to a Black in violation of a racially restrictive covenant, the plaintiff
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or the encouragement 221 of the state. In both cases, the action of a
private individual is deemed state action because of the parallel
action of some unit of government itself; hence these rationales
are termed government action rationales. The classic example is
state court enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant.22 2 An-
other example is a municipality's transfer of a public park to
private trustees to escape the obligations of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 22 3 In the government action rationales, government control
over the private party is limited T.government's ordinary police
powers over citizens in general. But this element of government
assistance, encouragement or authorization of private dis-
crimination has made such discrimination unlawful under the
fourteenth amendment.
The third rationale, "public action," is more difficult to de-
scribe. Under long established property law, a private owner's
acquiescence in public use of his land may operate as a formal
dedication of the land to the public use.224 When such formal
dedication has occurred, the state or municipality can, for many
purposes, treat the land as state or municipally owned land or land
subject to a state or municipal easement. Thus, management of
land formally dedicated to a public use is state action,225 either
agent action or government action depending on the circum-
stances.
However, state action is not limited to those situations in which
complete formal dedication has occurred. 226 For example, in
Marsh v. Alabama227 the Supreme Court held that a state could
not consistently with the first and fourteenth amendments impose
neighbor could seek to halt the action only through the aid of a court. Any attempt at
forceful "self-help" such as assault, arson, or the like, would have been a crime or a tort or
both.
221 Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S.
244 (1963).
Irrespective of whether private discriminations so "encouraged" amount to state action,
judicial intervention may limit or prevent further discrimination. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
222 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
223 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
224 See, e.g., Velasco v. Goldman Builders, Inc., 93 N.J. Super. 123, 225 A.2d 148
(1966); Allen v. Village of Savage, 261 Minn. 334, 112 NW. 2d 807 (1961).
225 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
226 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 510 (1946):
Constitutional privileges having such a reach [as to accord purveyors of
ideas, religious or otherwise, "a preferred position"] ought not to depend
upon a State court's notion of the extent of "dedication" of private property
to public purposes. Local determinations of such technical matters govern
controversies affecting property. But when decisions by State courts in-
volving local matters are so interwoven with the decision of the question of
Constitutional rights that one necessarily involves the other, state determina-
tion of local questions cannot control the Federal Constitutional right.
227326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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criminal punishment on a person who distributes religious liter-
ature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the
wishes of the town's management, even though the proprietors of
the private town apparently had not dedicated the sidewalks in
their business block to the public use.22 8 Of course, since the
proprietors were performing a full range of municipal services,
they could, alternatively, have been said to have engaged in agent
action.22 9 But the privately owned shopping center in Amalga-
mated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza2 30 was not
providing municipal services and yet was held subject to the first
amendment rights of labor union pickets.2 31 The actions of the
shopping center were short of formal dedication, as the following
quotation from Justice Marshall's opinion demonstrates:
This Court has also held ... that under some circum-
stances property that is privately owned may, at least for
First Amendment purposes, be treated as though it were
publicly held.
[I]t may well be that respondents' ownership of the proper-
ty here in question gives them various rights, under the laws
of Pennsylvania, to limit the use of that property by members
of the public in a manner that would not be permissible were
the property owned by a municipality. All we decide here is
that because the shopping center serves as the community
business block "and is freely accessible and open to the
people in the area and those passing through" [citing Marsh],
the State may not delegate the power, through the use of its
trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public
wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the
228 The proprietors had posted a sign saying "This Is Private Property, and Without
Written Permission, No Street, or House Vendor, Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will
Be Permitted." 326 U.S. at 503.
229 See, e.g., Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 258-59
(1970),rev'd, Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 197 1); Spriggs, Access of Visitors to Labor Camps on Privately Owned Property, 21
U. FLA. L. REV. 295, 302-03 (1969); Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 330-33 (1968).
2 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
231 Mr. Justice White's dissent stressed that:
[1]n Marsh, the company ran an entire town .and the State was deemed to
have devolved upon the company the task of carrying out municipal func-
tions. But here the "streets" of Logan Valley Plaza are not like public
streets; they are not used as thoroughfares for general travel from point to
point, for general parking, for meetings, or for Easter parades.
391 U.S. at 340.
The state courts, relying upon state trespass law, had enjoined the labor union from
picketing on the parking lot and sidewalks of the shopping center, thus restricting picketing
activities to narrow areas adjacent public thoroughfares and well away from the situs of the
dispute. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
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premises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant
with the use to which the property is actually put.232
The Logan Valley Plaza opinion did not indicate that formal
dedication had occurred or that the local government had ex-
ercised any powers over the shopping center greater than its
ordinary police powers. One might postulate state action from the
use of state trespass laws, a government action rationale, but to
do so would presuppose that a shopping center could avoid Logan
Valley Plaza by erecting a fence or by building an enclosed mall
and refusing entry to persons carrying picket signs, handbills or
the like, while admitting everyone else.233
Since neither agent action, nor government action, is fully con-
sistent with Logan Valley Plaza, an additional rationale, public
action, is required to account for the court's finding of state
action. In granting the general public unrestricted access to the
plaza, the private corporate owner of the shopping center engaged
in public action that, in effect, waived its private citizen status and
its immunity from the constraints of the fourteenth amendment. 234
The private corporation had established a direct interrelationship
with the public at large which made it subject to the public's free
speech rights. As Mr. Justice Black said in Marsh: "The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."235
A private individual engaged in public action becomes subject
to some governmental controls not applicable to ordinary private
232 391 U.S. at 316, 319-20.
Presumably, respondents could routinely bar all persons from the shopping center's
parking lots and sidewalks throughout the hours during which the center is closed. Short of
an emergency justifying a curfew (an exercise of general police power, rather than munici-
pal ownership authority), it seems unlikely, however, that a municipality could similarly
bar use of its ordinary sidewalks during hours when adjacent businesses are closed.
23 In Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), the
Supreme Court of California extended Logan Valley Plaza to all peaceful and reasonably
exercised first amendment expression, outside or within a shopping center's enclosed mall.
At trial upon plaintiffs' complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, the parties agreed
that defendant shopping center would have used a state trespass statute to enforce its
uniformly applied prohibition against noncommercial expression on its premises; no men-
tion was made of using self-help. Nonetheless, the court held plaintiffs entitled to a
judgment "declaring that defendants may not constitutionally impose a prohibition on all
First Amendment activity on the premises of their shopping center." This language hardly
appears to contemplate the use of self-help (blocking the doors of the enclosed mall to
those bearing leaflets or signs) as a lawful means of avoiding its requirements.
234 A private individual may also, in effect, waive other fourteenth amendment due
process rights by allowing the public to use his property. See City of Clayton v. Nemours,
353 Mo. 61, 192 S.W.2d 57 (1944). The author acknowledges the assistance of James A.
Lake, Professor of Law, University of Nebraska, in broadening his insights into this area
of law.
2m 326 U.S. at 506. Also quoted in Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. at 325.
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citizens. Since his public action has given the public certain rights
or opportunities that they could not otherwise assert against him,
governmental controls may be established as necessary to enforce
those rights or to ensure those opportunities. 23 6 Thus, the owner
of a shopping mall in Diamond v. Bland23 7 was held to be subject
to such control - in that case, a court injunction - to protect the
right of access of members of the public wishing to exercise free
speech rights inside the mall.
One of the most extreme examples of additional governmental
control of private persons engaged in public action is govern-
mental control of public utilities. The privately-owned public utili-
ty or common carrier company has not formally dedicated the
company's equipment and property to the public; it is still private-
ly owned unless the company performs additional actions or
otherwise acquiesces in formal dedication of a portion of its
property. 38 Thus, as to the bulk of its property which has not
been formally dedicated to public use, the mere management
thereof is not agent or government action. Nevertheless, the ac-
tions of a public utility or common carrier in serving the public
have been held state action, 23 9 and public action rationales readily
support these holdings. 240
When the government regulates a privately-owned utility or
236 In City of Clayton v. Nemours, 353 Mo. 61, 182 S.W.2d 57 (1944), the city had
prohibited parking on a portion of a privately owned street, even though it claimed no right
in the street "arising from dedication, condemnation, or prescription." Id. at 64, 182
S.W.2d at 59. In appealing a parking ticket, the defendant, the owner of property adjacent
to the no parking zone, contended that the ordinance establishing that zone had deprived
defendant of vested property rights in that portion of the private street without due process
of law and without just compensation. The decision rejected those arguments:
Defendant's basic premise is wrong. Instead of the municipality appro-
priating private property to a public use, there was evidence that Glen Ridge
avenue was devoted to a public use by the owners thereof and the municipal-
ity thereafter, exercising its governmental function referable to the police
power, regulated in a reasonable manner such public user for the protection
and in the interest of the public safety, health, and welfare.
In the instant case, sufficient for the purpose of this review, Glen Ridge
avenue was devoted, although not dedicated, to the public use by acts of the
owners. It was not taken over by the municipality. In so devoting the use of
their property, the owners constituted Glen Ridge avenue a de facto although
not a de jure public street within the meaning of statutory and ordinance
provisions, the word public, when applied to highways, not being restricted to
connote ownership alone but in proper instances being employed to describe
the use. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 65-66, 182 S.W.2d at 59-60.
237 3 Cal.3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970).
238 Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Muncey, 229 Ky. 538, 544, 17 S.W.2d 422, 425 (1929);
Crane v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., I F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1924).
239 Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d
845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
240 So also do traditional definitions of the obligations associated with public utility
status:
[VOL. 5:2
WINTER 1972] Right of Access
carrier, it does so to protect the public's right to reasonable and
non-discriminatory rates, practices and service; however, actions
by the utility or carrier outside their areas of obligation to the
public are no more subject to government regulation than similar
actions by other businesses. 241 Thus, even the public action of
public utilities and common carriers does not subject them to
governmental regulation beyond the bounds of their dedication to
the public service. Public action is not subject to the more ex-
treme forms of governmental intervention applicable to agent
action.
2. The First Amendment and Broadcaster Use of the Electro-
magnetic Spectrum- Broadcasting uses a natural resource, the
electromagnetic spectrum, 242 in a manner analogous to farming, in
that both activities require occupancy of a defined portion of a
resource to the exclusion of most other uses. 243 A farm occupies a
tract of land with ascertainable boundaries. Likewise a particular
broadcaster's transmission of electromagnetic radiation occupies a
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum having definable bound-
aries, although the overall system of boundary definition and
measurement is more complex than the system used to set the
boundaries for land.24 4 Moreover, barring 'some disaster, most
It is the duty which the purveyor or producer has undertaken to perform on
behalf of and so owes to the public generally, or to any defined portion of it,
as the purveyor of a commodity, or-as an agency in the performance of a
service, which stamps the purveyor or the agency as being a public service
utility.
Pinney & Boyle Co. v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co., 168 Cal. 12, 14, 141 P. 620, 621
(1914). "Public use, then, means the use by the public and by every individual member of
it, as a legal right." Allen v. Railroad Comm'n of Calif., 179 Cal. 68, 88, 175 P. 466, 474
(1918).
[Tihe principal determinative characteristic of a public utility is that of
service to, or readiness to serve an indefinite public (or portion of the public
as such), which has a legal right to demand and receive its services or
commodities.
Motor Cargo v. Bd. of Township Trustees, 52 Ohio Op. 257, 258, 117 N.E.2d 224, 226
(Summit Co. C.P. 1953).
241 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 12- 13 (1969), quoting
from Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota ex rel McCue, 236 U.S. 585, 595 (1915):
Utilities may act in a private, as distinguished from a public, capacity. They
may enter into agreements between themselves and with others free from
state control ... so long as those contracts are not oppressive and do not
impair the utility obligation. Public utility status should not be imposed on
such "private" activities by either regulatory or legislative action, for cer-
tainly "the state does not enjoy the freedom of an owner."
242 Electromagnetic radiation can be seen within a limited range of frequencies in a
rainbow or the display of a prism. Electronic equipment is used to produce, emit, receive
and interpret electromagnetic radiations of lower frequencies than the frequencies of light.
The full range of frequencies which can be occupied by such electromagnetic radiations
constitute the electromagnetic spectrum. See generally, W. JONES, supra note 90, at 1019;
Levin, supra note 99; SILENT CRISIS, supra note 99, at 2.
243 W. JONES, supra note 90, at 1020.
244 Furthermore, throughout much of the spectrum electormagnetic radiation tapers off
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occupancies of a farm cannot be terminated on a moment's notice;
occupancy of the electromagnetic spectrum can be terminated
virtually instantaneously by shutting off the pertinent transmitter.
The limits of an occupation of land can be described in terms of
the length of time involved and the necessary physical dimen-
sions: length, width, and, if some structure is tall enough to affect
aviation, a fourth variable, height. The limits of an occupation of
the electromagnetic spectrum are at least five: the three dimen-
sions necessary to describe the volume of space occupied, plus
time and a characteristic of electromagnetic radiation known as
frequency. 245 The same volume of space may at the same time be
usefully occupied by many electromagnetic radiations if their fre-
quencies are sufficiently different from one another, as our own
experiences in selecting a particular radio or television signal
demonstrate. On the other hand, as one notices at night on AM
standard radio, if two or more electromagnetic radiations of iden-
tical, or insufficiently dissimilar, frequencies occupy the same
volume of space at the same time, interference results rendering
part of our electromagnetic spectrum resource useless, until such
time as all but one of the radiations are no longer present in
sufficient strength to cause interference. Each broadcast occu-
pancy of the electromagnetic spectrum occupies a band of fre-
quencies of a width (usually called bandwidth) that varies from
one broadcast service to another. 246 The frequency of electro-
magnetic radiation is important because many of a radiation's
characteristics vary with its frequency. For example, the signals
of AM radio stations travel greater distances, particularly at night,
than do higher frequency FM radio and television signals. 24 7
A farm is occupied by the actions of plowing, planting, and
cultivating over a particular period of time. A portion of the
electromagnetic frequency spectrum-a specific bandwidth of fre-
quencies within a particular volume of space-is occupied by
constructing a transmitter and operating it for a period of time.
Several farmers cannot simultaneously perform their actions on
gradually, rather than terminating abruptly along a particular boundary line. For this
reason, [li]n radio transmission ... the area of interference is generally broader than the
area of beneficial use," W. JONES, supra note 90 at 1020- 1021, because a particular signal
may be too weak to be received reliably and usefully, but still strong enough to interfere
with another signal of useful strength at the same frequency.245 W. JONES, supra note 90, at 1019.
246 For AM standard broadcast radio, channels are 10 kilocycles per second in band-
width, W. JONES, supra note 90, at 1034, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3 (1971); FM broadcast radio
channels are 200 kilocycles in bandwidth, W. JONES, supra note 90, at 1040, 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.201 (1971); broadcast television channels are 6 megacycles (6000 kilocycles) in
bandwidth. W. JONES, supra note 90, at 1042, 47 C.F.R. § 73.601 (1971).
247 W. JONES, supra note 90, at 1034, 1039.
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the same piece of land unless they deliberately coordinate their
efforts. Likewise, several persons may not usefully occupy the
same portion of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum unless
they coordinate their efforts; however, in most cases, such coordi-
nation will be by using a portion of the frequency spectrum at
different times. With a few exceptions, simultaneous use of the
same portion of the spectrum is impractical.
If farmer A is the lawful occupant of a defined tract of land, the
state will aid him if farmer B attempts to occupy or use that tract
without lawful permission. Likewise, if the natural resource of the
electromagnetic spectrum is to be utilized gainfully, it is necessary
that government institute a system for determining lawful occu-
pancy of portions thereof and enforce such determinations against
would-be interlopers. While the techniques involved are more
elaborate and complex, the reasons for government intervention
are the same as those involved in state protection of the occu-
pancy of land.
Congress could have apportioned occupancy of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum in a number of ways, including: appropria-
tion by the first occupant as in western water law or home-
steading; definition and sale of property rights as economists have
proposed; 248 or some variant of the present licensing system.
Congress decided to deny the opportunity to purchase private
property rights in the electromagnetic spectrum. 249 Whatever the
economic merits of that decision, it appears somewhat more con-
sistent with the degree and flexibility of control required over
individual transmitters to utilize the spectrum most effectively. 250
248 Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & EcON. 1 (1959): De
Vany, A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A
Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499 (1969). But see Kalven,
supra note 24, at 30-32; also cf. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY,
FINAL REPORT, ch. 8 at 34- 38 (recommending greater consideration of economic factors
but not a property system).
249 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304 (1970). See also Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S.
327, 331 (1945) ("No licensee obtains any vested interest in any frequency.") Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969) ("Licenses to broadcast do not confer
ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary privilege of using them.");
Coase, supra note 248.
250 If your next door neighbor does not maintain his house properly, his peeling paint
may be an eyesore and may even lower the market value of your house; however, his poor
maintenance does not keep you from using your house as you please, and it is unlikely that
an economist would recommend that your neighbor's house be forfeited as a remedy for
your loss. On the other hand, if your "neighbor" on a frequency band adjacent to the one
you occupy does not properly maintain his transmitter, he may make it impossible for you
to utilize your frequency band fully or even at all. For reasons perhaps more psychological
than legal, a "licensee" of a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum is more likely to
respond promptly to a complaint of interference than one who feels secure in the knowl-
edge that he "owns" his portion of the spectrum and will at most suffer some minor
penalty for causing interference, rather than the loss of opportunity to utilize his portion of
the spectrum. Even today, the threat of forfeiture of an ownership interest in the spectrum
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Additionally, the demand on the electromagnetic spectrum, at
least in more populous locations, far exceeds the supply, and
wealthy individuals' acquisition of additional portions of the
spectrum for reasons of self-aggrandizement or personal con-
venience might waste a significant portion of the spectrum, unless
there were stringent regulation of use after purchase.
To enable greater economic efficiency in the manufacture and
use of the equipment needed to utilize the electromagnetic spec-
trum resource and to facilitate international cooperation in its
use, various bands of frequencies are limited or allocated to par-
ticular types of uses. 25 1 To some extent, the allocation of fre-
quency bands to various uses is done on the basis of determining
which band of frequencies is best adapted to the use in question,
but historical and other factors also influence the allocation pro-
cess. Most of the spectrum is allocated to communication rather
than broadcast uses or to other uses incompatible with broad-
casting. The federal government may so allocate portions of this
resource to non-broadcast uses without infringing the first amend-
ment. 2
5 2
Likewise, the allocation of certain frequencies to broadcast
usage has set aside a portion of nature's unique communications
resource, the electromagnetic spectrum, to serve as a public fo-
rum. 253 However, federal law also limits individual access to the
public forum portion of the electromagnetic spectrum; these limi-
tations will be analyzed in stages.
The first stage of federal limitation of access to this public
forum is the requirement that any individual who wishes to occu-
py a portion of the spectrum must first secure a transmitter
license; implicitly, through specification of factors such as loca-
tion, power, antenna height, frequency, time and general type of
operation, the license will fix the limits of his occupancy and
utilization. Knowingly and willfully to operate a transmitter with-
out first having secured such a license is a federal criminal offense
subject to a maximum penalty of a $10,000 fine and one year's
for failure to properly maintain equipment might raise due process problems not accom-
panying the licensing approach.
2 5
ISee 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.100-2.106(1971).
252 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (1971) shows that most of the spectrum is allocated to commu-
nication or to other uses imcompatible with broadcasting. Noncommunications uses in-
clude radar and microwave ovens. See, e.g., id., 13.25- 13.4 GHz band; and FCC Future
Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz, 35 Fed. Reg. 8644, 8647 (1970).
The power of the federal government to allocate portions of the spectrum to
non-broadcast uses without infringing the first amendment was recognized in Lafayette
Radio Electronics Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1965); Citizens Band
Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 55 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967).
253 The existence of a relevant audience makes this portion of the spectrum a public
forum. See Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1968).
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imprisonment for the first offense.2 54 Clearly, this first stage of
restriction is no more extreme than the system used to determine
and enforce lawful occupancy of land, and the criminal sanction
for unlicensed spectrum occupancy is the functional equivalent of
the criminal trespass action.
Theoretically, at least, had Congress or the FCC so desired, it
could have allowed anyone technically qualified,2 55 or able to hire
someone technically qualified, to operate a broadcast transmitter,
and then apportioned time to the extent necessary to accom-
modate all persons desiring such an opportunity.2 56 Such an
arrangement would meet all the technical requirements and limit-
ations of the electromagnetic spectrum. If electromagnetic spec-
trum technology does not so require, why then has it been deemed
constitutional for Congress and the FCC to limit access to the
public forum portion of the electromagnetic spectrum still further
by denying licenses to some and granting most licensees2 57 unlim-
ited time in which to occupy the forum? No doubt, because of
economic considerations. Broadcast transmitters are expensive, 258
and if the amount of time available for broadcasting were divided
among all persons desirous of broadcasting, none would receive
enough to support the costs of station operation and program-
ming. Under these circumstances the weakest would fall by the
wayside, releasing some time to be divided among those remain-
ing, until the time available to each remaining licensee would be
just enough to allow him to continue operation. With such margin-
al revenue, the quality of programming might be significantly
poorer than it is today. It is better to divide the available time in
such a way as to have a smaller number of stations, each with a
greater opportunity to derive revenue and provide better program-
ming, than to have licensees receive the minimum revenue needed
25447 U.S.C §§ 301, 501 (1970); United States v. Betteridge, 43 F. Supp. 53 (N.D.
Ohio 1942).
Certain low-powered transmitting devices need not be licensed if their operation does
not produce signals exceeding specified limits. See 47 C.F.R. part 15 (197 1).
255 The Commission does assure technical competence in the operation of transmitters
by maintaining a system of operator licensing, see 47 C.F.R. part 13 (1971). For this
system's relation to broadcasting, see, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.93, 73.661 (1971).
256 At one time the FCC did require several stations to share one portion of the
spectrum. See, e.g., United States Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C. 208 (1935) (reducing the
number of stations sharing the frequency of 1400 kc. at Brooklyn, N. Y., from four to two).
257 Because radiations in the standard (AM) broadcast band travel much farther at night
than during the daytime (see note 247 supra), certain standard (AM) broadcast stations
may operate only during daylight hours, with a few of those allowed limited pre-sunrise
operation. See, e.g., Cornell Univ. v. United States, 427 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1970); 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.21, 73.99 (1971).
258 However, the economic return from the utilization thereof can be quite great, with
television broadcasters averaging a 90 to 100 percent return on tangible investment
annually. N. JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 65.
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to survive.259 Whether it was necessary for the FCC to go to the
extreme of Unlimited time licenses, 260 as opposed to time-sharing,
is another question; however, at least some limitations, above and
beyond those minimum limitations technically required for
effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, are necessary for
economic reasons. Even Commissioner Nicholas Johnson appears
to have accepted this second stage of federal government con-
straint upon access to the public forum portion of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum. 2 61
Two of the stages of federal action narrowing individual access
to the public forum portion of the spectrum have been described.
First, by act of Congress, only licensed transmitters may
utilize any appreciable portion of this public forum. Second, by
determination of the FCC pursuant to its delegated authority,
only one person may operate a transmitter within a particular
portion of the spectrum. 2 62 Both are severe restrictions upon
individual access to the forum, but the first is necessary for
practical policing of the utilization of the electromagnetic spec-
trum, and the second is grounded in practical economic consid-
erations and appears to be within the area of discretion of a
legislature in determining how a public resource may be utilized
most efficaciously.
There is, however, a third stage of governmental action narrow-
ing individual access to the public forum portion of the electro-
magnetic spectrum that is more difficult to justify. While the
FCC affords some opportunities for non-licensee access under the
equal opportunities, personal attack, political editorial and Banz-
haf requirements of the Communications Act of 1934 and the
FCC's fairness doctrine,2 6 3 it otherwise authorizes licensees to
deny access to members of the public and to subject con-
stitutionally protected expression to arbitrary censorship. 264
Whether one characterizes broadcasters' unreasonable restric-
tions upon individuals' access to the media as actions of regulated
private individuals taken pursuant to express federal regulatory
authorization 65 or as private suppressions of individual rights
upon the encouragement of the federal government,266 these re-
259 Marks, supra note 101, at 980-82. For the appropriateness of avoiding the minimum
revenue situation resulting from an excess of licensees in a particular area, see Carroll
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
260 Note the exception mentioned at note 257 supra.
261 Johnson & Westen, supra note 12, at 583-84.
262 Note the exception.mentioned at note 257 supra.
263 See note 101 supra and the text accompanying notes 120- 130 supra.
264 See Ottinger, supra note 36.
265 As in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
266 See note 221 supra; Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
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strictions amount to state action under a government action ra-
tionale, in violation of the individual's right of access protected by
the first amendment.2 6 7
An additional state action rationale arises out of the nature of,
and conditions upon a licensee's interest in the portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum licensed to him. Congress has specified
clearly that this is not an ownership interest.268 Taken alone, this
factor might support an agent action rationale for holding broad-
cast licensee action to be state action. However, it is abundantly
clear that Congress, in denying ownership interests to licensees,
did not intend to make licensees agents of the state.2 69 Rather, the
Radio Act of 1927, the predecessor of the Communications Act
of 1934, was enacted to facilitate management of the spectrum
and operation of broadcasting in the public interest2 7 0 and not to
267 See cases cited in part IV A of this article, and text accompanying notes 13 1-170
supra.
Concurring in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965), Mr. Justice
Brennan said: "In the area of First Amendment freedoms, government has a duty to
confine itself to the least intrusive regulations which are adequate for the purpose." Since
technology does not require the third stage of limitation by the FCC, and since the
reasonable regulation to which the right of access is subject can protect those economic
interests justifying limitation of access (see Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d
440 (D.C. Cir. 1958), the FCC's decision in BEM exceeds the bounds of those "least
intrusive regulations."
2r847 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304 (1970). See also 67 CONG. REC. 12351 (1926) (remarks of
Sen. Dill). Apparently floor manager of the legislation that eventually became the Radio
Act of 1927, Senator Dill's views on communications law have been quoted with favor by
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379 n. 7
(1969).
The refusal of Congress to authorize ownership interests in the electromagnetic spect-
rum was a political decision, see 67 CONG. RFC. 12351, 12352, 12355 (remarks of Sen.
Dill), rather than an affirmation of Professor Jaffe's assertion that " [t]o speak of owning
such resources is a solecism." Jaffe, supra note 15, at 783. While the first two articles cited
supra, note 248, may have blundered in arguing that authorization of ownership of portions
of. the electromagnetic spectrum would be preferable to the licensing system we have
today, they have left little doubt as to the technical feasibility of such a system.
269 Section 326 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970), provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commis-
sion the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right
of free speech by means of radio communication.
This provision was apparently introduced in the Senate by Senator Dill. H.R. Rep. No.
1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (reference to § 29); Hearings on S.1 and S.1754 [Radio
Control]Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., part I
at 5 (§ 14) and part 2 at 121 (1926). His initiation of this provision may have been
motivated by reports of licensee fear of the possible consequences of their broadcasting
statement critical of the national administration. 67 CONG. REC. 12356 (1926) (remarks of
Sen. Dill). In any event, concern over the possibility of censorship motivated the Senate
committee to propose control by a bipartisan independent commission, rather than contin-
ued sole administration by the Secretary of Commerce. Id.
270 In his statement explaining the bill that eventually became the Radio Act of 1927,
Sen. Dill said:
The other condition regarding radio in the United States that is different
from conditions in foreign countries relates to broadcasting. In practically all
other countries the government either owns or directly controls all broad-
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make a licensee's actions agent action. Congress expressly de-
clined to assert full common carrier economic regulation over
broadcast licensees,2 71 but it did require licensees to operate
consistently with the public interest, convenience and necessi-
ty. 272 Such obligations are functionally equivalent to the public
service obligations undertaken by a public utility2 73 and appear to
mean that broadcasting is public action.2 74 Commercial broad-
casters themselves make their actions public action by giving
commercial advertisers ready access to the medium. In volun-
tarily allowing a variety of citizens access to the broadcasters'
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum public forum, broadcast
licensees bring themselves within the principle of public action set
forth in Marsh and Logan Valley Plaza.275 Whether licensee
action is public or government action, it is subject to other per-
sons' first amendment rights, including the right of access.
Broadcasters are also subject to fairly extensive federal regu-
casting stations. In this country there has been practically no control ex-
ercised by the Government, except as to the assignment of wave lengths and
regulations as to the amount of power to be used.
Let me add that not only are radio reception and radio broadcasting free
from Government restraint in the United States, but it is our desire and
purpose to keep them free so far as it is possible to do so in conformity with
the general public interest and the social welfare of the great masses of our
people. It is this combination of conditions and purpose that complicates the
problem of legislation on this subject and compels Congress to pioneer the
way in the passage of a radio bill. We must steer the legislative ship between
the Scylla of too much regulation and the Charybdis of the grasping sel-
fishness of private monopoly.
67 CONG. REC. 12335 (1926).
27147 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970).
272 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (1970). In particular, broadcast licenses are not to be renewed
unless the Commission finds that to do so would serve the "public interest, convenience,
and necessity." Id. § 307(d).
273 At an earlier part of his judicial career, Justice Burger said:
The argument that a broadcaster is not a public utility is beside the point.
True, it is not a public utility in the same sense as strictly regulated common
carriers or purveyors of power, but neither is it a purely private enterprise
like a newspaper or an automobile agency .... A broadcaster seeks and is
granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public
domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public
obligations.
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (by then Circuit Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger).
In attacking Judge Wright's determination that broadcasting is state action, Professor
Jaffe ignoes this functional equivalence between the broadcaster's obligation to manage the
use of a portion of a limited communications medium in the public interest and the public
utility's obligaton to manage large investments of capital in the public interest. Jaffe, note
15 supra, at 783. Judge Wright's reliance on Pollak, discussed in note 185 supra and
accompanying text, is entirely correct, because it is the operation of a public service under
regulatory supervision that is significant, not whether the regulation is of economic mat-
ters. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952).
274 Text accompanying notes 237- 242 supra.
275 Text accompanying notes 224- 235 supra.
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lation, leading some to the conclusion that broadcasters them-
selves have no first amendment rights. 276 To the extent that news-
paper publishers have the power to be arbitrary and to regard
their newspapers as extensions of their own personalities, pub-
lishers of the print media enjoy greater rights than do broad-
casters.2 77 Because of its limited nature and dedication to the
public interest, the public forum portion of the electromagnetic
spectrum cannot be used so arbitrarily or abusively.2 78 However,
the degree of dedication to the general public interest required by
the Communications Act of 1934 is not so great as to establish a
form of state action bringing the private licensee under the man-
agerial control of the federal government.2 79 The federal control
exercised over broadcast licensees is an intermingling of the po-
lice power, the economic power over commerce, and so much of
the judicial power as is delegated in the establishment of the
administrative process. None of these powers threatens the
broadcaster's right to express his own opinion on political issues,
and the FCC has expressly affirmed its right in its Report on
Editorializing.280
Why, then, such strong assertions that federal regulation threat-
ens broadcasters' rights? There may be a few legitimate concerns
underlying such assertions,281 but, primarily, such arguments seek
to use the first amendment as a screen behind which many
broadcasters may engage in the activity most important to
them-earning money from deliberately non-controversial pro-
gramming designed to appeal to large, profitable audiences. 282
276 See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 24, at 15- 18.
277 This "romantic" notion of the meaning of the first amendment as applied to news-
papers has been criticized. Barron,Access, supra note 1i.
278 In Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003
(D.C. Cir. 1966), the court said:
A broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and
valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is
burdened by enforceable public obligations. A newspaper can be operated at
the whim or caprice of its owners; a broadcast station cannot. After nearly
five decades of operation the broadcast industry does not seem to have
grasped the simple fact that a broadcast license is a public trust subject to
termination for breach of duty.
279 There is a significant difference between the status of Voice of America, operated by
the executive branch of the United States government, and the relationship of a broadcast
licensee's station to the federal government. Furthermore, since the first amendment
protects the expression of student editors of newspapers sponsored and financed by state
colleges and universities, it can hardly be said not to protect expression by broadcasters
who are not funded or (with a limited exception, Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258
F.2d 440 (D.C, Cir. 1958)) even protected against financial loss by the federal govern-
ment.
280 Note 25 supra.
281 See part V of this article.
282 F. FRIENDLY, supra note 38, at xi ("Because television can make so much money
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Of course, commercial broadcasters are expected to make mon-
ey; the opportunity to do so is an incentive for investing the
necessary capital and for maintaining "the costly temples of com-
munication that house the elaborate radio and television equip-
ment, the technical prerequisite to any speech at all" over the
broadcast media. 2 3 Investment is required to produce the pro-
gramming that entertains and occasionally enlightens us. 284 But it
is Orwellian Newspeak to invoke the first amendment as if it
existed to protect the opportunity, not merely to earn, but to
pander continuously to the lowest common denominator. Indeed,
so to exploit this unique public resource without a thought to the
social consequences or to the interest of others in using it for
public expression is antithetical to first amendment values.
Significant light has been shed on this issue by the Supreme
Court's decision in Red Lion despite the FCC's misconstruction
of the Court's opinion. In particular, the FCC has cited the
following quotation from Red Lion to support its position that for
practical and technical reasons there can be no right of access to
the broadcast media:
Where there are substantially more individuals who want
to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to
posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or
publish. 285
When the preceding quotation is viewed in context, it becomes
clear that the Court was referring to the opportunity to transmit
electromagnetic radiation into a particular portion of the spec-
trum-the opportunity to be a full broadcast licensee.286 Further-
doing its worst, it often cannot afford to do its best."); N. JOHNSON, supra note 15, at
20-23; R. MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, passim.
Edward R. Murrow once commented:
[W]e have in this country a free enterprise system of radio and television
which is superior to any other... There is no suggestion here that networks
or individual stations should operate as philanthropies. But 1 can find nothing
in the Bill of Rights or the Communications Act which says that they must
increase their net profits each year lest the republic collapse....
Quoted in F. FRIENDLY, supra note 38, at 112- 13.
282 Johnson & Westen, supra note 12, at 583-84.
284 For example, the production cost of The Selling of the Pentagon was approximately
$100,000. Sherrill, supra note 22, at 26.
285 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 388 (1969), cited by the FCC in
Democratic National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970), rev'd, Business Executives'
Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
286 The balance of the paragraph states:
If 100 persons want broadcast licenses but there are only 10 frequencies to
allocate, all of them may have the same "right" to a license; but if there is to
be any effective communication by radio, only a few must be licensed and the
rest must be barred from the airwaves. It would be strange if the First
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more, Red Lion does not support the third stage of federal regu-
latory action authorizing licensees arbitrarily to exclude others
from access to their equipment. Instead, it emphasized the dis-
tinction between the limited opportunity to be a licensee and the
broader opportunity to use a licensee's facilities:
By the same token, as far as the First Amendment is
concerned those who are licensed stand no better than those
to whom licenses are refused. A license permits broadcasting,
but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who
holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the
exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First
Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring
a licensee to share his frequency with others....
... As we have said, the First Amendment confers no right
on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on "their"
frequencies and no right to an unconditional monopoly of a
scarce resource which the Government has denied others the
right to use. 287
Thus, an individual's first amendment access rights are not subor-
dinate to the desire of broadcast licensees to maximize profits by
shunning controversiality.
While Red Lion guarantees continued first amendment protec-
tion of a licensee's basic rights of expression, a licensee's first
amendment rights do not include an absolute power to exclude
others from access to his facilities and designated portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum. Rather, the application of any of the
state action rationales described above is sufficient to require the
FCC and its reviewing courts to enforce individuals' first amend-
ment right of access when reasonably asserted against a broad-
caster, just as it must now be enforced when asserted against
media owned by a state. 28 8 The issues remaining for cons"a-cration
Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented
the Government from making radio communication possible by requiring
licenses to broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as not to
overcrowd the spectrum.
395 U.S. at 388. This description corresponds to the first and second stages of federal
limitation of access to the spectrum described in the text accompanying notes 254-261
supra.
287 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 389, 391 (1969).
2 8 8The great breadth of the first amendment's protection of individual rights related to
the exchange of ideas is illustrated in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
A 1962 postal statute required affirmative action within twenty days after receipt of a
notice if an addressee wished to receive an item of "'Communist political propaganda."
The court held the statute to be an unconstitutional limitation on the exercise of the
addressee's first amendment rights. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific guarantee of [ad-
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are the manner and extent of enforcement appropriate to the
context of broadcasting.
D. Reform Through Access to Conventional
Broadcast Media
As shown above, 289 the first amendment right of access extends
to the public forum portion of the electromagnetic spectrum and
facilities of broadcast licensees. However, implementing access to
conventional broadcast facilities will be significantly more com-
plicated than arranging access to the advertisement display area of
a transit system or the pages of a state college newspaper. The
purpose of this section is to explore the more significant issues
which will have to be considered and resolved by the FCC or by
broadcasters themselves if the right of access is to be effectively
implemented. 290 Four major issues will be considered: (1) alloca-
dressee] access to publications. However, the protection of the Bill of Rights
goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from congressional abridgment
those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the express
guarantees fully meaningful ... I think the right to receive publications is
such a fundamental right.
381 U.S. at 308.
289 See part IV C of this article.
290 The question of how best to secure individual freedom of expression over a broad-
caster's forum is not a new one. In 1926, the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce
proposed legislation providing, among other things, that,
[ilf any licensee shall permit a broadcasting station to be used as aforesaid, or
by a candidate or candidates for any public office, or for the discussion of any
question affecting the public he shall make no discrimination as to the use of
such broadcasting station, and with respect to said matters the licensee shall
be deemed a common carrier in interstate commerce.
67 CONG. REC. 12503 (1926) (remarks of Senator Howell). The preceding paragraph of the
committee bill, like 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1970), required identification of persons paying
valuable consideration for the broadcast of any matter. Id. at 1250 1-02.
In defending the quoted provision against an amendment that would have deleted it and
instead would have required only equal opportunities for candidates for public office,
Senator Howell of Nebraska pointed out that broadcasters were then censoring the
remarks of persons whom they had invited to their stations. Id. at 12503. However, the
broadcasters appeared to be strongly opposed to being referred to as "common carriers" in
any respect. 67 CONG. REC. 12503 (1926) (remarks of Senator Dill) (the committee's
reversal of position after recommending the quoted language to the Senate is also an
indication of the intensity of broadcasters' feelings on the provision. See id. at 12502).
After several pages of debate, the amendment was approved. Id. at 12501-05.
In Democratic National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970), rev'd, Business Execu-
tives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the FCC sought
to link this history with section 3(h) of the Communications Act of 1934, which in defining
the term "common carrier" for part II of the Act (see note 93 supra) also provides: "but a
person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be
deemed a common carrier." 47 U.S.C. 153(h) (1970). However, no other link besides the
words "common carrier" exists. For all that appears, section 3(h) was merely inserted to
ensure that no provisions of part I! of the Act would be applied to licensees qua licensees.
Furthermore, if the FCC construes section 3(h) as a statutory implementation of the
Senate's vote against the first provision quoted above, it is in effect asserting that its
fairnesss doctrine violated section 3(h) until section 315 was amended in 1959. See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 n. 11 (1969).
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tion of a minimum amount of conventional broadcast time for
access; (2) apportionment of that time between various applicants
for access; (3) power of a broadcaster to review and control
programming tendered by those entitled to access; and (4) assis-
tance from the broadcaster to those desiring access who are
unable to prepare their own programming effectively.
The preceding analysis of the broadcast media and the fairness
doctrine291 will be relied upon in approaching the four areas. For
example, part II of this article shows the importance of trying to
absolve the broadcaster, in the public mind, from responsibility
for the content of controversial messages he broadcasts for those
exercising their right of access. Important lessons from that mate-
rial will be used below to formulate recommendations. In part III,
the fairness doctrine was analyzed in terms of its absolute and
relative components. That analysis will be carried over into this
section to assist in comparing the fairness doctrine with the right
of access. To simplify the discussion, the term "access time" will
mean the broadcast time available to private individuals or groups
for the exercise of their right of access; those receiving and
utilizing such time will be called "accessees."
The absolute component of the fairness doctrine appears to be
in large part a failure.29 2 Because of broadcasters' strong interest
in seeking the largest possible audience in order to maximize their
earnings, it is undoubtedly naive to expect that more than a few
broadcasters will be willing to produce the variety and con-
troversiality of material needed to reflect a full spectrum of view-
points and thus fulfill effectively the mandate of the absolute
component of the fairness doctrine. Stronger attempts to require
broadcasters themselves to produce such programming can lead
only to significantly increased federal regulation over program-
ming with the threat of federal dominance of the marketplace of
ideas and stultification of first amendment values.293 One of the
great advantages of a fully implemented right of access is that it
Rather than attempt to link the vote of the Senate rejecting the first provision with either
the right of access or the fairness doctrine, it would be more realistic to note Senator Dill's
several references to broadcaster opposition to being branded with the term "common
carrier," and construe that vote as a rejection of that term and status for broadcasting.
While the first amendment prohibits broadcasters from denying others resonable access to
the public forum portion of the electromagnetic spectrum through the use of broadcasters'
facilities, it hardly imposes the full obligations of common carrier status upon broadcasters,
as the circuit court most carefully explained in BEM. 450 F.2d at 662-63.
291 Parts II and Ill of this article.
292 Text accompanying notes 113- 114 supra. See also Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 656-57 (D.C. Cir. 197 1), particularly notes 34 and
35.
293 Id. at 656. See also Blake, supra note 7, at 82-86; Frank, Freedom of the Broadcast
Press, 36 VITAL SPEECHES 332 (1970); Frank, supra note 94.
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can effectively serve as a powerful substitute for the absolute
component of the fairness doctrine.2 94
The principal criticism of the relative component of the fairness
doctrine is its lack of realism in expecting one person to accept
the responsibility for presenting, fairly and evenly, both sides of a
controversial issue.2 95 Again, attempts at significantly more de-
tailed federal regulation to achieve this objective would, in all
likelihood, do more harm than good.2 96 However, if the fairness
doctrine's relative component is applied at the correct level of
decision making, the objective of balanced programming can be
achieved more naturally without expecting broadcasters them-
selves to prepare all the programming required. The relative com-
ponent of the fairness doctrine should not be applied at all to the
programming of individual accessees. Rather, as will be developed
in greater detail below, this component should be applied in the
apportionment of access time among accessees of differing view-
points. 297
1. Broadcast Time for Access-How long a time period must
an accessee be allowed to purchase for the presentation of his
message? Is it only a minute or must an hour be sold from time to
time for an accessee's documentary? The D.C. Circuit in Busi-
ness Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC298 sought to
reassure broadcasters that the programming which they normally
produce would not suddenly be taken over by private individuals
exercising their right of access. 2 99 The court carefully dis-
294 As the D.C. Circuit said in the BEM opinion:
Assuming that broadcasters are sometimes fallible, the goal of a fully in-
formed public is best attained by opening of outlets for members of the public
to supplement the licensees' assessments of "importance," "controversiality"
and "full" coverage.
450 F.2d at 657.
295 Problems of both motivation and definition of fairness contribute to the artificiality.
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 10, at 143; Blake, supra note 7, at 82-86.
296 See note 293 supra. Reportedly, renewal of a CBS television license (see text
accompanying notes 402-405 supra) was deferred pending the answering of complaints on
another controversial CBS documentary, Hunger in America. Sherrill, supra note 22, at
87.
29 7 See text accompanying notes 317- 330 infra.
298450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
29 9 The circuit court said:
It is particularly important that these cases deal only with the public's
First Amendment interests in broadcasters' allocation of advertising time.
They deal only with time relinquished by broadcasters to others; petitioners
argue only that, in relinquishing that time, broadcasters must not discriminate
against protected expression. In normal programming time, closely controlled
and edited by broadcasters, the constellation of constitutional interests would
be substantially different. In news and documentary presentations, for ex-
ample, the broadcasters' own intersts in free speech are very, very strong.
The Commission's fairness doctrine properly leaves licensees broad leeway
for professional judgment in that area. But in the allocation of advertising
time, the broadcasters have no such strong First Amendment interests. Their
Right of Access
tinguished between broadcasters' advertising time and normal
programming time without defining either term, emphasizing that
its opinion would apply only to the former.300 When a com-
plainant recently sought enforcement of its right of access so that
it could broadcast an hour long documentary opposing the admis-
sion of the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nations, the
FCC denied its complaint stating that it read the D.C. Circuit's
opinion as "focusing upon the right of access for paid public issue
announcements" only,30' and that it "would not construe the
court's mandate as specifically applicable to the situation now
before us." 3 0
2
The problem here is definitional. The FCC uses the term "pro-
gramming time" to refer to all programs of some length, whether
produced by the licensee, his network, or some independent pro-
ducer buying time from the licensee or network, such as a political
party during an election, or a private corporation.303 On the other
hand, the FCC views the term "advertising time" as referring to
the rather short spot announcements commonly called "com-
mercials" by the public. While the D.C. Circuit used the terms
"advertising time" and "programming time," it probably did not
intend the terms to have the meanings ascribed to them by the
FCC. Certainly, the court did not explicitly limit itself to the
FCC's definitions; rather, at one point the court implicitly en-
dorsed a more expansive view of the time an editorial advertise-
ment may consume, by quoting from the early FCC decision in
United Broadcasting Co.30 4 In that 1945 case, a broadcaster had
refused to sell a period of time long enough to meet the current
FCC definition of programming time, as opposed to spot an-
nouncement time. Yet, the FCC saw no obstacle to ordering the
sale. The D.C. Circuit court's approval of United Broadcasting
Co. and its statement that there was "no reason why the Commis-
sion and broadcast licensees should be any less competent in
speech is not at issue; rather, all that is at issue is their decision as to which
other parties will be given an opportunity to speak.
450 F.2d at 654.
300 Id.
301 Committee of One Million, 23 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 148, 152.
302 Id.
303 Networks do sell program-length blocs of time to corporations and political parties.
H. MENDELSOHN & I. CRESPI, supra note 9, at 286-92; Johnson & Westen, . upra note
12, at 627. The reasons given by broadcasters for refusing to air the Committee's docu-
mentary (summarized in Commissioner Johnson's dissent) included little mention of sched-
uling problems. The predominant themes were broadcaster insistence on total control of
programming on controversial public issues, and avoidance of scheduling changes that
might adversely affect ratings. Committee of One Million, 23 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 148,
155-56 (1971).
304 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945), quoted in 450 F.2d at 665.
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1971 than they were in 1945," are inconsistent with the FCC's
view of the scope of the BEM decision. 30 5 The first amendment
right of access should extend, not merely to the sale of short
announcement time, but also to the sale of time for longer an-
nouncements and documentaries.
Time is, of course, limited on the conventional broadcast
media; in particular, there is great competition for prime time and
the opportunity to earn money therefrom. It is simply not prac-
tical to expect broadcasters to establish "reasonable" standards
for the amounts of access time that they will offer. The FCC
would do both the broadcasters and the public a great service by
facing up to the necessity of establishing minimum standards for
availability of access time. Of course, minimum standards would
not stop any broadcaster from offering a greater amount of access
time if he wished. 30 6
In setting its minimums, the FCC should consider at least three
major categories of access time, with subcategories in each for
prime time and non-prime time programming. The three major
categories would be announcement access time, regular program
access time, and entertainment program access time.307
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson has proposed a significant
difference in treatment of announcement access time and regular
program access time, suggesting that broadcasters should make 50
percent of their total announcement time available for use as
access time, while recommending a figure of 5 percent of available
regular program time during prime time hours as appropriate for
access time.308 This distinction seems quite reasonable. Although
305 The FCC did note that "one of the petitioners in the BEM case [the Democratic
National Committee], requested a broad ruling on its rights to purchase time, including
program length material." But, apparently regarding the sale of program length time as an
invasion ofeditorial control of broadcaster programming, the Commission concluded that
the circuit court had focused upon access for paid public issue announcements, even
though the court had remanded the FCC's ruling on DNC's request simultaneously with
its remand of BEM. The FCC is objecting to an inherent feature of the right of access - its
requirement that others be given reasonable access to a broadcaster's facilities, even
though the broadcaster will lose most editorial control over the material broadcast while
such access is occurring.
306 To the extent that such a minimum standard approach would appear to be regulatory
action that discriminates against ordinary commercial advertising, it would not violate the
first amendment which offers commercial advertising little protection against restrictive
regulation. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
307 Announcement access time would, of course, be available only for messages of
relatively short duration. The maximum length of time that a broadcaster should be
required to sell for one announcement should be fixed by referring to the maximum time
now consumed by a set of adjacent commercials. Longer "announcements" could be
treated as regular program access time material.
308 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 273 (1970) (dis-
senting opinion) and Democratic National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 235 (1970)
(dissenting opinion). See also Johnson & Westen, supra note 12, at 627-28.
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some critics, of television in particular, would like to restructure
broadcast programming radically, there appears to be no rea-
sonable way to avoid having the bulk continue to be typical
entertainment programming. While the right of access may mean
that the majority of the public cannot demand a total diet of
entertainment cleansed of all controversial ideas, it would be
stretching the right too far to hold that the right of access enables
those desiring access to deny the majority its favored program-
ming during a major part of the broadcast day. 309 Because of the
intense competition for prime time, any percentage of time set
aside for accessee programming within the entire broadcast day
should also be specifically applied to prime time. Thus, if the 50
percent figure proposed by Commissioner Johnson is accepted for
announcement access time during the entire broadcast day, the
FCC should also specify that 50 percent of announcement time
within prime time hours should be available as access time. The
same principle should also be applied to regular program access
time and entertainment program access time.
Most persons desiring program access time will be seeking an
opportunity to broadcast a single documentary, interview, panel
discussion, or the like. But some potential accessees may believe
that they can express themselves in a way that will appeal to the
public sufficiently to justify repeated exposure. Yet the history of
the Smothers Brothers' program shows that good ratings will not
protect a controversial combination of entertainment program-
ming and social commentary against suppression. 310 Therefore, in
addition to the 5 percent suggested for regular program access
time, an additional 5 percent should be set aside for accessees
who, in addition to expressing their views on public issues, could
maintain a specified minimum viewer rating. 311 If a person desir-
ing access is to have repeated appearances, as opposed to spot
announcements or an occasional documentary, it seems appro-
309 Another reason for the differing treatment is that accessee's spot announcements
displace only commercial messages, while accessees' program length materials will dis-
place entertainment or public issue programming, and thus should be more limited. John-
son & Westen, supra note 12, at 627- 28.
The latter type of displacement involves a balancing between conflicting first amend-
ment interests, Kalven, supra note 24, at 28- 30, while the former does not. See note 306
supra. Thus, the first amendment itself reinforces the distinction, though not to the extent
asserted by the FCC in Committee of One Million. See note 305 supra and text accom-.
panying notes 298-305supra.
310 Text accompanying notes 71- 81 supra.
311 This additional 5 percent would not constitute a financial burden on the broadcaster,
because the rating requirement would protect revenues. A reasonable minimum rating is a
feasible requirement; for instance, the Smothers Brothers were having no problems with
ratings while at CBS. Kloman, supra note 71, at 153.
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priate to expect him to prove that, among other things, he is, in
fact, entertaining. 312
The relationship between networks and affiliates in the market-
ing of access time must be carefully considered and defined.
Affiliates do not always elect to carry network program mate-
rial;313 furthermore, it is against current FCC regulations for them
to bargain away their power to reject network programming.3 14
However, it would seem that first amendment expression will be
chilled if a person seeking access to a nationwide audience for his
protected expression must deal with each individual affiliate.
Therefore, the FCC standards should delegate to networks the
power to market a certain proportion of access time without
affiliates having the discretion to refuse to broadcast the ac-
cessee's program or announcement.31 5 Perhaps the best approach
would be to allow networks to market the proportion of access
time, for each category, equal to the average proportion of broad-
cast time that they ordinarily provide affiliates in the correspond-
ing non-access category.3 16
2. Broadcaster Apportionment of Access Time-While broad-
casters and the FCC purport to fear inundation from persons
desiring access time, there are reasons to be skeptical of this
contention. It cannot be assumed that local level broadcasters will
experience an overwhelmingly large number of requests for ac-
cess.31 7 At the network level, while many people may desire the
opportunity to address a national audience, the higher advertising
rates may serve as a significant deterrent. However, skeptical
312 The FCC may wish to set different minimum access time standards for broadcast
stations that have been permitted to adopt specialized formats. For example, a station with
an "all news" format could reasonably be required to carry a higher percentage of program
access time than an ordinary broadcast station, because its format is more clearly analo-
gous to an ordinary forum than the "balanced programming" required of most stations. See
note 101 supra. A station that has been permitted to devote the bulk of its programming to
music might be allowed to make a lower percentage of program access time available.
313 For example, out of 204 CBS affiliated television stations, 39 elected not to carry the
first broadcast of the CBS documentary, The Selling of the Pentagon. Sherrill, supra note
22, at 26.
314 See 47 C.F.R. § 73. 658(e) (1971).
315 The FCC might authorize exceptions for reasonable local needs, such as emer-
gencies, fast breaking news events, local sports or civic events traditionally covered, etc.,
on the condition that the accessee be given a priority opportunity to purchase access time
from that portion of time sold by the excepted licensee.
316Thus, if a network provides an average of 75 percent of programming during the
prime time hours, it would market 75 percent of each category of prime time program
access time, while each affiliate would control the balance of time in each category
broadcast over his station.
317 Two New York city cable television companies have made two channels available
for public access and are not yet experiencing chaos. Demand averages 40 cable hours per
week out of an available 336 hours. Furthermore, cost to users apparently is significantly
lower than cost of conventional broadcast time. See Editorial, 19 TV GUIDE, Dec. I1,
197 1, at 4.
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speculation can be as erroneous as fearful speculation; therefore,
the following discussion is predicated on the broadcasters' as-
sumption that the demand for editorial advertising time will ex-
ceed any reasonable amount of time that might be made available.
It will also be assumed that requests for time will not necessarily
be balanced, either as between viewpoints on specific issues or as
to the issues sought to be covered.
In the BEM decision, the court strongly emphasized the power
of the FCC and broadcasters to establish reasonable regulation
concerning the time, place, and manner of speech.3 18 In estab-
lishing reasonable regulation, the FCC could define the limits of
the control which broadcasters might exercise over editorial ad-
vertising.3 19 In addition, the court made it clear that the FCC, or
licensees under FCC regulation, could set some outside limits on
the amount of advertising time to be sold to one group or repre-
sentatives of one particular viewpoint.320 Finally, the court noted
that the FCC would retain its power to apply the fairness doctrine
so as to require broadcasters, upon granting access to viewpoints
on one side of an issue, to accept advertisements on the other
side, free of charge if necessary.3 21 While setting forth the general
principle that broadcasters could no longer apply a flat ban to
editorial advertising, the court did not provide detailed guidance.
It did not need to because the fairness doctrine322 stands ready to
steer the FCC and broadcasters away from the chaos they fear.
Of course, some elements of the fairness doctrine are simply
not applicable to the apportionment of access time. For example,
the broadcaster's discretion under the general fairness doctrine to
determine whether an issue is a controversial issue of public
318450 F.2d 642, 663-64 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
3 19 
Id.
320 Specifically, the court said at 450 F.2d at 664:
[I]nvalidation of a flat ban on editorial advertising does not close the door to
"'reasonable regulations" designed to prevent domination by a few groups or
a few viewpoints. Within a general regime of accepting some editorial adver-
tisements, there is room for the Commission and licensees to develop such
guidelines. For example, there could be some outside limits on the amount of
advertising time that will be sold to one group or to representatives of one
particular narrow viewpoint.
321 Id. However, the court thought it "incredible that the Commission would enforce a
rule so rigid that licensees would be driven out of business," and stated further that upon a
showing of threat of actual harm to particular broadcasters, the FCC "could make
necessary adjustments." Id.
322 The court spoke of fairness doctrine obligations as being something the FCC has
"the power" to apply. id. at 664, perhaps implying that it has the power to decline to apply
the doctrine insofar as editorial advertising is concerned. However, the 1959 amendment
of section 3 15(a) of the Communications Act of 1934. a Congressional ratification of the
fairness doctrine, see the Red Lion opinion. 395 U.S. at 380, while affording the FCC
considerable latitude in interpreting the extent of its application, may nonetheless prevent
the FCC from simply excusing broadcasters generally from compliance with its terms.
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importance is clearly inapplicable to the apportionment of access
time; under the first amendment right of access, that determina-
tion is placed in the hands of individual accessees. 3 23 However,
other elements of the fairness doctrine can, and indeed should, be
applied. The most important of these elements is the relative
component of the fairness doctrine requiring a broadcaster who
has broadcast one view on a controversial public issue to provide
a reasonable opportunity for the broadcasting of opposing points
of view. As the fairness doctrine is ordinarily applied, the broad-
caster has great discretion to determine exactly how the opposing
points of view should be presented. On the other hand, under the
right of access, the manner of presenting views is for the accessee
to determine,3 24 subject to reasonable overall regulation discussed
below.3 25 Nevertheless, if a number of persons are simultaneously
requesting the opportunity to express their views on various con-
troversial issues, the relative component of the fairness doctrine
can serve as a familiar guide to the broadcaster, if he will use it
not as a basis for attempting to edit an accessee's program, but as
an aid to apportioning limited broadcast time among potential
accessees. If potential accessees do not among themselves
sufficiently cover the various viewpoints on any particular issue,
then the broadcaster would have an obligation to seek out persons
representing the "missing" viewpoint and to offer them a priority
opportunity to purchase editorial advertising time. If such a pur-
chase cannot be arranged, the relative component of the fairness
doctrine would require that the broadcaster, through his own
programming, present the missing viewpoint with his customary
discretion in the selection of spokesmen.3 26
The balancing principle of the relative component can be ap-
plied not only to balancing the opportunity for access between
opposing viewpoints on a particular issue, but also to allocating
available time between issues. While a broadcaster should not
have the power to prohibit altogether editorial advertising on a
particular issue, it might be appropriate for the broadcaster to
apportion limited access time3 2 7 so as to increase the variety of
issues covered, rather than to present issues on a "first-come,
323 As the BEM court said, "[W]hen an individual or group buys time to say its piece,
the crucial controls are in its own hands." 450 F.2d at 656.324 Id.
325 See text accompanying notes 33 1-359 infra.
32 6 Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963). See generally Editorializing, supra
note 25.
327 Balancing issues should be performed only to the extent necessary to match demand
for access time to available supply, after that demand has been "reduced" by the limitation
of amount of time to be sold to representatives of one particular viewpoint.
[VOL. 5:2
Right of Access
first-served" basis. Furthermore, the broadcaster should be free to
apportion less time to persons wanting to comment on issues
already substantially covered during the broadcaster's normal pro-
gramming. 328 Such an approach to apportionment would tend to
give more coverage to editorial advertising on matters not covered
in depth by the broadcaster, and thereby increase the total diver-
sity of issues and views appearing over the broadcast media.
The three more specific principles of the relative component of
the fairness doctrine 329 would also have the effect of giving certain
accessees priority over others in obtaining limited access opportu-
nities. Thus, an individual who has been personally attacked by a
prior accessee would have an earlier opportunity to respond than
he might otherwise have on a first-come, first-served basis. If an
accessee's editorial advertising amounts to comment on a specific
issue or person in a current political campaign, application of the
political editorial concept to such situations would give accessees
favoring other sides of the issue or other candidates an earlier
opportunity to respond. The Banzhaf principle would similarly
give priority to accessees seeking to respond to viewpoints ex-
pressed in those commercial advertisements to which the prin-
ciple applies.
In his apportionment of access time, a broadcaster might find
good reason in some cases to restrict an accessee's advertisement
to certain specified periods of the day. For example, he might
reasonably restrict the appearance of an editorial advertisement
setting forth a viewpoint on our sexual mores to a period of time
in the late evening when younger children presumably are asleep.
These suggestions demonstrate that the relative component of
the fairness doctrine can serve as a reasonable and familiar basis
for apportionment of access time. 330 Of course, if it should turn
out that the demand for editorial advertising time is not as great as
the FCC and broadcasters have predicted, then most of the spe-
cial considerations for apportionment described above would not
be required, and a first-come, first-served basis, augmented by
licensee programming, might be sufficient to satisfy the first
amendment and the public interest standard of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934.
328 The court in BEM, 450 F.2d at 657, states:
The Commission's and intervenors' argument might be somewhat stronger if
it were designed to support a partial ban on editorial advertising concerning
issues and views which have in fact been substantially aired on normal
programming time.
The court's footnote to this sentence says, however, that even then, "the special attributes
of editorial advertising would not be eliminated by the broadcaster's own coverage."
329 These principles are discussed in text accompanying notes 120- 130 supra.
330 Cf. Johnson & Westen, supra note 12, at 628 n. 234.
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3. Broadcaster Review and Control of Accessee Program-
ming-The very concept of access rests on the assumption that
each accessee will be entitled to determine the substance of the
material he will present. However, the "reasonable regulation" to
which the right of access is subject will give broadcasters and the
FCC an opportunity to review and to exercise carefully defined
control over the content of accessee programming. 331 Of course,
such control would not extend so far as to enable a broadcaster or
the FCC to require that the content of an individual accessee's
program or announcement comply with the relative component of
the fairness doctrine. Rather, the requirements of the relative
component should be met by balanced selection from among
potential accessees, plus necessary supplementary broadcaster
programming.
Where programming is submitted in advance in the form of a
script or on tape or film, the logistics of review and control will be
relatively simple. Live presentation will present greater problems,
which broadcasters might solve by taping in advance. Within his
capabilities, the broadcaster has an obvious duty to prevent ac-
cessees from broadcasting material that violates valid criminal
statutes. Thus, broadcasters must abide by the federal statutory
prohibitions against profanity and obscenity,332 lotteries, fraud,
31 While the circuit court's discussion in BEM is concerned primarily with scheduling
of editorial advertising, it admits of some broadcaster involvement in the preparation and
editing of advertisements and specifies that reasonable regulations may determine manner
of speech, in addition to time and place. 450 F.2d at 663.
332 Federal law prohibits the utterance of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language
by means of radio communication .. " 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970).
Relying upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (197 1), the FCC has suggested that recognition of the right of access to the broadcast
media would require that all constitutionally protected speech be allowed such access, thus
negating current federal prohibitions against the broadcasting of profanity and obscenity.
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en banc at 7, Business Executives'
Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 197 1). This fear is not justified.
A principal element of the Cohen case was the lack of specificity of the California statute
under which the defendant was convicted. The Court intimated that a more particularized
statute, supported by more compelling reasons, would pass constitutional muster. 403 U.S.
at 26.
The federal statutes in question are much more specific than the California statute at
issue in Cohen. They apply to a narrower set of circumstances and rely upon terms with
readily ascertainable meanings. See, e.g., H. WENTWORTH & S. FLEXMER, DICTIONARY
OF AMERICAN SLANG (1960), identifying offensive words with the euphemism "taboo,"
explained id. at xvi. Surely, if circulation of particular photographs can be banned as
obscene. United States v. fhirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), United
States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 357 (1971), without threatening the expression of popular
ideas, it is hardly reasonable to castigate more limited attempts to protect members of the
public against offensive words on the ground that "government might soon seize upon the
censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopu-
lar views," Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971), particularly when independently
compiled scholarly compendia exist against which any such government action can be
measured.
Furthermore, the federal statutes are supported by the compelling need to protect
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and so fortha333 The standards they enforce should be consistent
with their own practices. For example, if a broadcaster has custo-
marily relaxed prohibitions against certain profane words during
those portions of the late evening when younger children are not
expected to be watching, presumably an accessee would be en-
titled to the same relaxation for editorial advertising scheduled to
appear only during those times. 3 3 4
When reviewing accessee material, broadcasters will no doubt
look upon defamation as the most serious problem. In Farmers
Educational and Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY,
Inc.,3 3 5 the Supreme Court held a broadcaster not liable for a
political candidate's broadcast containing defamatory statements
because section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 prohibit-
ed the broadcasters from censoring the broadcast. Unless this
ruling is extended to protect broadcasters against liability for the
broadcast of defamatory material prepared by accessees, the
broadcaster may be held liable for his accessee's defamation be-
cause he published the defamation and gave it wide currency
throughout a local broadcast area or the entire nation.33 6 How-
privacy in the home. Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970). Admit-
tedly, total prohibition of obscene and profane language denies willing adults the opportu-
nity to receive "adult" programming. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 598
(1963). However, there is a significant difference between the sale of books in bookstores
and the ordinary use of the radio or television receiver in the home. While adults can
protect their own privacy by "flipping the dial," they cannot be expected to hover around
the receiver to do the same while their children are viewing or listening. In view of the
relatively unrestricted use of radio and television by children in the home, the interest of
Congress in protecting the individual right of privacy against offensive broadcast program-
ming is very strong. Even the United States Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
recommended that legislation should "aid parents in controlling the access of their children
to [explicit sexual] materials during their formative years," THE REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 57 (1970), and the Supreme Court has ruled such
legislation to be constitutional. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
3 See note 33 supra.
334 Cable television may someday provide "adult" programming through a locked chan-
nel technology that would enable more effective protection against unwanted programming
than present broadcast receiver technology permits. Note, Cable Television and the First
Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1008, 1034 (1971). See also note 363 infra.
335 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
336 The unsettled state of the relationship between defamation law and the first amend-
ment makes it difficult to predict whether WDAY will be so extended. While broadcasters
are expressly prohibited from censoring the material broadcast by a candidate for political
office during the exercise of his equal opportunity [47 U.S.C. § 3 15(a) (1970)], no such
express prohibition exists with respect to one who is exercising his right of access. The
right of access itself is subject to "reasonable regulation"; therefore, it is not clear at this
time that the first amendment itself prohibits the licensee from "reasonably censoring" an
accessee's materials to prevent defamation, or at least the types of defamation which are
still actionable under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 354 (1964), and its
progeny. For a recent review of these cases, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29,
30(1971).
The FCC has prohibited cable television operators from censoring material presented
by accessees to public access channels or lessees of leased channels, except to a minimal
extent not including the prevention of defamation. See text accompanying notes 375-376
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ever, if broadcasters attempt to exercise a power of review so
conservatively as to prevent any possibility of liability for defama-
tion, there would be little opportunity to satisfy the mandate that
"debate on public issues.., be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open."33 7
The FCC could help broadcasters solve this dilemma. First,
the FCC should attempt to provide guidance to licensees on the
current limits of constitutionally actionable defamation. Such
guidance written expressly for broadcasters would facilitate in-
telligent broadcaster screening of accessee material and selection
of those items that reasonably merit the attention and advice of
counsel.
Second, the FCC should promulgate regulations on broadcaster
procedures for review of accessee material. With its expert knowl-
edge and understanding of the practical problems of operating a
broadcast station or network, the FCC can indicate the standard
of care to be practiced by broadcasters in their review of material
for possible defamation. In particular, the FCC should determine
how far in advance filmed or taped materials must be submitted
for review. Without such standards, some broadcasters may re-
quire so long an advance that protected expression would be
chilled and a court tempted to hold an advance review require-
ment unconstitutional.338 Where advance review is not possible, a
broadcaster should not be expected to anticipate the occurrence
of defamation, particularly on a live program during which ac-
cessees spontaneously present their views.339
Third, the FCC should establish regulations governing broad-
caster response to complaints that broadcast accessee material
was defamatory. These regulations might expressly apply the
infra. In its accompanying report, the FCC stated that "state law imposing liability on a
system that has no control over these channels may unconstitutionally frustrate Federal
purposes," but admits that "the matter is of course one for resolution by the courts." 37
Fed. Reg. 3271 (1972). Presumably the damages that will be involved, if the FCC is
wrong, will be relatively small, because each cable television system reaches a relatively
small audience; therefore, cable television is an appropriate vehicle for experimentation.
But the audiences reached by network television are much larger, and the FCC may wish
to wait before applying the same approach to access to the conventional broadcast media,
until either a successful court test of the insulating value of the no-censoring regulation or
enactment of clarifying federal (or uniform state) legislation occurs.
337 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Court elimination of, or
limitation upon, review of accessee material for defamatory content would not necessarily
result in a simultaneous elimination or limitation of licensee liability. In WDAY, four
members of the Court felt that such a limitation of liability was not constitutionally
required, but was merely a question for state courts and'legislatures to decide. 360 U.S.
535.
33 8 Cf. Robinson v. Coopwood, 292 F.Supp. 926 (N.D. Miss. 1968), aff'd per curiam,
415 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1969).
339 While the FCC has held that a broadcaster may, in good faith, terminate a live
interview because it was appearing to become libelous, The NBC "Today" Program etc.,
31 F.C.C.2d 847 (1971), the transcript accompanying the holding, 31 F.C.C.2d at
850-852, shows how difficult an on-the-spot decision may be.
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personal attack rules and require priority in the availability of
access time for the defamed person's exercise of a right of
reply. 340 In those more serious situations requiring after-the-
broadcast investigation of an accessee's material, FCC regu-
lations might encourage the broadcaster to make the inquiry and
to issue a public statement of its findings. This procedure might
reduce the damage caused by an accessee's broadcast of factual
error.
Fourth, the FCC should develop a proposed uniform state law
limiting, or eliminating, the liability of a broadcaster who has
complied with the FCC's regulations. Limitation to actual eco-
nomic damages 341 might be the most socially desirable policy.
With damages so limited, broadcasters should be able to afford the
necessary insurance premiums - a burden broadcasters are better
able to bear than most persons who are defamed. Indeed, imple-
mentation of the first three recommendations above, when
coupled with the present scope of the first amendment privilege
may be sufficient to keep premiums low.
The FCC has found that prompt action is necessary to handle
the equal opportunities complaints of candidates for public office
under section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934,342 and
an analogous complaint procedure could undoubtedly be set up
for complaints following broadcaster refusals of access, partic-
ularly when time has been sold but accessee material rejected. If a
particular broadcaster appeared to be the cause of an excessive
number of complaints, the FCC should adopt the policy of in-
vestigating the basis for the complaints when the broadcaster's
license is up for renewal. Announcement of such a policy would
tend to keep the FCC's Complaints and Compliance Division
from receiving a complaint every time an accessee's material
causes a broadcaster the slightest concern.
Broadcasters may find it necessary to offer free time for re-
sponse to a personal attack made by an accessee. 3' Rather than
340 Mr. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29
(1971) said that: "If the States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond
adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring their
ability to respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public concern."
Id. at 47.
To the extent that FCC regulations ensure the ability of an allegedly defamed person to
respond, presumably they will tend to forestall the states from substituting a more drastic
and expensive remedy against broadcasters.
341 See Mr. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 78.
34247 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970); FCC, Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for
Public Office, 19 P&F RADIO REG.2d 1913, 1916- 17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FCC
Public Notice].
343 Such a requirement now applies if a candidate for public office, exercising his
uncensorable right to equal opportunity, makes a personal attack on a person other than
another candidate, his authorized spokesman or one otherwise associated with his cam-
paign. Id. at 1954-55.
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have a dispute each time a broadcaster fears that an accessee's
material contains a personal attack on someone else, it might be
much simpler to allow the broadcaster to protect himself by
inserting a clause in his contract with the accessee that would
require the accessee to pay for such free time as the broadcaster
may have to offer in response to any personal attack made by the
accessee.
344
The sensitivity of broadcasters to criticism, threats, or other
negative reactions from persons who object to their broadcasting
of controversial material has been explained above. 345 The FCC
should develop a standard form disclaimer to be used by broad-
casters in editorial advertisements.3 46 For television, the FCC
might wish to designate a standard symbol to appear on the screen
from time to time to indicate that the material being broadcast is
accessee material for which the broadcaster is not responsible. An
occasional tone might convey the same message on radio. The
broadcasters could also prepare and broadcast programs explain-
ing the right of access and the broadcaster's limited role in its
exercise as a means of educating the public. The public attitudes
that tend to reinforce the dragon's reluctance might then be miti-
gated.
344 It may be argued that such a provision would chill expression by accessees. How-
ever, the fihancial threat involved is quite distinguishable from that associated with general
damages in an action for defamation, see note 341 supra, and FCC Public Notice, 19 P&F
RADIO REG.2d at 1954-56, and is ordinarily not particularly serious. To the extent that the
presence of such a clause would tend to inhibit expression, even though not seriously
jeopardizing the finances of the accessee, it would nevertheless be protecting an important
interest: the interest of the government in protecting the reputation of its citizens against
unwarranted attack. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 48-49, 78 (197 1).
Such a contract would also contain an arbitration clause to settle differences between
the broadcaster and the accessee; if the arbitrators so determined, the licensee would make
reply time immediately available at the original accessee's expense. If the arbitrators ruled
against the person demanding reply time, he, as a third party, would still have the
opportunity to file a complaint with the FCC. The contract could also provide that if the
FCC ruled in favor of the complainant, the original accessee would still be required to pay
the costs involved. In handling such a complaint, the FCC should of course permit
intervention by the accessee, the real party in interest.
In Metromedia, Inc., 23 P&F RADIO REG.2d 610, 614-15 (Jan. 12, 1972), the FCC
indicated its disapproval of a condition in a licensee offer to give reply time prohibiting the
offeree's program from containing "any 'personal attack' as defined by the FCC." The
clause suggested herein would, of course, not require an accessee to promise that he would
make no personal attack. Furthermore, the reply in Metromedia was to be to licensee-
originated programming, not to programming originated by som person independent of the
licensee.
345 Text accompanying notes 32-42, 28 1-289 supra.
346 In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, 68 Cal.2d 5 I, 434 P.2d 982, 64
Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967), the defendant transit district had contended that riders might be led
to believe it endorsed the views expressed in its buses by editorial advertisers. In rejecting
that contention, the court said the transit district could require that editorial advertise-
ments include a disclaimer, in accordance with its existing practice for those political
advertisements which it had been carrying.
Note that a disclaimer of accessee material may protect a broadcaster against adverse
public reaction arising from the accessee's controversial message, while broadcasting of
that message can count toward fulfillment of his fairness doctrine obligations.
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4. Broadcaster Assistance to Accessees Unable to Prepare
Programming to Professional Standards-A number of organ-
izations and wealthy individuals will be able to prepare program-
ming that will effectively express their views over the broadcast
media. Others will nervously appear during time allocated by the
broadcaster on a local channel or on the public access channel of
their local cable television system and express their opinions to
whomever may be watching. Clearly, the average private citizen
will not be able to use the medium as effectively as will those who
can afford professionally prepared spot announcements of pro-
grams.3 47 Broadcasters and the FCC should explore a variety of
alternatives to minimize the effect of any monetary disparities.
A first alternative would be to enforce the relative component
of the fairness doctrine.3 48 If a controversial issue of public impor-
tance is the subject of editorial advertising, but one or more
viewpoints are not being presented, under the relative component
of the fairness doctrine the responsible broadcasters would have
to seek out an appropriate spokesman for each viewpoint and give
him reasonable air time to express his view. This approach is
better than a totally one-sided presentation, but the format for
expression may be little more effective than an appearance on a
public access channel or a letter to the editor in a newspaper. An
additional problem is that if the broadcaster himself produces the
program, he may have difficulty disassociating himself from the
views expressed.
One resolution of the problem of the spokesman who cannot
afford professionally prepared programming is for the licensee to
give him a partial or total grant from a fund accumulated from
broadcaster revenues or some other source prescribed by the
FCC. The accessee with little or no funds would be able to have
his own announcement or program produced professionally, and
the broadcaster, since he did not personally produce the material,
could disassociate himself from it. To avoid any connection of the
broadcaster in the public mind with the program, the broadcaster
could insulate himself further by establishing a committee of
prominent citizens to disburse the funds set aside for this purpose.
The broadcaster might prefer to establish such a committee and
then allow the committee to use the broadcaster's facilities for
producing programs presenting the view of those accessees who
cannot themselves afford to engage in professional production.
This practice would be analogous to the "Common Carrier," a
347 Cf. Seldes, supra note 61; note 62 and accompanying text supra.
348 Discussion of the relative component appears in text accompanying notes 323-326
supra.
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fe, ture recently established by the Salt Lake Tribune as a forum
foi public expression of opinion. 349 In addition to providing space
for statements longer than those ordinarily appearing in the letters
to the editor column, the feature operates under the supervision of
a lay board of editors acting independently of the Tribune staff,
and provides professional journalistic assistance to those whose
ideas are selected by the lay board for publication. 350 Since broad-
cast production costs are no doubt higher than the costs of em-
ploying a journalist to prepare a feature column in a newspaper, it
might be appropriate for the committee to expect partial payment
of production expenses by accessees who can afford it.
Finally, the FCC might wish to allow broadcasters to ex-
periment with the employment of several professional broadcast
journalists to act as conduits for expression of public opinion
during access time. If several journalists with differing viewpoints
were employed, each member of the public could communicate
with the one who appeared closest to his views. 35' Some mem-
349 The feature was announced in the Salt Lake Tribune of Aug. 1, 1970. A typical
edit0-'s note accompanying the feature, after further identifying the author and the article's
purpose, states:
Views expressed in "Common Carrier" do not necessarily reflect those of
the "Common Carrier" board of editors or The Tribune.
The public is urged to submit articles to "Common Carrier." Articles
should be short, promote dialogue and should pertain to the political, social
or economic well-being of the Intermountain Area. Articles need not be
expertly written.
A lay board of editors reviews the statements and either recommends them
for publication in The Tribune or rejects them. This board works in-
dependently of Tribune reportorial and editorial policies.
Mail your articles, along with a return address and phone number, to
"Common Carrier," The Salt Lake Tribune, Box 867, Salt Lake City, Utah
84110.
The Salt Lake Tribune, Nov. 28, 1971, at lOB.
The origins of the feature have been explained as follows:
[T]he idea suggested itself during the fight over the Newspaper Preservation
Act, which brought forth much criticism of the monopoly that is the average
ownership situation of newspapers in the United States. Despite the fact that
economic pressures have brought this situation to all but 39 towns in Amer-
ica, certain segments of the public are inclined to blame surviving publishers
for being alone in the field.
Howsoever a monopoly situation [arises] it is our feeling that today's
newspaper must respect the fact that it is probably the only newspaper going
into most homes it serves and it, therefore, should be truly a common carrier
of ideas for all of its readers and all groups and schools of thought within the
area it serves.
Letter from J. W. Gallivan, Publisher, Salt Lake Tribune, to Donald B. Holbrook, Esq.,
Dec. 22, 1971, in the author's files.
350 Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 16, 1970 (request for nominations); id., Oct. 25, 1970
(board of editors announced).
351 Since these journalists would be using access time repeatedly, they would have an
opportunity not available to the average accessee. Each should be allowed to retain his
opportunity only if he is effectively expressing the views of some portion of the public; his
performance could be measured by public opinion survey.
See also F. FRIENDLY, supra note 38, at 96; E. EFRON, supra note 9, at 210- 14.
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bers of the public might prefer to entrust expression of their
viewpoints to professionals rather than face the camera them-
selves. If none of the regular staff feels capable of expressing a
particular viewpoint, and its source cannot afford competently
produced editorial advertising, a guest, a professional, or a promi-
nent person might be invited to speak for that viewpoint.
Such a panel of journalists should have a defined opportunity to
employ the resources of the news-gathering department. While a
broadcaster may properly wish to deny a congressional in-
vestigating committee access to the films it has not broadcast, it
should be willing to make such films available to professional
journalists as aids to their presentations. It also should allow such
professionals to have a specified amount of a film crew's time to
cover events omitted by the regular news department. If a regular
news department, because of time restrictions or for other rea-
sons, edits out a fact that is important to the support of a particu-
lar viewpoint, the journalist called upon to express that viewpoint
should have the opportunity to show the omitted materials dem-
onstrating that fact or have the fact recorded by a film crew.3 52
These proposals are not suggested as substitutes for ac-
cessee-originated editorial advertising; rather, they should aug-
ment accessee-produced programming to reflect the full spectrum
of viewpoints on public issues.
E. New Promise for the Dragon:
Cable Television
The subject of cable television has been thoroughly covered in
recent literature,353 often accompanied by access-oriented recom-
mendations for regulatory action. Recent FCC regulations now
3 5 2See generally STAFF OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT ON TELEVISION COV-
ERAGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. 1968 (1969).
The report is critical of the networks' selection and editing of material to be broadcast.
Whether or not one agrees with the report's conclusion that "the significant outtakes
[material gathered but not broadcast] contained a predominant amount of material which
would have been unfavorable to the demonstrators," id. at 14, the existence of differing
views on what should 2hjave been broadcast supports the need for pluralistic review and
selection from filmr -Aiid tapes made in the field. Surely, it would be better to allow the
public to judge events for itself with the aid of materials selected from differing per-
spectives, than to have the public rely upon government to ensure "objective" network
journalism.
See also, Roberts, supra note 15, at 379-83, emphasizing the importance of the news
media's selection process upon the typical citizen's view of reality. For example, it is
argued that the first riots in urban ghettos in the late 1960's took the public by surprise
because the media did not cover ghetto conditions prior to the riots.
35 See, e.g., Note, Cable Television and the First Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
1008 (197 1): Note, Common Carrier CA TV: Problens and Proposals, 37 BROOK, L. REV.
533 (1971 ), and other materials cited herein.
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provide for access to many cable television systems. 35 4 Before
describing these regulations, however, the applicability of the first
amendment right of access to cable television will be briefly
considered.
Cable television systems are sufficiently engaged in serving the
public interest to be regulated by the states as public utilities,355
as well as by the FCC.3 56 While the FCC has shunned direct
control of rates, 3 5 7 it has now required local control of them.358
Furthermore, it will exercise limited control over entry359 and will
continue to exercise rather extensive control over many cable
television practices. 3 60 Therefore, it seems clear that the actions
of cable television system operators in providing cable television
service under governmental regulation is as much "state ac-
tion"-either public or governmental action-as the action of a
privately owned transit system operating under the regulation of a
public utilities commission.36 1 Since it is not agent action, the
problem of managerial control over cable television programming
does not arise,3 62 and the cable television operator should have at
least the same personal freedom of expression that broadcasters
enjoy. If the FCC adopts a "locked channel" regulation, per-
mitting the installation of tuning devices that would enable parents
to prevent their children from tuning to selected channels, the
operator will have greater freedom of expression than a broadcast
licensee.363
114 37 Fed. Reg. 3252, 3269-72 (1972); 37 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1972) (to be codified as 47
C.F.R. § 76.25 1). See also FCC, Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Tele-
vision, 31 F.C.C.2d 115, 128-133 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Cable TV Proposals].
These new rules are subject to modification in response to petitions for rehearing. 47
C.F.R. § 1.106 (1971); 37 Fed. Reg. 3277, para. 190 (1972).
55 TV Pix. Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F.Supp. 459 (1968), affd mem., 396 U.S. 556 (1970);
Ill. Commerce Comm. Investigation of Cable Television and Other Forms of Broadband
Cable Communications in the State of Illinois, 22 P&F RADIO REG.2d 2192 (1971), and
other authorities cited therein.
However, it appears that states are now prohibited from regulating cable television rates
at more than one level of state government, although implementation of the prohibition will
be gradual for existing systems. Specifically, the new regulations require new systems
immediately, and existing systems gradually, to obtain certificates of compliance from the
FCC, after showing inter alia that rates have been approved or specified by the franchising
authority. 37 Fed. Reg. 3281 (1972) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.31). See also 37
Fed. Reg. 3275 (1972), noting cable operator opposition to three-tiered government
regulation, particularly the state tier.
356 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
317 37 Fed. Reg. 3276 (1972). See also Cable TV Proposals, 31 F.C.C.2d 138 (1971).
358 37 Fed. Reg. 3281 (1972) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.3 1).
-59 37 Fed. Reg. 3268 (1972), Fed. Reg. 3280 (1972) to be codified in 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.11). See Also Cable TV Proposals, 31 F.C.C.2d at 125- 26.
360 Id. passim.
361 Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
362 Agent action is discussed in text accompanying notes 213-219 supra.
363 37 Fed. Reg. 3271 (1972). Note, Cable Television and the First Amendment, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 1008, 1034-35 (1971). See also Cable TV Proposals, 31 F.C.C.2d at
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Since the action of a cable television operator is state action, he
is constitutionally required to honor a person's first amendment
right of access. Whether in response to the right of access cases or
in response to many suggestions that cable television should be
treated as a common carrier,36 4 the FCC's regulations now pro-
vide for access to many cable television systems. 65 Affected
systems must "maintain at least one specially designated, non-
commercial public access channel available on a first-come, non-
discriminatory basis." 36 6 To avoid unreasonable economic burden
on cable systems, cable operators will be allowed to charge ac-
cessees for production costs for live studio presentations ex-
ceeding five minutes; however, except for production costs, ac-
cess to the public access channel is to be free. 367 Since accessees
may cablecast films and videotapes produced elsewhere, the pub-
lic access channel should fully satisfy the right of access of in-
dividuals and groups who can afford professional production ex-
penses; the proposal may not be sufficient for those who are less
well endowed. 368
In addition to the public access channel, cable system operators
will be required to lease their nonbroadcast channels on a
13 1. The equipment for locking certain channels would be furnished by the CATV system
operator. Ideally, a subscriber should have at least three options: 1) a device with no lock
through which any channel might be tuned; 2) a device with a lock that, when locked,
would prevent the signals of certain channels from reaching the receiver; 3) a device that
would always prevent the signals of certain channels from reaching the receiver.
While the FCC proposes to study a device that would lock off all public access and
leased channels, it should allow channel lessees who wish to appeal to larger audiences to
accept the burdens of full compliance with the standards applicable to broadcasters and
avoid being lumped together with those channels subject to being locked off.
364See, e.g., Note, Common Carrier CA TV: Problems and Proposals, 37 BROOK. L.
REV. 533 (1971), and proposals cited therein, id. 533 n. 5.
365 Note 354 supra. The access regulation will apply to all cable television systems
commencing operations within the top 100 market areas. See 37 Fed. Reg. 3278, 3281
(1972) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.5, 76.51). Every existing cable system within the
top 100 market areas must comply on or before March 3 1, 1977, or at such earlier time as
it adds another broadcast television signal to its system. 37 Fed. Reg. 3289-90 (1972) (to
be codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(c)). Cable television systems outside the top 100
market areas may be required by local government to provide access, and minimum
standards are made applicable to any access programming offered voluntarily or by local
requirement. 37 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1972) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.25 l(b) ).
Cable system operators are to implement, and elaborate, the FCC's access rules through
establishment of operating rules. 37 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1972) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.25 1(a)(1 1)); 37 Fed. Reg. 3271 (1972).
3" 37 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1972) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.25 1(a)(4) ); 37 Fed. Reg.
3270 (1972). See also Cable TV Proposals, 31 F.C.C.2d at 130.
367 37 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1972) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.25 1(a)(4) and (10)(ii));
37 Fed. Reg. 3270 (1972). See also Cable TV Proposals, 31 F.C.C.2d at 130.
368 The FCC has endeavored to assist those less well endowed by exempting
non-broadcast channels, including access channels, from its technical standards, thereby
allowing accessee use of less expensive production technology. 37 Fed. Reg. 3271-72
(1972). The question remains, however, whether the conditioning acquired from watching
professionlly produced broadcast programming will unconsciously bias viewers against
ideas presented with poor quality production techniques.
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first-come, nondiscriminatory basis. 369 As leasing or other non-
broadcast uses take up most of the available channel capacity,
operators will be required to make additional channels oper-
ational. 370 The length or repetitiveness of programming that will
require a person to lease channel space, rather than use the access
channel, is not specified in the FCC's regulations; rather, cable
operators will be able to define eligibility for use of the public
access channel in their operating rules.37'
The FCC's regulations do not allow a cable system operator to
exercise the degree of control over apportionment of time be-
tween applicants or over accessee program content suggested
above for conventional broadcasting access time.372 Of course,
much more access time will be available on the cable operator's
public access channel alone than any individual broadcast licensee
can provide. Additional cable time may be leased, and channel
capacity is to be increased as demand increases. 373 Consequently,
there should be no concern that demand for access will sig-
nificantly exceed the supply of cable television time3 74 and there
is no need for an elaborate time apportionment system guided by
the relative component of the fairness doctrine.
The FCC has restricted the authority of a cable system oper-
ator to exclude or prevent material from being cablecast over a
public access or leased channel. 375 In particular, he may not
exclude material on the ground that it is defamatory.376 The
courts may extend WDAY 3 77 to protect cable operators from
liability for actionable defamation committed by an accessee or
lessee, because the FCC regulations prohibit the operators from
369 37 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1972) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.25 l(a)(7) and (I 1)(iii) );
37 Fed. Reg. 3270 (1972).
37037 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1972) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a)(8) ); 37 Fed.
Reg. 3270 (1972).
371 37 Fed. Reg. 3271 (1972); 37 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1972) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.251(1 1)(i) and (iii) ).
372 See text accompanying notes 298- 346 supra.
373 Note 370 supra.
374 In New York City, supply of cable television public access time currently exceeds
demand by a considerable margin. See note 3 17 supra.
375 The cable operator must establish rules for leased and public access channels
prohibiting the presentation of lottery information and obscene or indecent matter. In
addition, his rules must prohibit presentation of any advertising material designed to
promote the sale of commercial products or services (including advertising by or on behalf
of candidates for public office) over any public access channel, and require identification of
sponsored programming appearing on a leased channel. 37 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1972) (to be
codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(1 l)(i) and (iii)); 37 Fed. Reg. 3271 (1972). However,
the cable system operator may exercise no additional control over program content beyond
that which he is required to exercise. 37 Fed. Reg. 3289 (1972) (to be codified in 47
C.F.R. § 76.25 1(a)(9)); 37 Fed. Reg. 3271 (1972). See also Cable TV Proposals, 31
F.C.C.2d at 131. 132.
376 37 Fed. Reg. 3271 (1972). See also Cable TV Proposals, 31 F.C.C.2d at 130- 33.377 See note 335 and accompanying text. See also 37 Fed. Reg. 3271 (1972).
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screening out defamatory material. In that event, the victim of
such defamation will be in a worse position than one who has
been defamed over the conventional broadcast media. The FCC
has wisely distinguished between the cable system operator's
origination channel on the one hand and public access and leased
channels on the other in applying the fairness doctrine and the
equal opportunities requirement. However, the distinction is ex-
tensive-the fairness doctrine and equal opportunities require-
ments are not imposed upon public access and leased channels at
all.3 78 The victim of such defamation or personal attack will have
to pay for the opportunity to respond unless a five minute live
presentation over the public access channel will suffice. Such a
result does not seem consistent with the most recent Supreme
Court opinion on the subject. 379 Potential victims might better be
protected by a contract provision between the cable operator and
lessees and those accessees presenting more than a five minute
live presentation, providing for the latter to pay the cost of reply
time,3 80 and a regulation applying the personal attack principle of
the fairness doctrine to their presentations. A lessee appearing at
regularly scheduled times should also be required to announce the
time and channel of the reply to his prior personal attack.
The FCC has emphasized the experimental nature of its pro-
posals for cable television. 381 It might wish to add to the ex-
periment a system of insurance, perhaps modeled after workman's
compensation, to reimburse the actual damages sustained by a
victim of a defamatory cablecast. In the process of protecting the
media against the potentially crippling effect of large awards of
general or exemplary damages, the courts have apparently lost
sight of the victim of defamation who suffers actual economic
damages.3 82 Presumably, the media are in the best position to
support a system of insurance to cover these costs. The FCC is in
a unique position to seek an alternative to the present failure of
the judicial system to protect the unavoidable few who are
financially harmed by the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
debate that is necessary to fuel and sustain the marketplace of
ideas.
378 37 Fed. Reg. 3272 (1972). For their application to origination programming, see 37
Fed. Reg. 3287-88 (1972) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, 76.209).
379 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 47 n. 15 (1971) and the dissenting
opinions thereto. See also note 126 supra.
380 This is analogous to the agreement suggested in note 344 supra.
381 37 Fed. Reg. 3271 (1972).
382 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971), particularly Mr. Justice Mar-
shall's dissent at 78; Note, The End of the Line: Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 31 U. PITT.
L. REV. 734 (1970).
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V. PARTING SHOTS AT THE DRAGON'S RELUCTANCE
The more a network controls through direct production or
participation in production the material it provides its affiliates,
the greater the opportunity for advertiser and informal govern-
mental pressures to reduce the flow of controversial ideas over
the broadcast media.38 3 In 1957 roughly two-thirds of television
network evening prime time programming was controlled by the
networks; by 1968, the proportion of network controlled produc-
tion had risen to almost 97 percent.38 4 The FCC, quite reasonably
disturbed by this trend, has adopted rules requiring that in addi-
tion to the half-hour of local news programming during or just
before prime time hours, another hald-hour of each licensee's
evening programming shall be obrained from some source other
than network origination.385 The network norm during the four
hours of evening prime time was three and one-half hours; under
the new rules, the networks are limited to three hours per evening,
with exceptions for network coverage of fast-breaking news
events and political broadcasts.38 6 Time will be required to deter-
mine how beneficial the new rules will be, but anything that
encourages the growth of independent production companies has
the potential for decreasing the dragon's reluctance. The FCC has
also prohibited the issuance of a new license that would result in
one person or entity owning both a VHF television station and a
radio station, AM or FM.38 7 Simultaneously with the issuance of
this regulation, the FCC proposed a rule that would require di-
vestiture to reduce common holdings in one market to one or
more daily newspapers or one television broadcast station, or one
AM-FM combination.388 The competition that would result from
reduction of media concentration within individual markets could
stimulate the dragon.
The FCC receives complaints from the public concerning pro-
grams originated locally or nationally. It selects some of these
letters and forwards them to the concerned licensee, demanding
that a letter of explanation be prepared within twenty or some-
times ten days.38 9 No doubt, some of the letters describe practices
for which some explanation is needed, but it is hard to believe that
383 See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
384 Prime Time Access Rules, 23 F.C.C.2d at 389.
385 Id. at 384. The rule is limited to licensees in the top fifty markets, but the effect
applies to all if the networks simply decide, as they apparently have, not to originate
material at all for that half-hour.
386 Id.; 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1971).
387 FCC, Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22
F.C.C.2d 306 (1970), modified, 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971).
388 Id. 22 F.C.C.2d 339, 346 (1970).
389 Kalven, supra note 24, at 21-23; Cronkite, supra note 29.
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some of the letters of complaint are prompted by anything more
than the viewer's ire over the controversiality of a program in
which a broadcaster is attempting to adhere to the marketplace of
ideas concept. Under these circumstances, a federal demand that
a broadcaster "explain" his action carries with it a certain aura of
intimidation that is inconsistent with the spirit of the first amend-
ment.39
0
It is unlikely that such intimidation is actually intended; more
likely, it is the result of public and financial pressures upon the
FCC. Federal agencies, themselves servants of the people, ordi-
narily attempt to respond to letters from the public. Naturally, it is
less expensive for the FCC to pass complaints on to licensees
than it is to explain the first amendment to each correspondent
individually. Nonetheless, when the FCC passes on letters that
complain about nothing more than the fact that the broadcaster
has engaged in lawful protected expression,3 91 it is passing on
expenses of reply that should be funded out of the FCC's budget.
The act of forwarding such complaints amounts to a tax on
broadcasters that increases with the controversiality of the broad-
caster's programming. Thus viewed, the practice is analogous to a
tax on content of speech and appears to violate broadcasters' first
amendment rights.392
The FCC should also reform its complaint handling proce-
dures. With the aid of thoughtful comments from broadcasters,3 93
the FCC should establish procedures for distinguishing between
complaints concerning activities within the FCC's purview and
complaints directed solely at a broadcaster's free speechp 94 The
FCC should devise some othei means for answering the latter
type of complaint, perhaps a form letter and accompanying bro-
chure explaining the FCC's limited authority over programming
390 Cronkite, supra note 29. Monroe, supra note 24, at 268.
391 See the list of explicit prohibitions given in note 33 supra. To the extent that the
fairness doctrine or program balance requirements are relied upon as justification for
forwarding such letters of complaint, quaere whether the FCC has adopted an enforce-
ment procedure having an undue chilling effect upon broadcaster protected expression?
392 Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
393 Broadcasters have brought some of their problems upon themselves by failing to
isolate and complain about those FCC practices threatening their freedom to engage in
controversial expression. Kalven, supra note 24, at 24. Instead, they concentrate their
complaints upon regulatory actions threatening to decrease revenues while increasing the
expression of ideas over their media, e.g., Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v.
United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom, Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), or call for a total end to regulation, Cronkite, supra note 29,
at 20. From this set of priorities, one might infer that broadcasters would rather protect
profits than expression. See text accompanying notes 281- 284 supra.
394 If the present approach toward enforcing the relative component of the fairness
doctrine in effect renders the making of such a distinction impossible, the FCC should
modify its procedures to require significantly more particularized fairness doctrine com-
plaints, based upon a viewing of the broadcaster's programming over a specified period of
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and the philosophy behind the first amendment. The FCC might
then forward such letters to broadcasters who wanted to volun-
teer further comment. But such letters should not be put into
licensee files (except as evidence that a licensee is attempting to
meet the affirmative mandate of the first amendment) or be for-
warded with demands for "explanation." The FCC cannot, of
course, shield licensees from public pressure, but it should not use
its procedures to formalize or amplify pressures for conformity or
orthodoxy, except as they have been embodied in statutory law
prohibiting obscene and profane programming.
Networks themselves own licensed stations "which contribute
substantially to their profits and provide key support for their
news operations. . . . "95 The Citizens Communication Center 96
case, prohibiting favoritism to existing licensees at renewal time,
while commendable as applied to renewal of affiliates' or in-
dependents' licenses, may increase the vulnerability of networks
to informal threats by government officials. 397 Of course, such
pressures could not be applied if networks did not own licensed
stations. Thus, it is imperative that the FCC investigate the rela-
tionship between networks and their licensed stations. If the sta-
tions are not necessary to the economic health of the network or
to successful news or other program production, divestiture might
be a sound course for increasing network independence from
informal governmental pressure. If, on the other hand, the net-
works need their licensee stations to perform their services to
the public effectively, 398 the FCC should consider treating net-
work-owned stations somewhat differently from all others. One
approach would be to consider all licenses owned by a particular
licensee at the same time and require competing applicants to
compare their alternates with the entire range of operations of the
network. If a protestant showed that a network-owned station is
not sufficiently concerned with local issues, the FCC might first
issue a warning, then a suggestion that the license be sold, before
considering non-renewal. Finally, the FCC might require partial
time, and simply refuse to process complaints based upon the content of one show unless
some other more specific programming abuse is alleged. Of course, some of the complaints
about The Selling of the Pentagon were more specific, see note 150 supra, but those types
of complaints can readily be avoided by the adoption of editing practices that tell the
viewer what the editor is doing. See text accompanying notes 152- 154 supra.
395 Cronkite, supra note 29.
396 Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
397 Cronkite, supra note 29. For one ripple from his "stone in the pond," see Knoll,
supra note 89, at 18 (quoting Tricia Nixon).
Reportedly, the FCC delayed renewal of a CBS television station license pending
investigation of the CBS documentary Hunger in America. Sherrill, supra note 22, at 87.
See also text accompanying notes 28- 30 supra.
398 See Cronkite, supra note 29.
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divestiture, accompanied by acquisitions elsewhere to ensure that
each city is served by no more than one network-owned station,
and that local ownership in each market increases.
The suggestions in this part may do a little to help broadcasters
overcome their own reluctance to broadcast controversial mate-
rial. Like the absolute component of the fairness doctrine, any
success resulting from their implementation may be only partial.
The most significant restraint upon the dragon is not the govern-
ment, but the various informal manifestations of majoritarian
opinion that slow the circulation of all new or strange ideas. The
dragon's appetite for revenue makes it highly sensitive to these
informal pressures, and there is little reason to expect that its
reluctance would decrease measurably if government regulation
were lifted.
Thus, the principal hope of those who do wish to see the
broadcast media provide a marketplace for the full spectrum of
ideas must be the first amendment right of access. The right of
access must survive further court review before that hope can be
realized. 399 The Supreme Court has considered a number of cases
closely related to the issue of access to the mass media, but has
not yet decided a case requiring it to strike the balance between
the first amendment rights of the broadcast media, and the in-
dividual's right of expression in the context of our technological
age, in which the keys to the principal means of expression are in
so few hands. 400 The Court has been adapting constitutional im-
peratives to the demands of our modern society on many fronts,
and this general sensitivity, coupled with the access-oriented rea-
soning of Red Lion, give strong reason to believe that the Court
will not deny the public a right to reasonable access to the elec-
tronic media. 40 1 Assuming such a response by the Supreme Court,
the proponents of the right to access will still have to urge the
FCC to implement the right.
Some day after the dust of litigation has settled dedicated
accessees may be causing the dragon to belch forth great drafts of
fire and smoke. As technological advance brings us from national
village to global village,402 we may have mutual experiences, other
than beer and detergent commercials, to discuss, to share, and, as
seems appropriate, to act upon.
399 See note 13 supra.
400 However, in Red Lion the Court ruled on a case involving an individual's opportun-
ity to appear on a broadcast station to reply to a personal attack. But the FCC grounds the
personal attack principle in the public's right to be fully informed. Fairness Doctrine
Inquiry, 30 F.C.C.2d at 28.
401 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the BEM case. See note 12 supra.
402 M. McLUHAN & Q. FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE 63 (Paperback ed. 1967).
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